Vega v. Captain M. Nunez in His Capacity

• Decision Date: 08 May 2014
• Docket Number: NO. LA CV 13-09530-VBF-E,LA CV 13-09530-VBF-E
• Parties: ANGEL LOUIS VEGA, JR., Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN M. NUNEZ in his official capacity, and CORRECTIONAL OFFICER L. GARCIA, in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

ANGEL LOUIS VEGA, JR., Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN M. NUNEZ in his official capacity,and CORRECTIONAL OFFICERL. GARCIA, in his official capacity, Defendants.

NO. LA CV 13-09530-VBF-E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATED: May 8, 2014

OPINION and ORDER

Dismissing Damages Claims With Prejudice;

Dismissing Rest of Complaint Without Prejudice;

Permitting Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint

by a Date Certain;

Warning Plaintiff that Dismissal May Be Converted

to "With Prejudice" if He Fails to File a Suitable Amended

Complaint by the Deadline

Proceeding pro se, California state prisoner Angel Louis Vega, Junior ("plaintiff") brings this civil-rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against two officials at the California State Prison - Los Angeles County. The defendants are Captain M. Nunez and Correctional Officer L. Garcia, sued in their official capacities only. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss with prejudice the damages claims against the defendants in their official capacities. The Court will dismiss the rest of the complaint only without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, i.e., with leave to amend by a date certain. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Finally, the Court will advise plaintiff of the possible adverse consequences in the event that he does not filed a suitable, timely first amended complaint.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff appears to challenge a prison disciplinary proceeding, alleging that there was "fabrication" and that he was "only a victim in the incident which occurred and led him in Confinement." He alleges that defendant Nunez assured him that he "Would go to Committe[e]" the next day but he was not brought before the committee until seven days later, in violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He further alleges that defendant Garcia moved him to a different cell which provided inadequate ventilation, subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment and mental stress.

The Court discerns numerous legal deficiencies in the complaint which render it, in current form, noncompliant with Rule 8's requirement of "simple, concise, and direct" allegations as part of a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(d)(1). Conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 686 (2009). "Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court's docket becomes unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court's ability to administer justice." Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). The confused and conclusory allegations of the Complaint do not satisfy these standards. See US v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, 637 F.3d 1047, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2011) (under Rule 8, a federal district court may dismiss confused, ambiguous and unintelligible pleading).

ANALYSIS: DAMAGES CLAIMS AGAINST OFFICIAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS

First, to the extent that plaintiff is trying to sue Nunez or Garcia in their official capacities for monetary damages, the suit is tantamount to a suit against their employer (the State of California). See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Krainski, 616 F.3d at 968; Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 565 F.3d 1205, 1208 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) ("We construe Byrd's complaint against [sheriff] Arpaio in his official capacity as a suit against Maricopa County.") (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985) and Center for Bio-Ethical Reform v. L.A. County Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (official-capacity suit against county sheriff was effectively a suit against the county)), on reh'g en banc on other grounds, 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

"'[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.'" Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 277, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 (1997) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 350 (1945)); see, e.g., Hamilton v. Hernandez, 500 F. App'x 592, 594-95 (9^th Cir. 2012) ("Hamilton's claims for monetary relief against prison officials in their official capacity also fail on sovereign immunity grounds.") (citing Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9^th Cir. 2012)).

Therefore, the claims for money damages against Nunez or Garcia in their official capacities are barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Braunstein v. Arizona DOT, 683 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[I]t has been 'well established for many years' that sovereign immunity precludes § 1981 and § 1983 damages claims against state entities and state actors in their official capacities" and the Supreme Court has held that section 1983 does not abrogate this sovereign immunity) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979)).

This is because "'when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest . . . even though individual officials are nominal defendants.'" Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 277, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 (1997) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 350 (1945)); see, e.g., Barendt v. Gibbons, 467 F. App'x 585 (9^th Cir. 2012) (holding that state governor and prison officials had sovereign immunity from prisoner's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim seeking money damages for alleged temporary restriction of his participation in a candle-lighting service at the appropriate time).

. In addition, "[a]lthough Congress may render states liable [sic, should be suable] in federal court by exercising its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), Congress did not do so with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . ." Sharnese v. California, 547 F. App'x 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub nom. Shea v. California, - U.S. -, 134 S. Ct. 1542 (2014).

Thus, plaintiff's request for damages against government defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with the unanimous practice of this court'smembers. See, e.g., Ass'n of Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 2012 WL 7683452, *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (Marshall, J.) ("The court granted that motion and dismissed (1) all claims against the Regents and any claims seeking damages against individuals in their official capacity with prejudice . . . .") (italics added); Silverbrand v. Woodford, 2010 WL 3635780, *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2010) (Woehrle, M.J.) ("The following claims are subject to dismissal with prejudice: . . . all damages claims against official[-]capacity defendants . . . ."), R&R adopted, 2010 WL 3635303 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010); Alexander v. Bay, 2010 WL 2951139, *6 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (McDermott, M.J.) ("Plaintiff's claims for damages against the Federal Defendants in their official capacities are claims against the United States that are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)."), R&R adopted, 2010 WL 2951152 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (Selna, J.); Corrow v. BOP, 2009 WL 1464390, *4 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (Hatter, J.). Accord Wilborn v. Napolitano, 2012 WL 354494, *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (Gonzalez, J.), app. dis., No. 12-55541 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012) ("Plaintiff's constitutional claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the extent Plaintiff is seeking damages. Accordingly, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's constitutional claims to the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages.").

The Court would further note that the State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not bar section 1983 claims which seek equitable relief, rather than damages, from state-employee defendants acting in their official capacities. See Buchanan v. Hurt, 2014 WL 1454831, *2 (D. Neb. Apr. 15, 2014).

ANALYSIS: HECK V. HUMPHREY BARS GOOD-TIME CREDIT CLAIM

Second, to the extent that Vega seeks to challenge a prison disciplinary ruling for which he suffered a loss of credited time, the claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that "[a] claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983." See Vargas v. Wabakken, 384 Fed. App'x 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2010) ("To the extent Vargas contends the misconduct report resulted in a loss of good time credits that will affect the duration of his sentence, his claim is Heck-barred.").

"The Heck bar exists t[o] preserve the rule that federal challenges which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of incarceration or its duration, must be brought by petition for writ ofhabeas corpus." Hernandez v. Martinez, 2013 WL 6838682, *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) (dismissing state prisoner's Due Process claim arising out of "isolated" incident in which a female prison employee saw him naked and putting on his underwear) (citing Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51, 124 S. Ct. 1303 (2004)). See also Thornton v. Brown, 724 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[A] person who is in state custody may not use §...