Rhodes v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 6:20-cv-927-Orl-40EJK
• Citation: 513 F.Supp.3d 1350
• Parties: Christopher RHODES, Plaintiff, v. EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

513 F.Supp.3d 1350

Christopher RHODES, Plaintiff,

v.EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 6:20-cv-927-Orl-40EJK

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.

Signed January 14, 2021

E. Michelle Drake, Berger & Montague, PC, Minneapolis, MN, Patrick F. Madden, Berger Montague PC, Philadelphia, PA, Rebecca Timmons, Matthew D. Schultz, Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A, Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiff.

Daniel A. Cohen, Pro Hac Vice, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Atlanta, GA, Paul M. Renner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Shaina Stahl, Nelson Mullins Broad and Cassel LLP, Orlando, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

PAUL G. BYRON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. 37 (the "Motion ")). Plaintiff responded in opposition. (Doc. 41). Each party has also submitted notices of supplemental authorities. (See Docs. 45–47). Upon consideration, the Motion is due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This breach of contract action arises out of Defendant Embry-Riddle University's response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19 "). During the spring 2020 academic term, Plaintiff was enrolled as a full-time undergraduate student and registered for live classes at Embry-Riddle's Daytona Beach campus. (Doc 32, p. 14).¹

The COVID-19 pandemic first reached the United States in January 2020. Within two months, infection rates had spiked to alarming numbers. On March 13, the president officially declared that COVID-19 had become a national emergency.² In response, many educational institutions, including Defendant, began adopting policies to reduce transmissions of the virus, curb infection rates, and "flatten the curve."

Throughout the month of March, Defendant made several policy changes in response to the pandemic. On March 13—the same day as the national emergency declaration—Defendant announced that most classes would transition from in-person to online instruction. (Id. at p. 15). The following week, Defendant announced that all classes would be taught remotely and all large gatherings would be canceled until at least the end of the spring 2020 semester. (Id. at p. 16). A week later, all community gathering spaces and laboratories were closed, student access cards were deactivated, and dining halls became limited to take-out. ( Id. ). Two days later, Defendant closed student residence halls. ( Id. ). These changes remained in effect through the end of the summer 2020 academic term.

According to Plaintiff, he contracted with Defendant to receive live, on-campus instruction and access to campus facilities during the spring 2020 academic term in exchange for his payments of tuition and related fees. (Id. at p. 1). Based on this contract, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's decision to close its campus and move classes online was a breach of contract. (Id. at p. 23 ("Count I ")). In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant would be unjustly enriched if it retained the full value of his tuition and fees. (Id. at p. 26 ("Count II ")). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeks relief on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated Embry-Riddle students. (Id. at p. 1). Defendant now moves to dismiss. (Doc. 37).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Courts are generally limited to the four corners of a complaint, see St. George v. Pinellas County , 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), but they may also consider attached exhibits and documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim, see Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc. , 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009).

Though a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, mere legal conclusions or recitation of the elements of a claim are not enough. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Moreover, courts are "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Courts must also view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any doubts as to the sufficiency of the complaint in the plaintiff's favor. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc. , 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

In sum, courts must (1) ignore conclusory allegations, bald legal assertions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim; (2) accept well-pled factual allegations as true; and (3) view well-pled allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. DISCUSSION

The facts of this case—like the coronavirus itself—are novel. The underlying law is not. Indeed, the Motion can be decided by resort to Florida's well-established legal principles.³ The Court addresses Defendant's arguments in turn.

A. The Academic Deference Doctrine does not give Universities Unbounded Discretion to Avoid Contractual Obligations

Defendant begins by arguing that "[c]onsiderations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial review of the substance of academic decisions." Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing , 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). Courts have a "responsibility to safeguard [educational institutions’] academic freedom." Id. at 226, 129 S.Ct. 1262. Commensurate with this freedom is an institution's autonomy to determine what may be taught and "how it shall be taught." Sweezy v. State of N.H. by Wyman , 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). From there, Defendant argues that Courts may not "second-guess a university's decision making in the realm of academic instruction." (Doc. 37, p. 7). Thus, Defendant asserts a right to "unilaterally" modify the format of classes, regardless of its existing contractual obligations. (Id. ). The Court disagrees.

At the outset, the Court is not convinced that the academic deference doctrine even applies to the present case. The case law consistently frames the issue as one of institutional competence—a university is best equipped to manage its academic affairs, so it must be afforded "broad discretion when it exercise[s] its academic judgment." Jallali v. Nova. Se. Univ., Inc. , 992 So. 2d 338, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (emphasis added). Accordingly, courts decline to entertain breach of contract actions where "[t]he claim requires the factfinder to enter the classroom and determine whether or not the judgments and conduct of professional educators were deficient." Paladino v. Adelphi Univ. , 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (1982).

In contrast, however, courts have supported breach of contract actions where universities fail to perform specific contractual obligations, provided that such claims do not require judicial review of an academic evaluation.⁴ As explained by the Seventh Circuit:

In these cases, the essence of the plaintiff's complaint would not be that the institution failed to perform adequately a promised educational service, but rather that it failed to perform that service at all. Ruling on this issue would not require an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories, but rather an objective assessment of whether the institution made a good faith effort to perform on its promise.

Ross , 957 F.2d at 417.

Consider the following illustration: a university decides to stop offering astronomy classes in favor of astrology classes. Such curriculum-based decisions would fall squarely within the ambit of academic freedom, so courts should defer to the university's independent assessment of each field's relative intellectual merits.⁵ But imagine students had already enrolled in, paid for, and begun taking an astronomy class when the university began teaching them astrology instead. In a breach of contract action predicated on the university's failure to provide the agreed-upon instruction, the virtues of astronomy over astrology would be irrelevant. Instead, the inquiry would be more straightforward: Did the students get what they bargained for?⁶

In this case, Plaintiff does not seek judicial review of an academic judgment. Neither Plaintiff (nor the Court, for that matter) challenge the educational merits of Defendant's decision to move classes online during a global pandemic. In fact, the Court emphatically believes that Defendant made the right choice. But that's beside the point. The focus of this case is simply whether Defendant promised something it later failed to deliver. To answer that question, the Court need not wade into the nuances of educational or public health policy, but rather make an objective assessment of whether Defendant failed to perform on a promise to provide students with in-person instruction and access to campus facilities.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the academic deference doctrine does not prevent judicial inquiry into a university's breach of specific contractual obligations that are unrelated to educational considerations. While Defendant should be given the widest possible latitude for determining what and how to teach, its students remain...