Am. Nat'l Prop., & Cas. Co. v. Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-cv-198-KD-N
• Citation: 533 F.Supp.3d 1110
• Parties: AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY, AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. GULF COAST AERIAL, LLC f/k/a Gulf Coast Aerial Advertising, LLC et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

533 F.Supp.3d 1110

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY, AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.GULF COAST AERIAL, LLC f/k/a Gulf Coast Aerial Advertising, LLC et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-cv-198-KD-N

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

Signed March 31, 2021

Michael Keith Gann, Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, AL, James Stephens Strawinski, Pro Hac Vice, Strawinski & Stout, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph D. Thetford, Jr., Bay Minette, AL, for Defendants Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC, Richard Michael Collins.

David S. Cain, Jr., David G. Wirtes, Jr., Cunningham, Bounds, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant Leslie Fields.

ORDER

KRISTI K. DuBOSE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC's and Richard Michael Collins’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61); Plaintiff American National Property and Casualty Company's Response (Doc. 66); and Defendants Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC's and Richard Michael Collins’ Reply (Doc. 69). Also before the Court is Plaintiff American National Property and Casualty Company's Partial¹ Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents (Docs. 62, 63, 64); Defendants Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC's and Richard Michael Collins’ Response (Doc. 67); and Plaintiff American National Property and Casualty Company's Reply (Doc. 68).²

I. Background ³

On August 4, 2018, an aircraft owned and operated by Defendant Gulf Coast Aerial, LLC (Gulf Coast) crashed shortly after takeoff. The aircraft was piloted by George Bancroft Marshall (Marshall); Bradley John LaFleur (LaFleur) was also in the aircraft. Both men were killed in the crash. Thereafter, Leslie Fields (Fields), as the administrator for the estate of LaFleur, filed the underlying state court action currently pending in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama (Case No. 05-cv-2018-901313) to recover for LaFleur's death. The complaint has been amended; the Fourth Amended Complaint (the Complaint) is the operative complaint. (Doc. 64-1 (the Complaint)).

The subject aircraft was insured by Plaintiff American National Property and Casualty Company (ANPAC). The insurance policy (Policy No. AC-03158-00) (the Policy) was issued to Gulf Coast "and its individual executive officers and members." (Doc. 10-1 (the Policy)). Collins was an insured under the Policy.

On April 18, 2019, ANPAC filed this declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of rights as to its duty to indemnify and defend its insureds in the underlying wrongful death action. (Doc. 1; Doc. 10).⁴ Thereafter, in May 2019, Defendants moved to have this case dismissed, stayed or in the alternative to have this Court abstain from entertaining the case. (Docs. 12, 17). Following briefing, this Court determined that ANPAC's duty to indemnify was not yet ripe for consideration and accordingly stayed that issue. (Doc. 30). Now, the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment asking this Court to decide the remaining issue—whether ANPAC has a duty to defend Defendants in the underlying state court action.

II. Standard of Review

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean–Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of production can assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party "cannot produce admissible evidence to support" a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note ("Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials. ... [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact."). If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

The fact that both parties have filed partial motions for summary judgment does not alter the ordinary standard of review. See Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 224 F.2d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 1955)⁵ (explaining that cross-motions for summary judgment "[do] not warrant the granting of either motion if the record reflects a genuine issue of fact"). Rather, the Court will consider each motion separately "as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 3D Med. Imaging Sys., LLC v. Visage Imaging, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (quoting Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2004) ) (internal quotations omitted). Accord Wilson v. Browne, 2012 WL 1605877, at *2 (N.D. Fla. April 20, 2012).

In some cases, "[c]ross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute." Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir. 1983). But, the existence of cross motions for summary judgment "do[es] not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist." Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir. 1983) ) (internal quotations omitted). This is so because "each party moving for summary judgment may do so on different legal theories dependent on different constellations of material facts. Indeed, cross-motions for summary judgment may demonstrate a genuine dispute as to material facts as often as not." Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers Intern. Union of America, Local Union No. 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1975).

III. Relevant Law

As an initial matter, because this is a diversity action, state substantive law determines whether ANPAC has a duty to defend Defendants. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) ; Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] federal court sitting in diversity will apply the choice of law rules for the state in which it sits.") (citation omitted); Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007) (same). Alabama law applies the doctrine of lex loci contractus to contract claims. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004). The parties do not dispute that the Policy was formed in Alabama or that Alabama was the site of the conduct giving rise to the harms alleged in the underlying action. The Court therefore applies Alabama law infra. See id. ("The doctrine [of lex loci contractus ] states that a contract is governed by the laws of the state where it is made except where the parties have legally contracted with reference to the laws of another jurisdiction.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

An insurance company has two general duties under a policy of insurance: a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. Here, ANPAC presently seeks only a judicial declaration that it owes no duty to defend its insureds. In Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 928 So.2d 1006, 1009-10 (Ala. 2005), the Alabama Supreme Court explained the duty to defend as follows:

‘It is well settled "that [an] insurer's duty to defend is more extensive than its duty to [indemnify]." United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong , 479 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Ala. 1985) (citations omitted). Whether an insurance company owes its insured a duty to provide a defense in proceedings instituted against the insured is determined primarily by the allegations contained in the complaint. Id. at 1168. If the allegations of the injured party's complaint show an accident or an occurrence within the coverage of the policy , then the insurer is obligated to defend, regardless of the ultimate liability of the insured. Ladner & Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. , 347 So.2d 100, 102 (Ala. 1977) (citing Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. , 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1948) ). However, "[t]his Court ... has rejected the argument that the insurer's obligation to defend must be determined solely from the facts alleged in the complaint in the action against the insured." Ladner , 347 So.2d at 103. In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Run–A–Ford Co. , 276 Ala. 311, 161 So.2d 789 (1964), this Court explained:

We are of [the] opinion that in deciding whether a complaint alleges such injury, the court is not limited to the bare allegations of the complaint in the action against [the] insured but may look to facts which may be proved by admissible evidence....

‘ 276 Ala. at 318, 161 So.2d at 795 ; see Ladner , 347 So.2d at 103 (quoting this language). "[I]f there is any uncertainty as to whether the complaint alleges facts that would invoke the duty to defend, the insurer must investigate the facts surrounding

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