Amato v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1090,80-1090
• Citation: 21 O.O.3d 158,423 N.E.2d 452,67 Ohio St.2d 253
• Parties: , 21 O.O.3d 158 AMATO, Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 253

67 Ohio St.2d 253

423 N.E.2d 452, 21 O.O.3d 158

AMATO, Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellant.

No. 80-1090.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 15, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

An order of a trial court, pursuant to Civ.R. 23(C)(1), determining that an action may be maintained as a class action is a final, appealable order, pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.

In 1976, appellant, General Motors Corporation, began placing engines manufactured by its Chevrolet Division in some of the automobiles produced by its Oldsmobile Division. ¹ The present cause is but a brief chapter in the multitudinous litigation that grew out of the discovery of the engine switch.

Appellee, Paul L. Amato, was one of the consumers who purchased an Oldsmobile equipped with an engine manufactured by the Chevrolet Division. Upon discovering this, appellee initiated the present action by filing an amended complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, against appellant and A. D. Pelunis Oldsmobile, Inc. (Pelunis), the dealer from whom appellee purchased his car. Appellee's complaint contained claims for breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, common law fraud, and violations of the Ohio Consumers' Sales Practices Act, R.C. Chapter 1345 (Act).

The appellee, pursuant to Civ.R. 23, sought to represent all Ohio consumers, "who previously owned, or presently or will own," one or more 1977 Oldsmobiles which came equipped with an engine other than one manufactured by the Oldsmobile Division (consumer class). Additionally, appellee sought certification of a defendant class of dealers with Pelunis acting as the representative of the putative defendant class (dealer class).

By order dated June 12, 1978, the trial court ruled that a consumer class action was maintainable under Civ.R. 23(B)(3). The class was limited to those residents of Ohio who had purchased new 1977 Oldsmobiles, and the claims were limited to those for breach of express warranty, common law fraud and violation of the Act. ² Additionally, the trial court refused to certify the dealer class, holding that threshold requirements of commonality and typicality, Civ.R. 23(A)(2) and (3), had not been met. ³

The appellant appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, asserting that the trial court improperly certified this as a class action. However, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the appeal. Rather, the appeal was dismissed because it was not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02. ⁴

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Andrew M. Fishman, Rye, N. Y., Robert B. Weltman, Cleveland, Leonard J. Schwartz, New York City, and Roger R. Roth, Shaken Heights, for appellee.

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Patrick F. McCartan, John L. Strauch, Kathleen B. Burke and John W. Edwards, II, Cleveland, for appellant.

HOLMES, Justice.

The question before this court, while difficult in resolution, may be stated with relative simplicity. Is an order, made pursuant to Civ.R. 23(C), that an action may be maintained as a class action, a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02?

The appellee argues that we need not answer this question because even assuming R.C. 2505.02 provides a right of appeal in cases such as this one, appellant is precluded from exercising this right since there was not compliance with Civ.R 54(B). ⁵ When there are multiple claims or multiple parties in a single action, Civ.R. 54(B) permits a trial court to enter a final judgment as to some, but not all, of the claims or parties upon an express determination that there is no just cause for delay.

Here, the trial court made no such determination; therefore, the appellee argues that this appeal was not properly before the Court of Appeals. Also, appellee points out that Pelunis remains a party to these proceedings.

Although this court has not addressed the question of the interplay between Civ.R. 54(B) and the right of appeal from orders certifying, or refusing to certify, class actions, ⁶ other jurisdictions, with rules similar to Civ.R. 54(B), have addressed the question. We look to those decisions for guidance.

In Rogelstad v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assn., Inc. (N.D.1974), 224 N.W.2d 544, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that an order, denying certification of an action as maintainable as a class action, is immediately appealable. In rejecting the argument that North Dakota Civil Rule 54(b) ⁷ precluded an immediate appeal, the court stated:

"We have no precedent in North Dakota which dictates that Rule 54 applies to orders denying class action status. We have considered this matter, and believe that Rule 54 applies to decisions which finally dispose of causes of action, as opposed to matters collateral to the merits of a case, such as the determination that an action may not be maintained as a class action. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.31 (2d Ed. 1974)."

Similarly, in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corporation (C.A.3, 1974), 496 F.2d 747, 752, the court stated that Federal Rule 54(b), "does not provide a means for reviewing the grant of class action treatment." Also, in West v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (C.A.10, 1977), 558 F.2d 977, the trial court denied certification of an action as a class action. In its order denying certification, the trial court made the requisite Rule 54(b) findings. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 54(b) cannot serve as a vehicle to review a trial judge's decision denying certification of an action as a class action.

Additionally, we note that it has been said that the words "claim for relief," as used in Civ.R. 54(B), are synonymous with "cause of action." 6 Moore's Federal Practice 471, paragraph 54.31. A class action is not a cause of action; rather, it is a procedural mechanism through which many plaintiffs' causes of action may be asserted against a single defendant in one lawsuit. Therefore, based upon the foregoing, we hold that Civ.R. 54(B) does not apply to orders certifying that an action may be maintained as a class action. ⁸ Consequently, we must decide whether a trial court's order, determining that an action may be maintained as a class action, is immediately appealable.

R.C. 2505.03 states, in relevant part, that "(e)very final order * * * may be reviewed * * *." Final orders are defined by R.C. 2505.02, which reads, in part:

"An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding * * *."

In Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 119, 314 N.E.2d 386, this court said:

"An order of a trial court, pursuant to Civ.R. 23(C)(1), determining that an action may not be maintained as a class action is a final, appealable order, pursuant to R.C. 2505.02."

In reaching this conclusion, this court reasoned that such an order affects a substantial right which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment. Here, the appellant argues that a determination allowing an action to be maintained as a class action affects a substantial right and is made in a special proceeding and, therefore, it is a final, appealable order. ⁹

That an order relating to the maintenance of an action as a class action affects a substantial right was settled by Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., supra. So, we must decide whether a trial court's ruling on a motion to certify an action as a class action is made in a special proceeding.

The term "special proceeding" has not been defined by the General Assembly. Also, "most modern courts have been less than precise in defining 'special proceeding.' " State v. Collins (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 107, 109, 265 N.E.2d 261.

However, from our cases discussing what is or is not a special proceeding, we are able to glean certain principles relating to special proceedings. First and foremost, this court has been most reluctant to allow interlocutory review of rulings made by a trial during the pendency of litigation by holding that such rulings were made in special proceedings. See Bernbaum v. Silverstein (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 445, and cases discussed therein, at page 447, 406 N.E.2d 532. The policy for this was stated in Squire v. Guardian Trust Co. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 1, 5, 68 N.E.2d 312, as follows:

"The prompt and orderly disposal of litigation is an object much to be desired, and the entertainment of appeals from various orders made by the trial court during the progress of the main action is not in pursuance of such object."

The second principle, derived from our cases, is that in the small class of orders deemed to have been made in special proceedings, " * * * (a) prime determinant of whether a particular order is one made in a special proceeding is the practicability of appeal after final judgment. * * * " Bernbaum v. Silverstein, supra, at page 447, 406 N.E.2d 532. Thus, in State v. Collins, supra, we held that a trial court's order granting a criminal defendant's motion to suppress evidence is made in a special proceeding because the state would be precluded by double jeopardy principles from any appellate review should the defendant prevail at trial. Likewise, in State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 258, 400 N.E.2d 897, we determined that a ruling on a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy was made in a special proceeding. This was because double jeopardy protects a criminal defendant from a second trial, so immediate appeal is necessary.

From the foregoing, we determine that whether an order is made in a special proceeding is resolved through a balancing test. This test weighs the harm to the "prompt and orderly disposition of litigation," and the consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from the allowance of an appeal, with the need for immediate review because appeal after final judgment...