Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. Nat'l Office v. D.C. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., No. 17-CV-383

• Decision Date: 10 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 17-CV-383
• Citation: 237 A.3d 81
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NATIONAL OFFICE, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

237 A.3d 81

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NATIONAL OFFICE, Appellant,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.

No. 17-CV-383

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 8, 2018

Decided September 10, 2020

Hampton H. Stennis, with whom David A. Borer, Washington, was on the brief for appellant.

Geoffrey H. Simpson, with whom Cedar P. Carlton and Bruce A. Fredrickson, Washington, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, and Easterly, Associate Judge, and Washington, Senior Judge.

Washington, Senior Judge:

The American Federation of Government Employees National Office ("AFGE") appeals from an order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia upholding a decision of the District of Columbia Public Employees Relations Board ("PERB") ordering the AFGE to provide Christopher Collins with financial documents under the control of the AFGE affiliate Local 1975 ("Local 1975"). Because the PERB did not have the authority to order the National AFGE to respond to the complaint on behalf of Local 1975, we reverse.

I. Facts

Mr. Collins, a member of the AFGE Local 1975, filed a standards of conduct complaint with the PERB against his local AFGE affiliate and the AFGE's National Union under D.C. Code § 1-617.03 (2016 Repl.) and 6-B DCMR § 544.2 (2020) alleging that his local union was being mismanaged. Specifically, Mr. Collins claimed that "there has been no accounting and fiscal/financial controls over [Local 1975's] membership dues and there has been no regular financial reports or summaries made available to members upon request[,]" which led him to conclude that "Union funds have been abused and mismanaged by Union representatives ...." As part of his complaint, he asked the PERB to order Local 1975 to turn over its fiscal records and meeting minutes from the previous four years; and further requested that the PERB order the AFGE to "report" on the financial submissions it received from Local 1975 during the same time period. Local 1975 never responded to the complaint, but some months after the filing, the AFGE responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" or "as moot." More specifically, the AFGE claimed that it is "not subject to D.C. Code § 1-617.03 with respect to [Mr.] Collins’[ ] claims."

In response, the PERB issued an order refusing to consider the AFGE's motion to dismiss on the ground that it was untimely under 6-B DCMR § 544.6 (2015),¹ finding that the complaint stated a violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.03(a)(5), deeming the allegations admitted under 6-B DCMR § 544.7, and ordering Local 1975 and the AFGE to provide the requested relief. The AFGE filed a motion for reconsideration asking the PERB to consider whether it had jurisdiction over the AFGE under D.C. Code §§ 1-617.03, - 617.10(a) and - 617.11(b), and 6-B DCMR § 544.1. The PERB denied the AFGE's motion for reconsideration solely on the grounds that the PERB had complied with 6-B DCMR §§ 544.6 and 544.7 when issuing the original order.

The AFGE then sought review of those orders in the Superior Court. Judge John M. Mott considered the challenge as one of "jurisdiction" and proceeded to address the issue in a matter similar to how courts of general jurisdiction would address the claim. Judge Mott found: (1) that the use of the term jurisdiction in 6-B DCMR § 544.6 "does not distinguish whether ‘jurisdiction’ ... means personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction"; (2) that the AFGE waived its argument that it was not subject to standards of conduct complaints under 6-B DCMR § 544.1 because the AFGE waived a challenge to the PERB's "personal jurisdiction" by filing an untimely response pursuant to 6-B DCMR § 544.6 ; and (3) that the matter should be remanded to the PERB to consider whether it had "subject matter jurisdiction" over standards of conduct complaints because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.

On remand from the Superior Court, the PERB determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because it was responsible for overseeing compliance with the District's laws governing public employee labor organizations, including ensuring that those organizations are in compliance with their administrative responsibilities, and that a "union's failure to hold periodic ... elections, ... maintain fiscal integrity ... or to provide members with regular financial reports" were "the very bases of [Mr.] Collins’ allegations." Further, the PERB determined that Judge Mott had "expressly rejected the AFGE's argument that the standards of conduct requirements in [ 6-B DCMR § 544.1 ] only apply to certified exclusive representative[s]" as "a personal jurisdiction argument couched as a subject matter jurisdiction defense" which the AFGE waived by failing to file a timely response. "Accordingly, consistent with the [Superior] Court's Opinion, the [PERB found] that it [had] subject matter and personal jurisdiction over [the] AFGE in this matter." The Superior Court, Judge Marisa J. Demeo, affirmed the PERB's order on remand and this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

"Although this is an appeal from a review of [an] agency action by the Superior Court ..., we review the PERB decision as if the matter had been heard initially in this court." Gibson v. District of Columbia Pub. Emp . Relations Bd ., 785 A.2d 1238, 1241 (D.C. 2001). While we will sustain the PERB's decision unless it is "clearly erroneous as a matter of law" or not "supported by substantial evidence," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), we "are not obliged to stand aside and affirm an administrative determination which reflects a misconception[,] ... faulty application," Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor , 409 A.2d 164, 169 (D.C. 1979), or failure to "conduct any analysis of" the applicable law. Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 971 A.2d 909, 915 (D.C. 2009).

III. Analysis

Although the parties over the life of this case have had disputes about whether the PERB had personal or subject matter jurisdiction, we see this case as presenting a single question: whether the PERB is authorized to exercise jurisdiction, i.e., "authority" over the AFGE. At the outset, we note that jurisdictional doctrines applicable to courts cannot be directly transposed onto administrative agencies. See City of Arlington v. FCC , 569 U.S. 290, 298, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) ; City of Hackensack v. Winner , 82 N.J. 1, 410 A.2d 1146, 1159-60 (1980). In City of Arlington , the Supreme Court discussed the confusion caused by references to "jurisdiction" when addressing the scope of an administrative agency's authority to decide certain matters. 569 U.S. at 297-301, 133 S.Ct. 1863. In that case, the Court concluded that no matter how the term is used, the question "is always whether the agency has gone beyond what [the legislature] has permitted it to do." Id. at 298, 133 S.Ct. 1863. We understand the Court to mean that courts reviewing agency actions ask not whether an agency has jurisdiction over a party or a dispute in the traditional sense of the term, but "whether the statutory text forecloses the agency's assertion of authority, or not." Id. at 301, 133 S.Ct. 1863. Therefore, the question before us is not whether the AFGE waived personal jurisdiction by responding to Mr. Collins’ complaint after the deadline, but rather whether the AFGE is subject to standards of conduct complaints filed with the PERB under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CMPA"), D.C. Code §§ 1-601.01 et seq . See D.C. Code §§ 1-605.02, - 617.03 ; District of Columbia v. 17M Assocs., LLC , 98 A.3d 954, 959 (D.C. 2014) ("An administrative agency is a creature of statute and may not act in excess of its statutory authority. When the legislature passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 163 (2020) ("[A]dministrative ... agencies must ... act within the limited scope of their powers.").

Whether the CMPA and 6-B DCMR § 544.6 grant the PERB statutory authority to order the AFGE to respond to standards of conduct complaints filed by an employee against his exclusive bargaining representative is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo . See Johnson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs. , 111 A.3d 9, 10 (D.C. 2015). As with all statutory interpretation questions, "[w]e look to the plain meaning of the statute first, construing words according to their ordinary meaning." Boyle v. Giral , 820 A.2d 561, 568 (D.C. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Only if the intent of the legislature is unclear will we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its statutory authority. See City of Arlington , 569 U.S. at 296, 133 S.Ct. 1863 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ); accord Johnson , 111 A.3d at 10. Although we will carefully consider the PERB's interpretation of the CMPA, "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear [legislative] intent." District of Columbia Fire & Emergency Med. Servs. Dep't v. District of Columbia Pub. Emp. Relations Bd. , 105 A.3d 992, 996 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Chevron, at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also District of Columbia v. Brookstowne Cmty. Dev. Co. , 987 A.2d 442, 449 (D.C. 2010) ("Agencies are creatures of statute and their authority and discretion are limited to that which is granted under their founding statutes. Therefore, regulations they enact pursuant to that statutorily provided authority cannot expand that...