Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Stinson
| Decision Date | 23 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. ED97657,ED97657 |
| Parties | AMERICAN STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM A. STINSON, Defendant, and SHAUNA M. YOUNG, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County
Honorable Nancy L. Schneider
Introduction
Shauna Young (Plaintiff) appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment to American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin (ASIC) on its petition seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify its insured, William A. Stinson (Defendant), for claims arising out of a fatal motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff claims the trial court erred by: (1) denying her motion for summary judgment because ASIC's automobile insurance policy is ambiguous as a matter of law; (2) granting ASIC's motion for summary judgment because there remain unresolved issues of material fact; and (3) granting ASIC's motion for summary judgment because the trial court misapplied the "law of the case" doctrine and based its ruling on a prior order that did notaddress the same motions and legal issues that were present before the trial court at the time of the challenged ruling. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
In August 2004, Defendant worked at a car dealership owned by his father, William B. Stinson (Father). On the night of August 14, 2004, Defendant rode his bicycle to Father's dealership, forced open the dealership door and a safe containing dealer license plates, took a set of keys, and drove a 2001 Lincoln LS off the dealership parking lot. Shortly thereafter, Defendant crashed the Lincoln into a vehicle being driven by Ricky J. Young, who died as a result of the collision.1 Plaintiff, Mr. Young's daughter, filed the underlying wrongful death suit against Defendant.
At the time of the August 14, 2004 collision, ASOC had issued an automobile insurance policy issued to Defendant. "Part I - Liability Coverage," provided, in relevant part:
(emphasis in original).
On January 28, 2008, ASIC filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Defendant for claims arising out of the August 14, 2004 collision. ASIC based its argument on the policy language excluding from the definition of "Insured persons" "[a]ny person using a vehicle without the permission of the person having lawful possession." ASIC asserted that, because Defendant drove the Lincoln without permission of the vehicle's owner, which was either Father or Father's dealership, the policy did not cover the accident.
On January 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the exclusionary clause upon which ASIC based its claim for a declaration of non-coverage was ambiguous. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion without explanation on April 1, 2010.
Plaintiff filed a first amended motion for summary judgment on November 12, 2010, again arguing that that the insurance policy was ambiguous, and, on February 19, 2011, the trial court issued an order and judgment denying Plaintiff's amended motion for summary judgment. The trial court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the policy language was ambiguous, explaining that "identical policy language was found to be clear and unambiguous in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Scheel[, 973 S.W.2d 560 (Mo.App.W.D. 1998)]." The trial court later set aside the February 19, 2011 order and judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff's counsel did not receive timely notification of its issuance.
On June 28, 2011, ASIC filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Defendant had no coverage under the policy and ASIC had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant because Defendant was using the Lincoln without "permission of the person having lawful possession" of it. Plaintiff filed a second amended motion for summary judgment on July 18, 2011, reasserting her earlier argument that the policy was ambiguous.
On October 5, 2011, the trial court granted ASIC's motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff's second amended motion for summary judgment. In the order, the trial court found that: (1) the policy language was "clear and unambiguous"; and (2) Defendant "did not have permission - express or implied - to drive the 2001 Lincoln automobile." Plaintiff appeals.
Standard of Review
We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 376; Rule 74.04(c). When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, this court views the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 376.
Discussion
In her first point on appeal, Plaintiff claims the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment because the undefined phrase "any person" is ambiguous as a matter of law and must be interpreted against ASIC and in favor of coverage. ASIC counters that the trial court properly denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in ASIC's favor because, under the clear and unambiguous language of the policy, Defendant was not an insured person.2
The interpretation of the meaning of an insurance policy is a question of law. Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007). In construing the terms of an insurance policy, this court "applies the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance and resolves ambiguities in favor of the insured." Id. (internal quotations omitted). We read the policy as a whole to determine the parties' intent and give the policy language used its plain and ordinary meaning. Grissom v. First Nat'l Ins. Agency, 371 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Mo.App.S.D. 2012). "If the policy is unambiguous, the policy will be enforced according to its terms." Id. at 874 (quotation omitted).
"An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy." Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010) (quotation omitted). "Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions." Id. (quotation omitted). "Ambiguous provisions of a policy designed to cut down, restrict, or limit insurance coverage already granted, or introducing exceptions or exemptions must be strictly construed against the insurer." Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Mo. banc 1992). However, "the absence of a definition for a key term does not necessarily render the policy ambiguous." Eldridge v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 270 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Mo.App.W.D. 2008).
Plaintiff maintains that the phrase "any person" is ambiguous as it is used in the provision excluding from the definition of "insured person" "[a]ny person using a vehicle without the permission of the person having lawful possession." More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that "any person" is ambiguous because it "may be reasonably understood to either include or exclude an'insured person' defined in the policy." In support of her argument, Plaintiff contends that ASIC's policy is ambiguous as a matter of law because, in Miller's Classified Ins. Co. v. French, 295 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App.E.D. 2009), this court found that the phrase "any person," which appeared in an exclusionary provision of an insurance policy, was reasonably open to different constructions and therefore ambiguous.
In French, the insured father's fifteen-year-old, unlicensed daughter drove her father's vehicle into a tree, injuring her passenger. French, 295 S.W.3d at 526. The passenger filed an action seeking compensation for her injuries, and the father demanded that his insurance company, Miller's, provide a defense and indemnify his daughter. Id. Miller's, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that, pursuant to the exclusionary language contained in the policy, it had no obligation to defend or indemnify the daughter. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the father "based upon the definition of who is insured under the policy and an ambiguity in one of Miller's exclusionary clauses." Id.
On review, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the term "any person" was ambiguous when analyzed in the context of the whole policy. Id. at 527. The liability coverage section of the policy defined "insured" as "[y]ou or any 'family member,'" and defined the words "you," "your," "we," "us," "our," and "family member," but it did not define "any person." Id. An exclusionary clause that appeared later in the policy denied coverage to "any person operating a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is entitled to do so." Id. The court reasoned that a lay person who purchased the policy could interpret the exclusionary provision's use of the term "any person" to be either "an all encompassing term" or to mean "'any person' other than those individuals specifically defined by the policy's definitions." Id.
French is distinguishable. The policy at issue in French defined "insured person" in one part of the policy to...
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