Amarone v. Brennan

• Decision Date: 06 March 1940
• Citation: 11 A.2d 850,126 Conn. 451
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: AMARONE v. BRENNAN et al.

11 A.2d 850

126 Conn. 451

AMARONE v. BRENNAN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 6, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John R. Booth, Judge.

Action for an injunction by Pasquale Amarone against E. Gaynor Brennan and others to restrain the defendants from revoking the plaintiff's permit to sell intoxicating liquor brought to the Superior Court in Hartford county and reserved by the court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Judgment in accordance with opinion.

Henry H. Hunt, of Hartford, for plaintiff.

Leo v Gaffney, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Francis A. Pallotti, Atty Gen., for defendants.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.

AVERY Judge.

The essential facts as stipulated by the parties are as follows: The plaintiff sold beer on premises in New Haven under a tavern permit issued by the liquor control commission. He had carried on the business at the same site for four years under a permit, confining himself exclusively to the sale of Ballantine's beer. On the exterior of the premises he displayed a sign advertising his business and the principal product sold within. This sign contained the name of the tavern and, in addition, the word ‘ Ballantine's' in the form of the trade-mark of the Ballantine Brewing Company. The sign had no illumination other than street lighting in the vicinity. The plaintiff had built up a valuable good will because of his exclusive handling of Ballantine's beer, a product claimed to be of superior quality. On July 1, 1939, the liquor control commission adopted this regulation respecting signs: ‘ Section 27. Exterior Signs . No retail permittee shall permit or suffer the display of, on the exterior of the permit premises, any signs or other advertising matter bearing the name, brand or trade mark of any manufacturer or wholesaler of any alcoholic beverage.’ The commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of this section, ordered the plaintiff to remove the sign and has threatened to revoke his permit unless the sign is removed from the permit premises. The revocation would deprive the plaintiff of a valuable permit to transact business and the loss of the entire good will built up by a valuable investment and years of industry on the plaintiff's part, would prevent the plaintiff from advertising to the public the kind and quality of the product sold by him, and would depreciate the value of the good will of his business to an extent that cannot be determined in money damages. The total cost and expense of the erection of the sign is not in excess of $15, and the plaintiff is in no way indebted to the Ballantine Brewing Company except for its weekly invoices for merchandise. The sign does not deceive or tend to deceive a purchaser or consumer as to the nature, quantity or quality of such liquor.

The questions presented to this court for advice are in substance: (1) Has the liquor control commission authority to regulate advertising generally? (2) Is Section 27 a reasonable regulation? (3) Is the act of the plaintiff in maintaining an exterior brand sign a violation of Section 27? So far as the decision of this case is concerned, it is necessary to consider only the second and third questions. If the regulation is reasonable and within the power of the commission, and the plaintiff in maintaining an exterior sign violates the regulation, the action must fail. It is unnecessary to consider whether the liquor control commission has authority to regulate advertising generally.

The powers of the liquor control commission are referred to in Loglisci v. Liquor Control Commission, 123 Conn. 31, 35, 192 A. 260, and the statutes there set forth need not be repeated. The commission is given power to enforce the provisions of the act and ‘ to make all needful rules and regulations for that purpose’ and generally to do whatever is reasonably necessary for the carrying out of the intent of the act, General Statutes, Cum.Supp.1935, § 1019c, and ‘ every regulation made by the commission * * * shall have the same force and effect as law, unless and until set aside by some court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by the commission.’ General Statutes, Com.Sup.1935, § 1020c. In the Loglisci case, supra, 123 Conn. 37, 192 A. 263, we said: ‘ The authority of the administrative body acting under such grant of power is limited to the making of reasonable rules and regulations within the scope of the power granted,’ and ‘ must be exercised within the powers delegated, that is to say, must be confined to details for regulating the mode of proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amending or adding to the requirements of the statute itself.’ This is but another way of saying that the exercise of rule making power committed to the commission is subject to review by the court and if the court finds that the commission acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, in abuse of its power, or illegally, the action of the commission will be set aside. Wilks v. Liquor Control Commission, 122 Conn. 443, 445, 190 A. 262; Gwiazda v. Bergin, 121 Conn. 705, 185 A. 416; Skarzynski v. Liquor Control Commission, 122 Conn. 521, 525, 191 A. 98; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 329, 111 A. 209; Huntington Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 118 Conn. 71, 80, 170 A. 679; Lazarevich v. Stoeckel, 117 Conn. 260, 262, 167 A. 823.

One purpose of the Liquor Control Act is undoubtedly to discourage the artificial stimulation of liquor consumption. That advertising upon the exterior of places where liquor was sold was considered to be subversive of the intent of the act, appears from the provision of § 1039c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement to the General Statutes, which provides: ‘ No electric or neon sign advertising the sale of...