Am. Optical Corp. v. Spiewak
| Decision Date | 08 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | s. SC08–1616,SC08–1640,SC08–1617,SC08–1639. |
| Parties | AMERICAN OPTICAL CORPORATION, et al., Appellants–Petitioners, v. Walter R. SPIEWAK, et al., Appellees–Respondents. American Optical Corporation, et al., Appellants–Petitioners, v. Daniel N. Williams, et al., Appellees–Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gary L. Sasso, Matthew J. Conigliaro, and Christine R. Davis of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, FL; and M. Stephen Smith, Michael R. Holt, and Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein of Rumberger, Kirk and Caldwell, P.A., Miami, FL; for Appellants/Petitioners.
Joel S. Perwin, Miami, FL, James L. Ferraro, David A. Jagolinzer and Case A. Dam of The Ferraro Law Firm, P.A., Miami, FL, for Appellees/Respondents.
Frank Cruz–Alvarez of Shook, Hardy and Bacon, LLP, Miami, FL and Mark A. Behrens of Shook, Hardy and Bacon, LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of The Associated Industries of Florida, American Insurance Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Tort Reform Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, American Chemistry Council, and National Association of Manufacturers; Caryn L. Bellus of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami, FL, on behalf of Florida Defense Lawyers Association; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Craig D. Feiser, Deputy Solicitor General, Russell S. Kent, Special Counsel for Litigation, and Ashley E. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, on behalf of the Office of Attorney General; Steven G. Gieseler, Stuart, FL, on behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation; Gordon James, III, Valerie Shea of Sedgwick, Detert, Moran and Arnold, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, David J. Schenck of Jones Day, Dallas, TX, Gregory R. Hanthorn and Amber B. Shushan of Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, on behalf of North Safety Products, Inc. and Saint–Gobain Abrasives, Inc.; and Philip M. Burlington and Nichole J. Segal of Burlington and Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, in behalf of Florida Justice Association, for Amici Curiae.
This case is before the Court on appeal from Williams v. American Optical Corporation, 985 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act (the Act) is unconstitutional as applied to the Appellees. In its decision, the Fourth District also certified conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Hurst, 949 So.2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). See Williams, 985 So.2d at 32. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
In the decision below, the Fourth District Court of Appeal "cobbled" together multiple asbestosis-litigation cases and summarized the relevant facts as follows:
—that is, interstitial lung disease resulting from asbestos exposure and pleural thickening. According to plaintiffs, when they filed their lawsuits before the Act's adoption it was not necessary to establish that any malignancy or physical impairment had already resulted from their contraction of the disease asbestosis. Instead, they claim, it was merely necessary for them to show that they had suffered an injury from an asbestos-related disease.
Under the Act, however, a claimant bringing an action for damages from exposure to asbestos must now, as an indispensable element, plead and prove an existing malignancy or actual physical impairment for which asbestos exposure was a substantial contributing factor. Plaintiffs' asbestosis claims were dismissed for failing to meet the requirements of the Act. They challenge the Act on the grounds that by this legislation the government of Florida has taken from them a personal right in a cause of action for money damages arising from the exposure to asbestos even if the injury has not yet become malignant or caused any physical impairment.
Williams, 985 So.2d at 25–26 (footnote omitted). The Fourth District framed the dispositive issue presented as: "Can [the Act] be retroactively applied to prejudice or defeat causes of action already accrued and in litigation?" Id. at 25.
The Fourth District properly noted that citizens have personal rights under the Florida Constitution to acquire, defend, and keep property free from the claims of government and to vindicate those rights in courts of law. See id. at 26. The district court explained that a cause of action constitutes an intangible property right that is grounded in tort. See id. Retroactive legislation that impacts property rights is constitutionally invalid where "vested rights are adversely affected or destroyed or when a new obligation or duty is created or imposed, or an additional disability is established, in connection with transactions or considerations previously had or expiated." Id. at 27 (quoting McCord v. Smith, 43 So.2d 704, 709 (Fla.1949) ).
The district court stated that when a cause of action accrues, it becomes a substantive vested right. See id. at 27. However, whether legislation may affect a vested right to a particular cause of action is dependent on "the stage the right has attained when the legislation is enacted." Id. The Fourth District concluded that where a right of action has already accrued, new legislation enacted after that accrual which substantively affects the cause of action may not be retroactively applied to that cause of action. See id. at 28.
Based upon this conclusion, the Fourth District next considered whether prior to the Act, Florida law recognized a cause of action for damages arising from asbestosis
without any physical impairment or the presence of cancer. See id. at 28. The Fourth District concluded that case law from this Court and the Third District Court of Appeal clearly established that prior to the Act, emotional effects from contracting asbestosis were actionable under Florida law even though no physical impairment or cancer had resulted. See id. The district court recognized this Court's prior precedent that in cases where an alleged injury is a "creeping-disease," such as asbestosis, the action accrues when the accumulated effects of the substance manifest themselves in a way which supplies some evidence of a causal relationship to the product. See
id. at 29 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So.2d 533, 539 (Fla.1985) ). The district court rejected the asbestos industry's contention that the causes of action of those manifesting injury were a mere expectancy and not a vested cause of action. See
id. at 30. Instead, the Fourth District explained that the Appellees had alleged a previous exposure to asbestos which resulted in the disease of asbestosis, and that the disease had manifested itself in some way. See
id. at 30–31. As a result, the Fourth District concluded that for each of the Appellees, the cause of action had "passed from an expectation to the accrual of the right to sue for damages." Id. at 31.
The Fourth District held that the Act could not be constitutionally applied to eliminate any existing vested property rights in the asbestos-related actions that were pending when the Act became effective. See id. at 32. The district court certified conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Hurst, 949 So.2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), "to the extent that it ... stand[s] for a holding that the Act may be validly applied to asbestosis
claimants with accrued causes of action for damages but without permanent impairments or malignancy." Williams, 985 So.2d at 32.
The decision of the Fourth District is now before this Court for review.
The Act was created by chapter 2005–274, Laws of Florida. The preamble to the legislation provides multiple statements with regard to asbestos litigation, and section 774.202, Florida Statutes (2010), provides that the Act serves four purposes: (1) to give priority to "true" victims of asbestos (i.e., those claimants who can demonstrate "actual physical impairment" caused by asbestos exposure); (2) to preserve the rights of any individuals who have been exposed to asbestos to pursue compensation should they become "impaired" in the future; (3) to enhance the ability of the judicial system to supervise and control asbestos litigation; and (4) to conserve the resources of defendants to permit compensation to cancer
victims and individuals who are currently "physically impaired," while securing the right to similar compensation to individuals who may suffer "physical impairment" in the future. See § 774.202, Fla. Stat. (2010).
Section 774.204(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that "[p]hysical impairment of the exposed person, to which asbestos ... exposure was a substantial contributing factor" is an essential element of an asbestos claim. Subsection (2) provides that "[a] person may not file or maintain a civil action alleging a nonmalignant asbestos claim in the absence of a prima facie showing of physical impairment as a result of a medical condition to which exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor." The subsection details the highly...
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