Am. Agricultural Chem. Co v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 26 February 1913 |
| Citation | 77 S.E. 582,139 Ga. 495 |
| Parties | AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL CO. v. RHODES. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
of Contract of Employment.
Where a dealer in fertilizers contracts with a salesman to sell his goods within a designated territory for a given term, and that the salesman shall receive as his commission a certain sum oh the number of tons sold, reserving the right to the dealer to pass upon the credit of the customers procured by the salesman, and also upon the amount of tonnage to be sold in that territory, and where the salesman on the faith of such contract and in pursuance of its execution solicits orders for fertilizers and is discharged without cause, the dealer is liable in damages to the salesman for an unauthorized breach of the contract. Baldwin v. Marqueze, 91 Ga. 404, 18 S. E. 309.
(a) It would be an unauthorized breach of such contract (1) if the dealer, upon demand, refused to furnish the salesman with a list of prices of fertilizers to be sold, and, after orders were obtained by the salesman from customers for fertilizers at the market price, to capriciously refuse to fill them; (2) to dis charge the salesman without cause before his term expired.
(b) It would not be a breach of the contract if the dealer in good faith, upon reasonable grounds, should reject orders for fertilizers procured by the salesman in the territory specified in the contract.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 37, 42; Dec. Dig. §§ 31, 36.*]
Where there is a contract of the character above specified, which is breached by the employer in the manner indicated, and the salesman sues for damages, alleged to consist of loss of profits which he would have earned directly under the contract, but for its breach, he may recover them, if the evidence furnishes reasonable data for computation. Civil Code 1910, § 4394; Baldwin v. Marqueze, 91 Ga. 404, 18 S. E. 309; Schumaker v. Heinemann, 99 Wis. 251, 74 N. W. 785; Spencer Medicine Co. v. Hall, 78 Ark. 330, 93 S. W. 985; Brig-ham v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 243, 56 Am. Rep. 28. The ruling here made is not in conflict with the decisions of this court in S. A. L. Ry. v. Harris, 121 Ga. 707, 49 S. E. 703, Anderson v. Hilton & Dodge Lumber Co., 121 Ga. 688 (3), 49 S. E. 725, Cooper v. Young, 22 Ga. 269, 68 Am. Dec. 502, Clay v. AVestern Union Telegraph Co., 81 Ga. 285, 6 S. E. 813, 12 Am. St. Rep. 316, and other similar cases, holding that profits which might have been derived from some other or collateral contracts are not recoverable.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases,-see Master and Servant, Cent Dig. §§ 12, 50-53; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]
Under the principles announced in the preceding notes, the petition was not subject to general demurrer, based on the ground that the alleged contract was too indefinite, or that the damages laid were remote and speculative in character.
The grounds of special demurrer were without merit.
The suit was not on the contract, but was for damages as for breach of contract, based on the alleged unlawful discharge of the plaintiff by the defendant. It was proper, therefore, to decline a request to charge to the effect that the jury could not consider the loss of certain portions of the commissions which would have been earned except for the breach of the contract, merely because a suit to recover to the commissions as such under the contract would be premature.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant Cent Dig. §§ 12, 50-53; Dec. Dig. § 41.*]
Under one phase of the case, there being evidence to authorize it, it was erroneous, on appropriate request, to refuse to charge: "I charge you that claims of damage under breach of contract that are speculative in character and that are incapable of reasonably exact computation cannot be the basis of a recovery. The mere opinion of an agent selling on commissions, as to what sales he could have made but for the breach of the contract, does not afford sufficient certainty to be the basis of a recovery in damages. Also mere expectation, doubtful offers, and indefinite assurances and
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*For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexespromises of an intention to purchase, without specifying quantity, prices, or terms, cannot be the basis of a recovery in damages."
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 59; Dec. Dig. § 44.2-*]
7. Evidence (§ 479*)—Opinions—Financial Standing of Customer.
Under the contract of employment it was primarily the right of the dealer to pass on the moral and financial standing of all prospective customers; but, if he failed to do so, then in an action of damages for breach of the contract any competent witness might give testimony on that subject.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 2245, 2246; Dec. Dig. § 479.*]
8. Trial (§ 51*)—Reception of Evidence-Provisional Admission.
Where the court refused, at the time an objection to testimony was interposed, to make a ruling thereon, but reserved his decision until the witness had testified further and thereafter there was no further objection or motion to rule out the evidence and no ruling made thereon, a complaint that the judge failed to sustain the objection to the testimony furnishes no ground for a motion for a new trial. Becker v. Donalson, 133 Ga. 864 (3), 67 S. E. 92.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 125; Dec. Dig. § 51.*]
9. Qualification of Charge.
The qualifying words employed by the court in connection with a portion of the charge, as complained of...
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