Alvarado v. Schmidt

• Decision Date: 29 September 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 69-C-210.
• Parties: Tibursio and Maria ALVARADO, Mary Deleon, Agnes Hanson, Betty Hanson, Dolores Hill, and Corinne Rolo, individually and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wilbur J. SCHMIDT, individually and as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Franklin Walsh, individually and as Chairman of the Wisconsin Board of Health and Social Services, Joseph E. Baldwin, individually and as Director of the Milwaukee County Department of Public Welfare, and William F. O'Donnell, individually and as Chairman of the Milwaukee County Board of Public Welfare, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

317 F. Supp. 1027

Tibursio and Maria ALVARADO, Mary Deleon, Agnes Hanson, Betty Hanson, Dolores Hill, and Corinne Rolo, individually and on behalf of their minor children and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wilbur J. SCHMIDT, individually and as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Franklin Walsh, individually and as Chairman of the Wisconsin Board of Health and Social Services, Joseph E. Baldwin, individually and as Director of the Milwaukee County Department of Public Welfare, and William F. O'Donnell, individually and as Chairman of the Milwaukee County Board of Public Welfare, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 69-C-210.

United States District Court, W. D. Wisconsin.

September 29, 1970.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James A. Walrath, Richard M. Klein, Eric Schulenburg and Steven H. Steinglass, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., and Donald P. Johns, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants, Wilbur J. Schmidt and Franklin Walsh.

Robert P. Russell, Corporation Counsel and James J. O'Donnell, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants, Joseph E. Baldwin and William F. O'Donnell.

Before FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge, and DOYLE and REYNOLDS, District Judges.

OPINION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

This is an action challenging the reduction of AFDC welfare benefits in the State of Wisconsin on the grounds that the reductions are (1) unconstitutional because they unfairly discriminate against the recipients of the AFDC program, and (2) violate federal law.

Plaintiffs and their children receive grants under the Wisconsin Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program and bring this class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all persons who are elibigle for such grants. The defendants are officials of the State of Wisconsin and Milwaukee County and will hereinafter be referred to as the "state."

The statutes involved are:

1. Section 49.19(11) of the Wisconsin Statutes, enacted in August of 1969, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

"* * * during the 1969-71 fiscal biennium the state-wide average of money grants to persons on aid to families with dependent children, living with legally responsible relatives, shall not exceed 120% of the national average of such aid, as determined from federal statistics. * * *"

2. Section 402(a) (23), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23), (Supp. IV 1968) of the Federal Social Security Act of 1935, which was enacted on January 2, 1968, and provides:

"(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must * * * (23) provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted."

The plaintiffs challenge the validity of § 49.19(11) of the Wisconsin Statutes in that it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by reducing the level of benefits to AFDC recipients while maintaining previous benefit levels for recipients of the three other "categorical aid programs," i. e. Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Old Age Assistance.

Plaintiffs further challenge the validity of the state AFDC plan (adopted November 1, 1969, and amended on November 28, 1969—hereinafter referred to as the "November 1969 plan") which implements § 49.19(11) of the Wisconsin Statutes in that the plan violates § 402(a) (23) because (1) it establishes a "maximum" on the amount of aid paid which lowers the amount of benefits paid and is not related to the "standard of need," hereinafter described, and (2) the standard of need in the November 1969 plan does not comply with the standard of need requirements of § 402(a) (23). Specifically, in this regard, plaintiffs contend that under the November 1969 plan, the state has (a) lowered the standard of need by eliminating some items and limiting the availability of other items, (b) failed to make cost-of-living increases for all items formerly in the standard of need, (c) failed to implement a revised standard of need by July 1, 1969, and (d) failed to compute the cost-of-living increases over the correct period of time.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. They seek relief enjoining the operation of § 49.19(11) as implemented by the November 1969 plan and an award of retroactive payments of money grants wrongfully withheld pursuant to § 49.19(11) and the plan.

This action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. A hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was held, and the court, by its order dated September 23, 1969, denied that motion. On the same day, the district judge wrote to the chief judge of the court of appeals indicating that plaintiffs had made application for injunctive relief restraining the enforcement of a state statute on the ground that such statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the contentions of the plaintiffs were not frivolous or insubstantial. On September 25, 1969, a three-judge court was designated to hear and determine the action. The case was argued before the three-judge court on December 5, 1969.

We find for reasons set forth in part II that the present November 1969 plan does not fulfill the requirements of § 402(a) (23) of the Federal Social Security Act, and, therefore, it is unnecessary for us to consider the constitutional question.

I. JURISDICTION

We must consider the question of whether the plaintiffs are asserting the deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). In considering this question it is not necessary to decide whether there is a constitutional right to food, shelter, and other necessities of life. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), and Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F.Supp. 339, 346-347 (S.D. N.Y.1969), with Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 1969), and Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp. 1332, 1335 (N.D.Tex.1969). It is only necessary to note that the Supreme Court found jurisdiction over causes of action based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases where the right asserted is not distinguishable from the right asserted in this case. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312, n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).

In an action to enjoin enforcement of a state statute based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with jurisdiction claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4), where the rights, privileges, or immunities sought to be redressed are those secured by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a three-judge district court has jurisdiction only if the constitutional claim is not insubstantial. Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F.Supp. 409 (D.Conn.1969), aff'd per curiam 396 U.S. 5, 90 S.Ct. 25, 24 L.Ed.2d 5 (1969); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D.Conn.1969); Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967). The criterion of substantiality of the constitutional claim, as indicated by the Utica court, is found in the Supreme Court's statement:

"The lack of substantiality in a federal question may appear either because it is obviously without merit or because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this Court as to foreclose the subject." California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255, 58 S.Ct. 865, 867, 82 L.Ed. 1323 (1938).

Plaintiffs claim that the reduction in AFDC payments without a like reduction in payments to Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and Old Age Assistance program recipients is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We find that this claim is neither obviously without merit nor an issue foreclosed by prior Supreme Court decisions.

Two recent three-judge court decisions have considered at length very similar equal protection claims. Lampton v. Bonin, 299 F.Supp. 336 (E.D.La.1969), and Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp. 1332 (N.D.Tex.1969). While in both cases it was held that reductions in payments to AFDC recipients without commensurate reductions to other welfare recipients did not violate the equal protection clause, the fact that the courts found the equal protection claim to be not insubstantial for purposes of jurisdiction and discussed the issue at length is authority that the equal protection claim of plaintiffs in the instant case is not insubstantial. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Rosado found a similar equal protection claim to be not insubstantial for jurisdictional purposes. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' equal protection claim.¹

Having found that jurisdiction is proper over the constitutional issue, it must now be determined whether pendent jurisdiction is proper over the statutory claim and, if so, whether the court retains jurisdiction when it decides the case on the statutory claim and does not reach the constitutional issue.

It is well settled that once the jurisdiction of a federal district court has been properly invoked, the court acquires jurisdiction to decide all related claims arising out of the same transaction or dispute. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586, 77 L.Ed. 1148 (1933); Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F.Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y.1968). In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80, 80 S.Ct. 568, 4 L.Ed.2d 568 (1960), the court said that a properly convened three-judge district court has jurisdiction "over all claims" raised against a state statu...