Alvarez v. Hill
Decision Date | 20 January 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 10–35865.,10–35865. |
Citation | 667 F.3d 1061,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 831,12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 809 |
Parties | Blackie ALVAREZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jean HILL; Max Williams; Mitch Morrow; Judy Gilmore; Steve Franke; Tom O'Conner; Tom Armstrong; Steve Brabb; Brad Cain; Sonny Rider; Sonia Hoyt, Defendants–Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
P. Andrew McStay, Jr., Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, OR, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Carolyn Alexander, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, OR, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:04–CV–00884–BR.Before: DAVID M. EBEL,* MARSHA S. BERZON, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.
The question presented here is what relief is available to Plaintiff–Appellant Blackie Alvarez, a former inmate in the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), on claims alleging that ODOC employees substantially burdened the practice of his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5. Money damages are not available under RLUIPA against state officials sued in their official capacity. And, because the ODOC has released Alvarez from its custody, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Therefore, having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Alvarez's claims.
In June 2004, Alvarez sued several ODOC officials in their official capacity, alleging, among other things, that they were substantially burdening Alvarez's practice of his Native American religion.1 The district court granted the ODOC officials summary judgment, but this court remanded Alvarez's claims for further consideration under RLUIPA. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1154–55, 1159 (9th Cir.2008). On remand, the district court again granted the ODOC officials summary judgment and dismissed Alvarez's RLUIPA claims, ruling: 1) money damages are not available under RLUIPA against state officials sued in their official capacity; and 2) in light of Alvarez's release from ODOC custody, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Alvarez appeals, challenging both determinations.
We review de novo questions of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Holley v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.2010).
The Supreme Court, in Sossamon v. Texas, held that money damages under RLUIPA are not available against states because of their sovereign immunity. See ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1655, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011). And, “[f]or sovereign-immunity purposes, we treat [a] suit against state officials in their official capacities as a suit against the state.” Holley, 599 F.3d at 1111. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Alvarez's claims for money damages.
Mootness presents a question of law reviewed de novo. See Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1176 (9th Cir.2011).
Article III of the federal constitution “restricts federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies,” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 732, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008), and requires that “a justiciable case or controversy ... remain extant at all stages of review,” United States v. Juvenile Male, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 180 L.Ed.2d 811 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is moot “when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, without his damages claims, Alvarez no longer has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this case. Alvarez was an inmate in the ODOC's custody in 2004 when he initiated this litigation, alleging ODOC officials were substantially burdening the practice of his religion. But ODOC released Alvarez from custody in 2007. “An inmate's release from prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison's policies unless the suit has been certified as a class action.” Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.1995). The same is true for claims seeking declaratory relief. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 2–4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (per curiam). The reason is that the released inmate is no longer subject to the prison conditions or policies he challenges. See id. at 4, 109 S.Ct. 202; see also Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir.2007) ( ).
Once an inmate is removed from the environment in which he is subjected to the challenged policy or practice, absent a claim for damages, he no longer has a legally cognizable interest in a judicial decision on the merits of his claim. Any declaratory or injunctive relief ordered in the inmate's favor in such situations would have no practical impact on the inmate's rights and would not redress in any way the injury he originally asserted. And the [released] inmate has no further need for such declaratory or injunctive relief, for he is free of the policy or practice that provoked his lawsuit in the first place.
Alvarez concedes this general proposition, but argues that his claims fall within one of two mootness exceptions: 1) his claims are capable of repetition, yet will continue to evade review; and 2) his claims challenge ongoing prison policies to which other inmates will remain subject.
The mootness exception for claims that are capable of repetition, yet evade review, “is limited to extraordinary cases in which (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff will be subjected to the same action again.” C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks, alteration omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 14, 2011) (Nos. 11–759, 11A452). But there is no indication that Alvarez will again be subjected to the challenged prison policies.
Alvarez claims, to the contrary, that it is reasonably likely that he will be returned to ODOC's custody in the future and, thus, again be subjected to the challenged prison policies and conditions. But because Alvarez has now completed his prison sentence and his term of post-incarceration supervision, the only way that he might be returned to ODOC custody is if he commits another crime. That possibility, however, is too speculative a basis on which to conclude that Alvarez's claims are capable of repetition. See United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir.2007) (); Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1988) ( ); cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–97, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) ( ).
In United States v. Howard, we recognized a variation on the mootness exception for claims capable of repetition, yet evading review. See 480 F.3d at 1009–10. Howard 's exception applies where, although there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff himself will be subjected to the same alleged harm in the future, he...
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