Alza Corp. v. Lehman Development Corp.
Decision Date | 04 August 1999 |
Citation | 162 Or. App. 128,986 P.2d 59 |
Parties | ALZA CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation, Appellant, v. LEHMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation, and Cypress Pointe Capital, an Oregon corporation, and Lehman Hot Springs, Inc., Respondents, v. James B. Griffin, Additional Counterclaim Defendant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Adam L. Dean, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Gary E. Enloe, Tigard, argued the cause for respondents Lehman Development Corporation, Cypress Pointe Capital and Lehman Hot Springs, Inc. With him on the brief was Furrer & Scott, LLC.
No appearance for additional counterclaim defendant James B. Griffin.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and ARMSTRONG and KISTLER, Judges.
Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of its claims resulting from the trial court's grant of defendants' summary judgment motion. ORCP 47. We reverse and remand.
We review the factual record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party in the summary judgment proceeding. See Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 420, 939 P.2d 608 (1997)
. Defendants solicited and eventually retained plaintiff to provide coordination for some construction projects. After several months, defendants began to run behind schedule on a project and requested that plaintiff help obtain the necessary equipment for the project. Plaintiff responded by renting equipment directly to defendants and by allowing defendants to use plaintiff's credit account with a rental agency. Eventually, plaintiff helped operate the equipment on the project at defendant's request. After the completion of the project, defendants disputed plaintiff's charges for the rental equipment and its services. The parties entered into negotiations in an effort to resolve the dispute and, subsequently, defendants signed a $25,000 "promissory note" payable at $1,000 a month.
When the parties failed to resolve their differences, plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court seeking foreclosure of a contractor's lien that it had filed against defendants' property on January 7, 1997. It also sought recovery of damages in the approximate amount of $40,000. Defendants raised several affirmative defenses to the complaint, including that plaintiff was not registered with the State of Oregon Construction Contractors Board and that it had waived the construction lien by accepting the note. Plaintiff also made a third claim, in the alternative, that in the event the trial court determined that the note represented payment in full of defendants' obligations, then plaintiff was entitled to a judgment under the terms of the note. Defendants moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defenses. The trial court granted defendants' motion without stating its reasons, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims and declaring the lien to have no legal effect.
On review of a motion for summary judgment, we determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47 C. Apparently, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims because it concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred under ORS 701.065 (1995). That statute provides:
On appeal, plaintiff argues that there are material issues of fact still to be decided as to each of its claims, including whether plaintiff knew of the registration requirement and whether plaintiff would incur substantial injustice if ORS 701.065 were applied to bar its claims. Defendants respond that they presented evidence that plaintiff was aware of the registration requirement of ORS 701.065 and that no reasonable juror could decide otherwise. However, James Griffin, plaintiff's president and sole employee, stated in his affidavit that "I did not believe it was necessary for the corporation to obtain a license from the Builders Board in order to perform these services" and that "I was unaware of any requirement that Alza be registered with the Construction Contractors Board."
Whether summary judgment is permissible in this case first involves a question of interpretation of ORS 701.065(2). The first level of statutory analysis requires us to examine the text and context of the statutory provision itself for evidence of the legislature's intent. To avoid the effect of ORS 701.065(1), ORS 701.065(2) requires "the court" to determine whether the contractor was unaware of the registration requirement. If that condition exists, the statute authorizes the court to exercise its discretion in determining whether the application of subsection (1) "would result in a substantial injustice to the unregistered contractor."
Also, the context of a statute includes other related statutes. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 411, 939 P.2d 608 (1997). ORS 87.060 provides for the foreclosure of liens by construction contractors. ORS 701.065(1) provides a potential defense to such a foreclosure, while ORS 701.065(2) provides for an avoidance of that defense. ORS 87.060 also says, in part:
We conclude that the text and context of ORS 701.065(2) require a legal determination by the trial court of the availability of a defense under ORS 701.065(1) before any issues are submitted to the jury under ORS 87.060. Moreover, the determination of whether the contractor was unaware of the registration requirement...
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Splinters, Inc. v. Andersen/Weitz
...the summary judgment evidentiary record under ORS 701.065(1) and (2) (1999) is informed by our decision in Alza Corp. v. Lehman Development Corp., 162 Or.App. 128, 986 P.2d 59 (1999), in which we considered an earlier version of the statute.6 In Alza, we held that the text and context of th......
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PARTHENON CONST. & DESIGN, INC. v. Neuman
...would "result in a substantial injustice to the unregistered contractor." ORS 701.065(2) (1995). See Alza Corp. v. Lehman Development Corp., 162 Or.App. 128, 132, 986 P.2d 59 (1999) (factual dispute concerning contractor's knowledge of registration requirement for purposes of ORS 701.065(2)......