Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill.

Decision Date07 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. 09-1049.,No. 08-3206.,08-3206.,09-1049.
Citation588 F.3d 940
PartiesSusan SRAIL, Jeffrey Srail, Janeen Brzeczek, and Ronald Brzeczek, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF LISLE, ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Shawn M. Collins, Attorney (argued), Naperville, IL, Michael D. Hayes, Attorney, Varga, Berger, Ledsky, Hayes & Casey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Brandon K. Lemley, Attorney (argued), Paul Rettberg, Attorney, Querrey & Harrow, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are citizens of the Village of Lisle, Illinois, and of the Oak View subdivision located therein. Appellants sued the Village of Lisle, the claiming that Lisle had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state negligence laws by discriminating against Appellants. The district court certified a class consisting of all individuals who owned or resided in residential property in the Oak View subdivision. Subsequently, the district court granted Lisle's summary judgment motion on the equal protection claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' state law claim. Appellants filed this appeal, seeking reversal of the summary judgment decision and vacation of the award for costs. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. Background

The Oak View subdivision was built in the 1950s, and in 1956, the developer created its own water and sewer utility to serve Oak View residents. Since that time, a privately owned utility company has provided Oak View residents with their water needs.

The Village of Lisle, Illinois, was incorporated in 1956. In 1967, Lisle developed its own water system. Prior to that time, most residents received their water through private, underground wells. Lisle's system grew gradually as developers built new housing developments, installing water mains that the developers then donated to Lisle. In 1980, Lisle purchased one of the two privately owned water companies operating in town, which also contributed to the growth of the Lisle system. Lisle did not purchase the privately owned water company operating in Oak View. The Lisle system received its water supply from the DuPage Water Commission ("DWC"), which provided water from Lake Michigan to the utilities with which it contracted. Lisle would then deliver this water to its customers.

The water company serving Oak View entered into a similar contract with DWC to receive its water; however, because of difficulties in transporting the water from DWC to Oak View, Lisle entered into an agreement with DWC and the water company in 1995 providing that Lisle would deliver the water purchased by the water company from DWC's facilities to Oak View. This agreement was known as the "Wheeling Agreement."

In 2002, Illinois-American Water Company ("IAWC") purchased the water company that operated in Oak View, thus becoming the exclusive operator of the water system in the subdivision. Under both IAWC and its predecessor, Oak View's water system operated with pressure insufficient to extinguish fires. It was this concern that sparked the litigation in this caseAppellants claim that Lisle impermissibly discriminated against them by expanding its water services to other subdivisions within Lisle, but not to Oak View.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Appellants assert that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lisle. Specifically, Appellants claim (1) that the district court erred in holding that Lisle's proffered monetary concerns could serve as a rational basis for its discrimination against Appellants, and (2) that the district court improperly drew inferences in Lisle's favor to reach this holding. We address Appellants' arguments in turn.

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Pepper v. Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir.2005). We will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We construe all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. We may affirm on any ground adequately supported in the record; we need not affirm on the basis found by the district court. See Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco Mfg., Ltd. P'ship, 319 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2003).

B. Requirements of an Equal Protection Challenge

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Often an equal protection violation occurs when a regulation draws distinctions among people based on a person's membership in a "suspect" class. Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir.2002). Suspect classes include race, alienage, and national origin. Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir.2006). Another typical equal protection challenge is based on denial of a fundamental right. Id. Fundamental rights include freedom of speech and religion. Id. With both suspect classes and denials of fundamental rights, the government's justification for the regulation must satisfy the strict scrutiny test to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.

Neither scenario is present in this case. Appellants are not members of a suspect class, nor do they assert that Lisle infringed upon their fundamental rights. See Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir.1984) ("The Constitution creates no positive entitlement to fire protection."); see also Magnuson v. City of Hickory Hills, 933 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir.1991) ("We do not consider the right to continued municipal water service such a fundamental right...."). In the absence of deprivation of a fundamental right or the existence of a suspect class, the proper standard of review is rational basis. Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 1000-01. Rational basis review requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) the state actor intentionally treated plaintiffs differently from others similarly situated; (2) this difference in treatment was caused by the plaintiffs' membership in the class to which they belong; and (3) this different treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th Cir.2006).

Appellants in this case allege that they are a "class of one," meaning, for practical purposes, that Appellants need not demonstrate the second element of an equal protection challenge. As the Supreme Court explained in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, a class-of-one equal protection claim has merit when it "alleges that [the plaintiff] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep't. of Agric., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2153 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). Appellants contend that a class-of-one claim can also be brought by certified class members, citing to the Supreme Court's decision in Olech that a class-of-one equal protection claim is not limited to just a single claimant. 528 U.S. at 564 n. 1, 120 S.Ct. 1073 ("Whether the complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis."). The district court speculated that Appellants could pursue a class-of-one equal protection claim even though they were members of a certified class, but did not make an explicit holding because its decision that Lisle had a rational basis for its disparate treatment of Appellants made such a holding unnecessary. We agree with the district court that we need not reach the class-of-one issue in this case because Appellants fail to establish the requirements of an equal protection claim. See infra Part II.C-D.

The district court also prudently refrained from attempting to reconcile the Seventh Circuit's divergent class-of-one precedent. At times, we have held that a class-of-one claim's absence of rational basis requires proof of illegitimate animus, while at other times, we have held that a class-of-one claim requires illegitimate animus as an alternative to the absence of rational basis. Compare Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) ("We described the class of equal protection cases illustrated by Olech as `vindictive action' cases and said that they require `proof that the cause of the differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.'" (quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir.1998), aff'd, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000))), with Lunini v. Grayeb, 395 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir.2005) ("We have recognized on several occasions that `[a] class of one equal protection claim may be brought where ... there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment or the cause of the differential treatment is a "totally illegitimate animus" toward the plaintiff by the defendant.'") (quoting McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)). Like the district court, we need not address this issue to resolve the case before us because we find that Appellants fail to establish that there exist comparators with whom they are similarly situated and that Lisle lacked a rational basis for its decision. See infra Part II.C-D.

But we will address the fact that Appellants' claim fails for another reason entirely under Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). The plaintiff in Engquist was a public...

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