Alvizo v. Walker

Decision Date03 May 2021
Docket NumberNo. 06-20-00080-CV,06-20-00080-CV
Citation625 S.W.3d 177
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
Parties Jane Ann Walker ALVIZO, Appellant v. Andy WALKER, Appellee

Sarah L. Kaminar, James R. Rodgers, Paris, for Appellant.

Scott Pelley, Jacob Pelley, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Stevens

In 2018, Andy Walker obtained a declaratory judgment (the 2018 Judgment) against his sister, Jane Ann Walker Alvizo, dividing several tracts of real property they had inherited from their parents. Among the properties divided between the parties was an approximately 51-acre tract awarded to Alvizo that shared a common boundary with an approximately 21.75-acre tract1 awarded to Walker. A subsequent survey of the common boundary line between the two contiguous tracts in accordance with the metes and bounds description of the boundary contained in the 2018 Judgment revealed that an irrigation well, irrigation equipment, and some blueberry plants that Walker thought were located on his tract were, in fact, located on Alvizo's tract. Since the time to appeal the 2018 Judgment had expired, Walker filed this bill of review action in which he asked the trial court for a declaration that the tract awarded to him in the 2018 Judgment included the well and irrigation equipment. Walker filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted based on mutual mistake, and modified the 2018 Judgment based on an "equitable division survey" of the common boundary so that Walker's tract would include the irrigation well, irrigation equipment, and blueberry plants.

On appeal, Alvizo complains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Walker did not establish, as a matter of law, (1) that he had exercised due diligence in pursuing his legal remedies, (2) a meritorious ground of appeal, (3) that he was entitled to a bill of review because of mutual mistake of the parties, and (4) that he was without negligence or fault. Because we find that Walker did not establish his right to a bill of review, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Background

Walker filed a motion for a traditional summary judgment and alleged that, although many of the tracts in the 2018 Judgment were hotly contested, the parties always agreed that Walker was to receive the 21.75-acre tract and its appurtenances, that Alvizo was to receive the 51-acre tract, and that they would use the metes and bounds description in a 1980 deed to identify the 21.75-acre tract. Walker also alleged that it was intended by the parties that the discrepancy between the acreage was to be made up by the presence of improvements and appurtenances on the smaller tract and that the parties presumed that the 21.75-acre tract included the family blueberry patch, a well, and accompanying irrigation equipment. Walker also alleged that, when the 21.75-acre tract was surveyed following the metes and bounds description contained in the 2018 Judgment, it contained less than 21.75 acres, and part of the irrigation equipment, the blueberry patch, and the related irrigation well were "cut off." Consequently, he alleged, the reliance on the metes and bounds description in the 1980 deed was a mutual mistake because it did not include these cut off improvements.

In support of his allegations, Walker provided the following summary judgment evidence:

1. A copy of the 2018 Judgment containing descriptions of the 51-acre tract2 awarded to Alvizo and the 21.75-acre tract3 awarded to Walker.
2. A copy of a warranty deed dated December 4, 1943, by and between G.P. Faires and Lillie Faires, husband and wife, grantors, to G.H. Walker, grantee, conveying a 72.45-acre tract of land out of the R.W. Lee Survey and the B. Olivo Survey, described by metes and bounds (the 1943 Deed).
3. A copy of the Last Will and Testament of Harold Hobert Walker (Harold's Will),4 providing that his wife, Oleta, would inherit a life estate in three listed tracts of land that Harold inherited from George Walker as his separate property, including a tract identified as "approximately 45 acres,"5 that Alvizo would inherit the "45 acres" in fee simple, subject to Oleta's life estate, and that Walker would inherit Harold's interest in a community property tract identified as "approximately 27 acres,"6 "including the house thereon, the contents of the house, ... outbuildings thereon, all farm equipment, tools, and junk ... in fee simple."
4. A copy of the Oleta M. Walker revocable living trust agreement dated July 3, 2007 (Oleta's Trust Agreement), that provided in a "Special Directive" attached thereto that Walker was to receive
the 21.75 acre tract that contains the house, equipment and one irrigation well, along with a 25 foot wide strip of land off the South side and a Southern part of the West side of the 51 acre tract, allowing access from the 21.75 acre tract to the Curry tract. This land is known as the home place and is located in the Bastian Oliver Survey Abstract Number 855.
She also directed that Alvizo "shall receive the remainder of the 51 acre tract and one irrigation well. This land is located in the Roswell W. Lee Survey Abstract Number 667."
5. A copy of a warranty deed dated March 28, 1980, by and between G.H. Walker and Martha Walker, husband and wife, grantors, and Harold H. Walker and Oleta Walker, husband and wife, conveying 21.75 acres, more or less, and containing a metes and bounds description identical to the description of the 21.75-acre tract contained in the 2018 Judgment (the Homeplace Deed).
6. A copy of an order entered in cause number CV-2016-7416, in the County Court at Law of Fannin County.7
7. The affidavit of Andy Walker.8
8. A copy of an unsigned and undated distribution deed by and between Alvizo and Walker, grantors, to Walker, grantee, with an altered metes and bounds description of the 21.75-acre tract and accompanying survey performed by Underwood Drafting and Surveying, Inc.

Alvizo filed a response.9 In support of her response, she filed the affidavit of Jane Alvizo,10 with the following attached and incorporated exhibits:

1. A copy of the 1943 Deed.
2. A copy of Harold's Will.
3. A copy of an order admitting Harold's Will to probate dated April 21, 1999.
4. A copy of the inventory and appraisement of the estate of Harold Walker showing that at the time of his death, Harold owned, inter alia , an undivided one-half community interest in a homestead dwelling and the 21.75-acre tract, and a separate property interest in three tracts of land, including the 51-acre tract (the Inventory).11
5. A copy of Walker's original petition filed in the declaratory judgment action, with attached exhibits.
6. A copy of the Homeplace Deed.

In addition, Alvizo attached a copy of a letter brief filed by Walker in the prior proceeding. The trial court granted Walker's motion for summary judgment based on the mutual mistake of the parties in reliance on the 1980 survey.

II. Standard of Review

"The grant of a trial court's summary judgment is subject to de novo review by appellate courts." Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc. , No. 06-14-00105-CV, 2015 WL 2437519, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003) ). "In making the required review, we deem as true all evidence which is favorable to the nonmovant, we indulge every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, and we resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) ). We may only affirm a summary judgment on grounds that the movant preserved for review. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates , 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996). Thus, "[a] motion must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the motion." McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist. , 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993).

"To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a movant must establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Brown , 2015 WL 2437519, at *2 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009) ). "Once the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (citing Walker v. Harris , 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996) ).

III. Bill of Review

A bill of review is an independent equitable proceeding to set aside a judgment in a prior suit that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial. Baker v. Goldsmith , 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979). Relief by a bill of review "is available only if a party has exercised due diligence in pursuing all adequate legal remedies against a former judgment and, through no fault of its own, has been prevented from making a meritorious claim or defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party." Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera , 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Tice v. City of Pasadena , 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989) ; Petro-Chem. Transp., Inc. v. Carroll , 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974) ). "If legal remedies were available but ignored, relief by equitable bill of review is unavailable." Id. (citing Caldwell v. Barnes , 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998) ).

In a case such as this, where the party fully participated in the prior suit, to obtain relief by bill of review, the party is generally "required to allege and prove" "(1) a failure to file a motion for new trial" or to appeal the prior judgment "(2) caused by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or by an official mistake" "(3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of [its] own and (4) a meritorious ground of appeal." McDaniel v. Hale , 893 S.W.2d 652, 663 (Tex....

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