Alvarez v. CSX Corp.
| Decision Date | 02 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:10-CV-80-PRC |
| Parties | KELLY A. ALVAREZ, Individually and as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF ANGEL L. ALVAREZ, JR., Plaintiff, v. CSX CORPORATION, INC., et al., Defendants. TRANSFLO TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., et al., Cross Claimants, v. SAVAGE SERVICES CORPORATION, Cross Claim Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on:
(1) Savage Services Corporation's Motion to Dismiss [DE 77], filed by Defendant Savage on September 14, 2012;
(2) Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 75], filed by Defendants on September 14, 2012;
(3) TRANSFLO and CSX Defendants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence Cited in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 102], filed by Defendants on November 15, 2012; and
(4) Savage Services Corporation's Objection to and Motion to Exclude Exhibit B [DE 106], filed by Defendant Savage on January 10, 2013.
On January 8, 2010, Plaintiff Kelly A. Alvarez filed a Complaint as personal representative of the Estate of Angel L. Alvarez, Jr., in Lake County Circuit Court, for the wrongful death of her husband as the result of the alleged carelessness, recklessness, and negligence of Defendants CSX Corporation ("CSX"), CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT"), CSX Intermodal, Inc. ("CSXI"), and CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc. ("CSXIT") (collectively, the "CSX Defendants") and TRANSFLO Terminal Services, Inc. On February 11, 2010, Defendants filed an Answer and affirmative defenses, and on February 16, 2010, they removed the action to this Court.
On March 29, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and at a preliminary pretrial conference on April 15, 2010, the parties agreed to limit discovery while the Motion was pending. The Court issued a scheduling order setting a deadline of 60 days after the Court's ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint without seeking leave of court. On July 14, 2010, the Court issued an Order granting in part the Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims for Alvarez's personal injuries and the claims for loss of consortium brought in her individual capacity.
On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Defendant Savage Services Corporation. On September 24, 2010, the CSX Defendants and TRANSFLO filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint and a cross-claim for indemnification against Savage. On November 10, 2010, Defendant Savage filed its Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and affirmative defenses, including the defense that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
On September 14, 2012, Defendants filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment. OnOctober 29, 2012, Plaintiff filed a response. On November 15, 2012, TRANSFLO and the CSX Defendants filed a reply and Savage filed a separate reply. Also on November 15, 2012, TRANSFLO and the CSX Defendants filed a Motion to Strike. Plaintiff has not filed a response and the time to do so has passed.
On September 14, 2012, Savage filed a Motion to Dismiss. On October 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed a response, including exhibits, and on October 23, 2012, Savage filed a reply, including its own evidence and statement of material facts. On November 15, 2012, the Court held a telephonic conference at which the parties agreed that Savage's Motion should be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court set deadlines for additional briefing. On December 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an additional response brief and on January 10, 2013, Savage filed an additional brief in reply. Also on January 10, 2013, Savage filed a Motion to Strike. Plaintiff has not filed a response and the time to do so has passed.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-111 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving partycannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
On January 8, 2008, journeyman electrician Angel L. Alvarez, Jr., was killed by electrocution while working at Defendant TRANSFLO's Distribution Center Yard. Alvarez was employed as an electrician by Meade Electric Co., Inc., for whom he had worked since completion of an electricalworkers' apprenticeship program at the top of his class.
Defendant TRANSFLO leased the Terminal from Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. Defendant Savage Services Corporation operated the Terminal for TRANSFLO as an independent contractor, and was responsible for conducting and supervising operations in the Terminal.
At the time of the incident, the Terminal had an ungrounded 480-volt, three phase delta electrical system, a type of system often used for industrial sites using heavy equipment and machinery. The lighting circuit was made up of two insulated current-carrying conductor wires wrapped around an uninsulated messenger wire that provided the strength to carry the conductor wires between poles and served as a ground reference for the lighting circuit. The Terminal's electrical system complied with the National Electric Code at the time of the incident.
For years, Meade had been the contractor hired for all electrical problems at the Terminal. It provided services to the Terminal on an on-call basis, and Meade employees frequently repaired lighting problems at the Terminal. Meade's electricians were responsible for identifying and fixing the electrical problems they were sent to address, including shutting off the power if needed. The electricians...
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