Amalgamated Transit Union v. New Orleans Reg'l Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 02 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-1790 |
| Parties | AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION ET AL. v. NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion[1] for summary judgment by defendants New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”) and Alex Wiggins (“Wiggins”). Plaintiffs Amalgamated Transit Union (“ATU”) and Valerie Jefferson (“Jefferson”) oppose the motion.[2] For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion.
The Court exhaustively recounted the facts giving rise to this matter in its order and reasons denying the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,[3] and it therefore does so only briefly here.
Jefferson was fired from her job as a bus driver for RTA on September 8, 2021.[4]In addition to being a bus driver Jefferson was the president of her local chapter of the ATU.[5] Defendants assert that Jefferson was fired because, after asking about the RTA's termination of its deputy chief operations officer, Thomas Stringer (“Stringer”), a non-union member, she said, “it's on now, bitch” or “it is on bitch,” to Wiggins, RTA's CEO.[6] The conversation between Jefferson and Wiggins was witnessed by only one other person, RTA chief human resources officer Darwyn Anderson (“Anderson”).[7]
Plaintiffs argue that Jefferson initiated the conversation at issue due to her concern that the firing of Stringer indicated that the RTA planned to renege on a recently negotiated hazard pay deal,[8] and that Jefferson did not use profanity.[9]Plaintiffs assert that Jefferson said “it's on now, I need to contact the [union] executive board.”[10] Jefferson asserts that, by firing her, defendants violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free association.[11]
As noted, the Court previously denied cross-motions for summary judgment, determining that the parties' differing accounts as to what Jefferson said during the relevant conversation constituted a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment as to both the speech and association claims.[12] The Court also noted that defendants, in their motion and response to plaintiffs' motion, had not specifically addressed plaintiffs' freedom of association claim.[13]
After continuing the trial date, the Court granted defendants leave to file a motion for summary judgment addressing the issues of qualified immunity and municipal liability, as well as plaintiffs' substantive First Amendment claims.[14] In the motion currently before the Court, defendants argue that Wiggins is entitled to qualified immunity, that Wiggins' decision to fire Jefferson does not give rise to municipal liability, and that both the speech and association claims fail on the merits, regardless of the dispute over what Jefferson said.
Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the other party's case. Id.; see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1986) ().
Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by ‘conclusory allegations,' by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a ‘scintilla' of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the nonmovant fails to meet their burden of showing a genuine issue for trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075-76.
“Although the substance or content of the evidence submitted to support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . . the material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C., 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party's evidence, however, “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor.” Id. at 255.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that its previous order denying summary judgment does not preclude granting the instant motion. “An order denying summary judgment is interlocutory, and leaves the trial court free to ‘reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.'” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little, 37 F.3d 1069).
A government agency “cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)). “[T]he First Amendment nonetheless permits government employers to exercise a degree of control over their employees' words and actions.” Hardesty v. Cochran, 621 Fed.Appx. 771, 775 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
To succeed on a First Amendment free speech retaliation claim pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must show that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action, (2) she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, (3) her interest in speaking outweighs the government's interest in the efficient provision of public services, and (4) the protected speech motivated the adverse employment action. Wilson v. Tregre, 787 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Nixon v. City of Houston, 511 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2007)). The parties disagree as to whether plaintiffs can establish the second and third elements.[15]
The second element requires the Court to make two separate determinations: first, whether Jefferson was speaking as a private citizen; and second, whether she spoke on a matter of public concern. Regarding the first prong of this element, the Supreme Court has held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. “Official duties” are tasks that employees are “employed to do.” Id. The inquiry of whether an employee speaks pursuant to their official duties “is a practical one.” Gibson v. Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424). The fact that an employee speaks inside their office, rather than publicly, or that the subject matter of speech relates to their employment, does not necessarily mean that the speech was pursuant to their official duties. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21. The “critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).
When considering the second prong of this analysis-whether the employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern-the court “consider[s] the speech for which the employee was disciplined . . . not some other speech.” Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 437 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679 (1994)). Speech relates to a matter of public concern “when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” Moody v. Walker, No. 20-2656, 2021 WL 3423597, at *11 (E.D. La. Aug. 5, 2021) (Vitter, J.) (quoting Lane, 573 U.S. at 241) (internal quotations omitted).
In determining whether employee speech is on a matter of public concern, courts consider the “content, form, and context” of the speech. Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48). The speaker's motive “may be considered,” but it is not “a determinative factor.” Davis v. Ector Cnty., Tex., 40 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1994)....
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