Alvarado v. Sec'y, CASE NO. 8:10-cv-1365-T-23TGW
| Decision Date | 11 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 8:10-cv-1365-T-23TGW |
| Parties | NICHOLAS ALVARADO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Nicholas Alvarado petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his two state convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia, for which he serves nineteen years imprisonment. Alvarado alleges one ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and several grounds of trial court error. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit __") support the response. (Doc. 11)
In ground three Alvarado contends that the trial judge committed fundamental error and violated Alvarado's right to due process by replacing the word "charge" with the word "knowledge" in the standard jury instruction for trafficking in a controlled substance. Alvarado argues that the allegedly erroneous instructionrelieved the prosecution of its burden of proving an essential element of the charge. In ground four Alvarado alleges a due process violation resulting from an allegedly incomplete jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of (1) possession with intent to sell amphetamine and (2) possession of amphetamine.1 In ground five Alvarado contends that the cumulative effect of the erroneous jury instructions constituted fundamental error, depriving him of due process.
Alvarado presented each ground to the state court in his amended Rule 3.850 motion alleging only fundamental error under state law.2 His failure to present to thestate court a federal due process claim challenging a jury instruction renders each due process claim unexhausted. Before a federal court may grant habeas relief, a federal habeas petitioner must exhaust every available state court remedy for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), (C). "[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) () (citations omitted)). To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must present the state court with the particular legal basis for relief in addition to the facts supporting the claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) () (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). The prohibition against raising an unexhausted claim in federal court extends to both the broad legal theory of relief and the specific factual contention that supports relief. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).
The requirement that a federal habeas corpus petitioner exhaust available state court remedies as a prerequisite to federal review is satisfied if the petitioner "fairly presents" his claim in each appropriate state court, alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971). A petitioner must "do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record." McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted). A petitioner may raise a federal claim in state court "by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'" Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).
In his amended Rule 3.850 motion Alvarado failed to alert the state post-conviction court to a federal, substantive due process claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5-6 (1982) (). Alvarado's failure to present to the state post-conviction courtthe federal component of either ground three, ground four, or ground five deprived the state court of a "full and fair opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. Consequently, the exhaustion requirement remains unsatisfied, Henry, 513 U.S. at 365, and renders ground three, ground four, and ground five procedurally defaulted.
Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner "must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court." Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999). To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate not only that the errors at his trial created the possibility of prejudice but that the errors actually and substantially disadvantaged him and infected the entire trial with error of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). In other words, he must show at least a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
A petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, if review is necessary to correct afundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892; Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001). To meet this standard, a petitioner must show a reasonable likelihood of acquittal absent the constitutional error. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
Alvarado fails to demonstrate cause and prejudice excusing the default of his federal claims. Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 451; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96. He neither alleges nor shows that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. Because Alvarado fails to proffer specific facts showing an exception to procedural default, ground three, ground four, and ground five are procedurally barred from federal review.
Alvarado's two remaining grounds are exhausted and entitled to review on the merits.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highlydeferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended...
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