Aluminum Ore Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7995.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 7995.,7995.
• Citation: 131 F.2d 485
• Parties: ALUMINUM ORE CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

131 F.2d 485 (1942)

ALUMINUM ORE CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

No. 7995.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

November 30, 1942.

Bruce A. Campbell, of East St. Louis, Ill., and Frank B. Ingersoll, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert, of East St. Louis, Ill., Smith, Buchanan & Ingersoll, of Pittsburgh, Pa., of counsel), for petitioner.

Robert B. Watts and Ernest A. Gross, General Counsel National Labor Relations Board, Gerhard P. Van Arkel, Asst. General Counsel, and Frank J. Donner and Robert E. Mullin, all of Washington, D. C., and L. N. D. Wells, Jr., of St. Louis, Mo., for respondent.

Joseph A. Padway and Herbert S. Thatcher, both of Washington, D. C., for Intervenor.

Before SPARKS, and MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

This review involves the validity of an order of the National Labor Relations Board which petitioner seeks to have vacated and the Board, to have enforced. The complaint charged that, in a labor controversy between a union of its employees and petitioner, the latter "engaged in unfair labor practices" in that it refused to bargain collectively because it (1) "refused to make counterproposals"; (2) "by unilateral action took certain action as to wage increases although the union had requested collective bargaining concerning said matter" and (3) "withheld from said union, information as to pay rates which was necessary and basic to collective bargaining." The issue raised by the complaint and answer was as to the truth of these specific averments and the evidence submitted bore only upon that issue. Consequently we are confronted with the narrow question of whether petitioner, in its negotiations with the union, acted unilaterally and refused to furnish information it was bound, under the intent and purport of the act, to supply, thereby avoiding collective bargaining.

The relationship between petitioner and the union had been at all times serene and friendly. The employer had readily recognized the union as the authorized representative of its employees. It co-operated freely in various conferences in attempts to reach a satisfactory understanding. It bargained from time to time both before and after the complaint was filed. To nothing that occurred in these transactions is objection made, except that, in their course, a situation ultimately arose wherein petitioner claimed that any increase in wages should be determined by consideration of the individual members of the several separate groups included in the union, group by group. Quite reasonably, and with every indication of honest belief in justification of its position, it argued that, in view of its past record of increases, a flat horizontal increase to all members of the union in the same proportions or same amounts would work inequities, as the wages of some of the men had been raised comparatively recently and those of others had not. At first the union had insisted that its members be treated as a whole and that only a flat increase affecting any and all members in the same amount would furnish the proper standard. Thus, while the parties continued their negotiations, they reached an apparent impasse as to the proper approach to a solution of the issue between them. However, as the issue raised its head, near the end of the conferences, the union receded from its earlier position and announced that it would be willing to bargain upon the basis of consideration of the respective groups.¹

At this stage, it would have seemed and indeed it did seem to some of the interested parties that petitioner and its employees had met on a sound agreed basis for final bargaining. Unfortunately, however, the course of events thereafter changed. Petitioner, having this far bargained and conferred, declared that it would determine for itself what the wages and rates of pay should be, as it had for many years; that it was then making certain increases, (of which it advised the union); that these would stand until and unless there should be objection by any individual member and that, in such case, petitioner would permit any aggrieved person to present his complaint either personally or through the union. Thus, upon the apparent verge of complete successful bargaining, the company insisted upon following the plan it had pursued in the past of not bargaining but of fixing increases ex parte, leaving to hearings of future grievances, determination of whether any adjustment was justified. This attitude, manifestly, petitioner believed conformed with its statutory duty.

But, to our minds, this was not the collective bargaining required by the act. It was not the giving and taking in open discussion and negotiation contemplated by Congress. Rather it was reversion to the procedure of the past upon the part of...