Amalfitano v. Owen Cocolin & State
| Decision Date | 18 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. N15C-08-219 ALR |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER A. AMALFITANO, as Administrator For THE ESTATE OF MARY SMITH and ROBLISHA SMITH, individually, Plaintiffs, v. OWEN COCOLIN and STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY DIVISION DELAWARE STATE POLICE, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, v. STEPHEN J. JEFFERIS, Third Party Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
CHRISTOPHER A. AMALFITANO, as Administrator For THE ESTATE OF MARY SMITH
and ROBLISHA SMITH, individually, Plaintiffs,
v.
OWEN COCOLIN and STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
AND HOMELAND SECURITY DIVISION DELAWARE STATE POLICE, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs,
v.
STEPHEN J. JEFFERIS, Third Party Defendant.
C.A. No. N15C-08-219 ALR
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Submitted: June 14, 2017
July 18, 2017
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Upon State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment DENIED
Upon State Defendants' Motions in Limine DENIED
Upon Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine DENIED
ROCANELLI, J.
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This is a wrongful death case arising from the death of Mary Smith, who was killed on October 3, 2014 in a motor vehicle collision with Third-Party Defendant Stephen J. Jefferis ("Jefferis"). Defendant Trooper Owen Cocolin of the Delaware State Police ("Trooper Cocolin") was pursuing Jefferis at high speeds when Jefferis proceeded through a red stop signal at the intersection of Lea Boulevard and Philadelphia Pike in Wilmington, Delaware, and struck a vehicle carrying Ms. Smith as a passenger. Ms. Smith died as a result of the collision.
This civil action is brought by Ms. Smith's estate and daughter ("Plaintiffs") against Trooper Cocolin and the Delaware Department of Public Safety and Homeland Security, Division of State Police ("Delaware State Police"). Plaintiffs assert that Trooper Cocolin caused Ms. Smith's death by acting with gross negligence in his pursuit of Jefferis. For ease of reference, the Court refers to Trooper Cocolin and the Delaware State Police collectively as "State Defendants."
The State of Delaware has appeared on behalf of State Defendants and filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. State Defendants deny liability and assert a number of affirmative defenses. State Defendants also seek third-party contribution and/or indemnification against Jefferis for liability arising from the incident.1
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Trial is scheduled to begin on August 14, 2017. The parties have completed discovery and State Defendants have moved for summary judgment. In addition, State Defendants and Plaintiffs have moved to preclude certain expert testimony at trial. To date, Jefferis has not filed a response to State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or the pending Motions in Limine. This is the Court's Memorandum Opinion on State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, State Defendants' Motions in Limine, and Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine.
On October 2, 2014, Trooper Cocolin was on-duty in an unmarked Delaware State Police vehicle when he received a report of two men using heroin in a Ford Mustang at a shopping center parking lot on Miller Road in Wilmington, Delaware. At approximately 9:08 p.m., Trooper Cocolin entered the shopping center parking lot and observed a Ford Mustang with two occupants. Jefferis was in the driver's seat of the Mustang while another man was in the passenger seat. Trooper Cocolin stopped his police vehicle near the left-side rear of the Mustang and activated his emergency lights. Trooper Cocolin exited his vehicle and approached the driver's side door of the Mustang.
Upon approaching the Mustang, Trooper Cocolin reportedly observed a hypodermic needle and other paraphernalia consistent with the use of heroin.
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According to Trooper Cocolin, Jefferis noticed Trooper Cocolin outside the driver's side window of the Mustang and proceeded to move his hands away from Trooper Cocolin's line of sight. Trooper Cocolin responded by drawing his service weapon and ordering Jefferis to keep his hands visible. Jefferis pulled the Mustang out of its parking spot and exited the shopping center parking lot toward 37th Street.
Trooper Cocolin returned to his police vehicle and pursued Jefferis in close proximity as Jefferis operated the Mustang at high speeds around stopped vehicles and through intersections against red stop signals. Jefferis eventually struck the vehicle in which Ms. Smith was a passenger after running a red light at the intersection of Lea Boulevard and Philadelphia Pike. Investigating officers estimated that Jefferis was traveling at approximately 99 mph at the time of impact. Ms. Smith died as a result of the collision.
State Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case of negligence because there is insufficient evidence that Trooper Cocolin proximately caused Ms. Smith's death. In addition, State Defendants assert that State Defendants are immune from liability pursuant to Section 4001 of the State Tort Claims Act ("Section 4001")2 and Delaware's Authorized Emergency Vehicle
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Statute ("AEVS")3 because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Trooper Cocolin acted with gross negligence in initiating, conducting, or failing to terminate his pursuit of Jefferis.
Plaintiffs oppose State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Trooper Cocolin was grossly negligent and proximately caused Ms. Smith's death. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiffs may proceed against the Delaware State Police pursuant to AEVS by establishing ordinary negligence as opposed to gross negligence.
A. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c).
State Defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c). The Court may grant summary judgment only where the moving party can "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."4 A genuine issue of material fact is one that "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."5 The moving party bears the initial burden of proof and, once that is met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a material issue of fact exists.6 At the motion for summary judgment phase, the Court must view the facts "in the light
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most favorable to the non-moving party."7 Summary judgment is appropriate if Plaintiffs' claims lack evidentiary support such that no reasonable jury could find in Plaintiffs' favor.8
B. Sovereign Immunity and Section 6511 of the Insurance for the Protection of the State Act.
State Defendants are eligible for sovereign immunity, which bars a lawsuit against the state or federal government in the absence of express consent from the legislature.9 Delaware courts are not empowered to disregard the doctrine of sovereign immunity.10 Rather, sovereign immunity must be waived pursuant to a clear statutory manifestation of intent by the General Assembly.11
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The General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 6511 of Delaware's Insurance for the Protection of the State Act ("Section 6511").12 Section 6511 provides:
The defense of sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as to any risk or loss covered by the state insurance coverage program, whether same be covered by commercially procured insurance or by self insurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain a provision to this effect, where appropriate.13
The Delaware Supreme Court has construed Section 6511 as a waiver of immunity "to the extent that either the State insurance program was funded by direct appropriation (self-insurance) or that the State purchased commercially available insurance to cover the loss."14
C. Section 4001 of the State Tort Claims Act.
The waiver of sovereign immunity through self-insurance does not necessarily mean that a lawsuit against the State is permissible. In Pauley v. Reinhoehl,15 the Delaware Supreme Court articulated an additional prerequisite for a cause of action to proceed against the State or its officials. Specifically, Pauley requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that (i) the State has waived the defense of sovereign immunity for the actions mentioned in the complaint; and (ii) Section
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4001 does not bar the cause of action.16 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that Section 4001 is analyzed "only after an express intent to waive sovereign immunity has been identified."17
Section 4001 provides an additional limit to civil liability "where [the State] has, by some means independent of 10 Del. C. § 4001, waived immunity."18 Section 4001 shields the State and its employees from liability if the State actor's conduct (i) arose out of and in connection with the performance of official duties involving the exercise of discretion, (ii) was performed in good faith, and (iii) was performed without gross or wanton negligence.19 Plaintiffs must establish the
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absence of one of these elements to defeat immunity under Section 4001.20 In circumstances involving a police officer, Section 4001 "strikes a balance between the need, on one hand, to hold responsible public officials exercising their power in a wholly unjustified manner and, on the other hand, to shield officials responsibly attempting to perform their public duties in good faith from having to explain their actions to the satisfaction of a jury."21
D. Delaware's Authorized Emergency Vehicle Statute (AEVS).
AEVS extends certain privileges to the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle in pursuit of a criminal suspect.22 AEVS authorizes a driver to (i) park or stand, irrespective of the other provisions of Title 21 of the Delaware Code; (ii) proceed past red lights or stop signs, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation; (iii) exceed the speed limit in circumstances where the driver does not endanger life or property; and (iv) disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in a specified direction.23 Although AEVS's privileges typically apply if the driver "is making use of audible
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or visual signals,"24 AEVS expressly provides that "an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not make use of such signals."25
In addition to extending certain privileges,...
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