Alvarez v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Decision Date27 November 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 12–22763–CIV.
Citation905 F.Supp.2d 1334
PartiesGil ALVAREZ and Raquel Alvarez, Plaintiffs, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Gil Alvarez, Apopka, FL, pro se.

Raquel Alvarez, Apopka, FL, pro se.

Darren Wayne Friedman, Foreman Friedman, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

FEDERICO A. MORENO, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (D.E. No. 6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED as to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. The parties are directed to proceed to arbitration with respect to the claims that do not involve personal injury, illness or death as provided in the cruise ticket contract, specifically, Counts 3, 8 and 11. Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

I. Plaintiffs' Allegations

On August 28, 2011, Plaintiffs Gil and Raquel Alvarez (collectively, Plaintiffs) boarded a cruise ship owned and operated by Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. (Defendant). D.E. No. 1 ¶ 13. What followed, according to Plaintiffs, was a “terrible and totally avoidable ordeal” related to the non-delivery of Plaintiffs' luggage. Id. ¶ 28. The gravamen of the complaint is that Plaintiffs spent approximately seven or eight hours without luggage and, upon discovering their suitcases onboard, were forced to carry their own bags to their stateroom, which was on the same floor as the unattended luggage. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs suffered aches, bruises, headaches, pain and suffering, mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment as a result of this ordeal. Id. ¶¶ 28, 70. Plaintiffs' complaint further alleges several customer service lapses and unfulfilled promises on the part of cruise line employees. Id. ¶¶ 21–29. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant refused to arbitrate the Plaintiffs' complaints as providedfor in the passenger contract contained in the cruise ticket. Id. ¶ 81.

On July 27, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the complaint which gave rise to the instant action. The complaint contains eleven (11) counts alleging, in order, strict liability; breach of contract (Counts Two and Three); unjust enrichment; negligence; breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; negligent misrepresentation; violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq. (2012); fraud in the inducement; misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41; and punitive damages.

II. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

A tort claim is subject to the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction when (1) it occurs on navigable waters or is caused by a vessel on navigable waters, (2) the incident has a potentially disrupting impact on maritime commerce, and (3) the general character giving rise to the incident has a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). The Court has jurisdiction over this action because this lawsuit arises from (1) alleged misconduct that occurred while the Plaintiffs were passengers aboard Defendant's cruise ship and (2) an alleged breach of the cruise ticket for the Plaintiffs' voyage on the Allure. See28 U.S.C. § 1333; Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.1990) (finding that admiralty law governed slip and fall incident on cruise ship and noting that “when the parties allege diversity of citizenship as the basis of the federal court's jurisdiction ... if the injury occurred on navigable waters, federal maritime law governs the substantive issues in the case). For the same reasons, general maritime law governs this action. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3–5 (2d ed.1994); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.1989).

III. Legal Standard

On August 23, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), claiming Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a cause of action. D.E. No. 6. When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the Complaint's allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2008). The plaintiff must nevertheless articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Where a cause of action sounds in fraud, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) must be satisfied in addition to the more relaxed standard of Rule 8. Under Rule 9(b), “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” although “conditions of a person's mind,” such as malice, intent, and knowledge, may be alleged generally. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “The ‘particularity’ requirement serves an important purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with which they are charged and protecting defendants against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior.” West Coast Roofing & Waterproofing, Inc. v. Johns Manvilie, Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 81, 86 (11th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). Thus, the Rule's “particularity” requirement is not satisfied by “conclusory allegations that certain statements were fraudulent; it requires that a complaint plead facts giving rise to an inference of fraud.” Id. at 86. To meet this standard, the Complaint needs to identify the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; the time and place of, and the persons responsible for, the alleged statements; the content and manner in which the statements misled the plaintiff; and what the defendant gained through the alleged fraud. Id.

IV. Discussion
1. Arbitrable claims

As alleged in Count Three of Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendant's cruise ticket contract provides for arbitration of all claims not involving “PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS OR DEATH OF A PASSENGER....” D.E. No. 1 ¶ 81; Royal Caribbean Cruise/Cruisetour Ticket Contract, sec. 10(b) (attached to complaint as “Exhibit A”) (capitalization in original). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1213–1214 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (“Because the FAA is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements, we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of the agreement.”); E.E.O.C v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

This presumption in favor of arbitration is not absolute, however: “The courts are not to twist the language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.” Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419–20 (11th Cir.1990). That means “the parties will not be required to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” Id. at 1419;see also Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294, 122 S.Ct. 754 (“Arbitration under the FAA is a matter of consent, not coercion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, it is apparent from the face of the cruise ticket contract that Defendant cruise line agreed to arbitrate “ANY AND ALL OTHER DISPUTES, CLAIMS OR CONTROVERSIES WHATSOEVER EXCEPT FOR PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS OR DEATH OR A PASSENGER BETWEEN PASSENGER AND CARRIER, VESSEL OR TRANSPORT....” Royal Caribbean Cruise/ Cruisetour Ticket Contract, sec. 10(b) (capitalization in original); D.E. No. 1 at 47. This is the kind of all-encompassing language that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently suggested would require enforcement of a broad arbitration provision such as the one at issue. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir.2011) (“If the cruise line had wanted a broader arbitration provision, it should have left the scope of it at any and all disputes, claims, or controversies whatsoever [.]) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The fact that the arbitration provision contains an exemption for claims alleging personal injury, illness and death is consistent with both federal maritime law and public policy.1 Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to limit the scope of the arbitration provision contained in the cruise ticket contract.

Plaintiffs, meanwhile, accepted the terms and conditions of the contract by purchasing and accepting passage onboard Defendant's vessel. Courts have uniformly held that passengers are bound by provisions printed on a ticket, even when the passenger did not actually read those provisions. See Nash v. Kloster Cruise A/S, 901 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir.1990); Harden v. American Airlines, 178 F.R.D. 583, 587 (M.D.Ala.1998) (“The Plaintiff who fail[s] to sign the ticket would still be bound by it, because he accepted passage on the ship.”). Plaintiffs are therefore likewise bound by the broad arbitration provision contained in the cruise ticket contract.

Defendant argues that it is not required to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement because Plaintiffs' claims are not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.2 D.E. No. 6 at 5–6. Defendant points out that any claims related to the personal injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiffs...

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