Amavizca v. Nissan N. Am.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | ED CV22-02256 JAK (KK) |
| Parties | Ignacio Ibarra Amavizca, et al. v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Present: Honorable JOHN A. KRONSTADT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Proceedings (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND (DKT 11)
On March 24, 2022, Ignacio Ibarra Amavizca and Pricila Ibarra (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action in the Riverside Superior Court against Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”) and Okdak, Inc. (“Okdak,” or together with Nissan, “Defendants”). Dkt. 1-2 (the “Complaint”). The Complaint advanced four causes of action against Defendants: (1) breach of an express warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Act; (2) fraudulent inducement via intentional misrepresentation; (3) fraudulent inducement by concealment; and (4) negligent repair. Id.
Plaintiffs and Okdak are California citizens. Dkt. 1. However, on December 5, 2022, Plaintiffs dismissed Okdak from this action. Dkt. 1-6. Complete diversity was satisfied as to the remaining parties, Plaintiffs and Nissan. On December 27, 2022, Nissan removed this action asserting diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. 1.
On March 2, 2023, Plaintiffs moved to remand this action. Dkt. 11 (the “Motion”). On March 16, 2023, Nissan filed an opposition to the Motion. Dkt. 18 (the “Opposition”). On March 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in support of the Motion. Dkt. 19 (the “Reply”).
A hearing on the Motion was held on April 10, 2023, and it was taken under submission. For the reasons stated in this Order, the Motion is DENIED.
On May 27, 2018, Plaintiffs allegedly purchased a new 2018 Nissan Altima with VIN 1N4AL3AP0JC154805 (the “Subject Vehicle”). Complaint ¶ 8. They allegedly entered into an express written contract with Nissan, which is the New Vehicle Limited Warranty (“Warranty”), which obligated Nissan to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the Subject Vehicle or provide corresponding compensation if there was a failure to do so. Id. ¶ 9. It is alleged that the Warranty covers any repairs needed to correct defects in materials or workmanship of covered parts. Id. The basic coverage period is in place until the earlier of 36 months or 36,000 miles, and the powertrain coverage is in place until the earlier of 60 months or 60,000 miles. Id. The powertrain coverage specifically applies to the engine, transmission and transaxle, drivetrain and restraint system. Id. It is alleged that through the Warranty, Nissan assured consumers that it would repair any defect in materials or workmanship under normal use. Id.
It is alleged that Nissan manufactured and/or distributed more than 500,000 vehicles throughout the United States with defective continuously variable transmissions (“CVT”). Complaint ¶ 11. It is further alleged that this occurred between 2010 to present, and that the vehicles were sold or leased to consumers in California, including Plaintiffs. Id. The CVT defect allegedly causes vehicles to exhibit unusual noises; stalling; premature transmission failure; hesitation from a stop before acceleration; sudden, hard shaking during deceleration; sudden, hard shaking and violent jerking (commonly known as “juddering” or “shuddering”) during acceleration; and other drivability concerns that impede the driver's safety, each and all of which prevent a CVT-equipped vehicle from operating as intended by the driver. Id. ¶ 12. It is also alleged that this transmission defect creates unreasonably dangerous conditions for those in the vehicles, including the risk of a crash when trying to accelerate after a stop, when accelerating to merge with highway traffic and during uphill driving. Id. ¶ 13.
It is alleged that Nissan knew or should have known about the safety hazard posed by the defective transmissions before the sale of CVT-equipped vehicles as the result of pre-market testing, consumer complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, consumer complaints to Nissan and its dealers, and other sources and that this led Nissan to issue Technical Service Bulletins acknowledging the transmission defect. Complaint ¶ 14. Plaintiffs allege that Nissan was aware, on or before October 2012, that the CVT installed in the vehicles was defective and would manifest the symptoms described above. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs further allege that Nissan knew the CVTs installed in its vehicles were prematurely failing, requiring repeated repair or replacement. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Nissan knew the replacement CVTs were just as likely to fail prematurely as the originally installed CVT. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Nissan's knowledge of the defects is confirmed because it monitors warranty spending by component part and regularly reviews warranty spending on repairs and replacements of the CVT and its component parts. Id. ¶ 16.
Plaintiffs allege that Nissan should not have sold, leased or marketed the CVT-equipped vehicles without a full and complete disclosure of the transmission defect, and it should have voluntarily recalled all CVT-equipped vehicles. Complaint ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege that Nissan instead concealed and minimized the significance of these defects. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiffs argue that Nissan is continuing to sell CVT-equipped vehicles notwithstanding that it has not developed any solution to correct the transmission defects. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.
Plaintiffs allege that they would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle, or would have paid considerably less for it, if they had known of the transmission defect, and they argue that a reasonable consumer would have done the same. Complaint ¶¶ 45-46.
Although Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Vehicle on May 27, 2018, they contend that the statute of limitations has been tolled under the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Complaint ¶¶ 56-77.
A motion to remand is the vehicle used to challenge the removal of an action. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, a state civil action may be removed only if, at the time of removal, it is one over which there is federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Diversity jurisdiction is present where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the adverse parties are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Complete diversity of citizenship is required, i.e., “the citizenship of each plaintiff [must be] different from that of each defendant.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
When a matter is removed based on a claim of diversity jurisdiction, the removing party has the burden of showing that “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “[T]he amount in controversy includes all relief claimed at the time of removal to which the plaintiff would be entitled if she prevails.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, “[t]he amount in controversy may include ‘damages (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well as attorneys' fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.' ” Id. at 416 (quoting Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016)). Where it is unclear “from the face of the complaint whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Because federal courts are ones of limited jurisdiction, the removal statute is to be strictly construed; any doubt about removal is to be resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). The removing party has the burden to establish that it was proper to do so. Id. “If a case is improperly removed, the federal court must remand the action because it has no subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the case.” ARCO Env't. Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep't of Health & Env't. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000).
“[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant's amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014)). Therefore, the “defendant's notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). If “a defendant's assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged . . . both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88).[1]
“In measuring the amount in controversy, a court must assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.” Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Therefore, “[t]he ultimate inquiry is what amount is put ‘in controversy' by the plaintiff's complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe.” Id.
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