Hannifan v. Sachs
| Decision Date | 18 December 1962 |
| Citation | 150 Conn. 162,187 A.2d 253 |
| Parties | Mary E. HANNIFAN v. Arthur S. SACHS et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
James H. Throwe, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Albert L. Coles, Atty. Gen., for the appellees (defendants).
Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.
On January 10, 1958, the plaintiff was employed as an administrative fiscal management officer (credit manager) for the commission on alcoholism at its Blue Hills Clinic in Hartford. She continued in that position until, on February 29, 1960, she was notified by letter from the defendant Dudley P. Miller, executive director of the commission, that she was dismissed from state service effective at the close of business on March 14, 1960. Miller is the appointing authority and had employed the plaintiff. She appealed from the dismissal to the personnel appeal board pursuant to § 5-60 of the General Statutes. The defendants Arthur S. Sachs, Louis Margolis and Helen C. Foster, members of the personnel appeal board, acting as a hearing panel of the board under §§ 5-59 and 5-60 of the General Statutes, held a hearing and dismissed the appeal. The decision of the hearing panel is final. § 5-60. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought this action against Miller and the members of the personnel appeal board named above. She sought an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the personnel appeal board to vacate its decision, sustain her appeal, reinstate her as a permanent employee with all benefits accruing from the date of her dismissal and restore her to the roster of employees, or, as an alternative, to vacate its decision and grant a new hearing.
The pertinent portion of § 5-60 on the powers of the personnel appeal board, acting through a hearing panel, provides: The quoted language makes it clear that the personnel appeal board has no power to reinstate the plaintiff as a permanent employee, to reinstate her benefit rights as such an employee, or to restore her to the roster of state employees. Since no order for such action by the appointing authority is sought, we do not concern ourselves with those claims for relief. The only question on this appeal is whether the Superior Court was correct in refusing to issue an order requiring the appeal board to vacate its decision and either sustain the appeal or grant a new hearing.
The original complaint was in three counts, two of which were eliminated on demurrer. In the count on which the case was tried, relief was sought on the ground that the decision of the appeal board was arbitrary, capricious and illegal, that it was not rendered within the purview of § 5-56, relating to dismissals, and that it was in excess of the authority granted under § 5-60, relating to appeals to the board. Errors assigned in the finding and in rulings on evidence were not pursued in the brief, and these assignments are therefore treated as abandoned. Salgreen Realty Co. v. Ives, 149 Conn. 208, 211, 177 A.2d 673; State v. Ferraiuolo, 145 Conn. 458, 459, 144 A.2d 41.
The undisputed facts beyond those already recited are as follows: The plaintiff at the time of her dismissal was a permanent employee of the state in the classified service. The reasons given by Miller for her dismissal, as recited in the written notice of dismissal, were 'failure to carry out directives concerning collection procedures,' and 'failure to maintain effective relationships with patients and their legally liable relatives.' The appeal board, as a result of its hearing, concluded that the dismissal was justified and legal. The plaintiff was paid her salary to and including the effective date of her dismissal. The appeal board, in its decision, stated 'that despite the legality of the dismissal, the failure to adjust to the rather specialized working atmosphere of the Blue Hills Clinic should not destroy her 19 years of state service and ban her from all state service,' and therefore it denied the appeal 'unless Miss Hannifan, on or before September 1, 1960, delivers to this Board her resignation and a waiver of all claims for back pay, all in writing.' The plaintiff did not resign.
Section 5-56 of the General Statutes provides that '[a]n appointing authority may dismiss any employee in the classified service when he considers the good of the service will be served thereby,' that a written notice of the dismissal shall be given to the employee and to the personnel director, and that the notice shall set forth 'the reasons for dismissal in sufficient detail to indicate whether the employee was discharged for incompetency or other reasons relating to the effective discharge of his duties.' No claim is made that the notice in this case did not comply with the statute. The claim is that the appeal board acted arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally in reviewing the action of the appointing authority. Section 5-60, quoted above, confers on the appeal board the power to review the action of the appointing authority in discharging an employee only to the extent of determining whether the action was 'arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause.' If the appeal board finds that the appointing authority acted improperly in either of those respects, its duty is to adjudge the discharge invalid and sustain the appeal. If it finds that the appointing authority has not acted arbitrarily or without reasonable cause, its duty is to dismiss the appeal. Turrill v. Erskine, 134 Conn. 16, 23, 54 A.2d 494. The responsibility thus imposed on the board requires an exercise of judgment and discretion.
The function of the court in this action in the nature of mandamus is not to interfere...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Zinker v. Doty
...patterned their procedures on the provisions of sections 5-240 and 5-202 of Connecticut's General Statutes. Cf. Hannifan v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 166-68, 187 A.2d 253 (1962) (decided under former section 5-60 of Connecticut's General Statutes, the predecessor to present section 5-202). More......
-
Waterbury Teachers Ass'n v. Furlong
...of the act. Where the official or agency is authorized to exercise a discretionary power, mandamus does not lie. Hannifan v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 167, 187 A.2d 253; see General Statutes § 52-485. Relief by way of mandamus, therefore, is only available to one who has a complete and immediat......
-
State ex rel. Golembeske v. White
...but not discretionary, duties. State ex rel. Scala v. Airport Commission, supra, 154 Conn. 176, 224 A.2d 236; Hannifan v. Sachs, 150 Conn. 162, 167, 187 A.2d 253; State ex rel. Quintard Land Co. v. Hagan, 123 Conn. 383, 385, 195 A. 616; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 568, 23 A. 924. More pre......
-
Beccia v. City of Waterbury
...v. Furlong, 162 Conn. 390, 414, 294 A.2d 546 (1972); Ballas v. Woodin, supra, 155 Conn. 283, 285, 231 A.2d 273; Hannifan v. Sacks, 150 Conn. 162, 167, 187 A.2d 253 (1962). It is available only to one who has a clear legal right to the performance sought. Bahramian v. Papandrea, supra, 3; Ge......