Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1947
• Docket Number: No. 11751.,11751.
• Citation: 158 F.2d 554
• Parties: AMAYA et al. v. STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

158 F.2d 554 (1946)

AMAYA et al. v. STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al.

No. 11751.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 27, 1946.

Rehearing Denied January 21, 1947.

William Lawrence Scarborough and E. Garland Brown, both of Corpus Christi, Tex., and Dennis B. Chapin, of Mission, Tex., for appellants.

Frank J. Scurlock, of Dallas, Tex., Benjamin Dudley Tarlton and Walter M. Lewright, both of Corpus Christi, Tex., and Paul A. McDermott, of Fort Worth, Tex., for appellees.

Before SIBLEY, WALLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

WALLER, Circuit Judge.

The Plaintiffs, citizens of Mexico, claiming an interest in oil lands under a grant from the kingdom of Spain, and a right to recover for their portion of the minerals taken from the lands, have appealed from an adverse decree.¹

The lands lie between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers in Texas. The original grantee from the kingdom of Spain conveyed the lands in 1811 to Pedro Ygnacio Garcia, a remote ancestor of the Plaintiffs, and likewise a citizen and resident of Mexico.

The Plaintiffs contend that the land between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers was never under the jurisdiction of the United States nor of the State of Texas until same were ceded by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848; that the lands involved in this suit are within the area so ceded and are within the protection of Article VIII in the treaty requiring title of Mexican citizens to such lands to be "inviolably respected;" and that by that article of the treaty the lands involved in this suit were secured against the passage by Congress or by the Legislature of Texas of any statutes of limitation, forfeiture, or prescription whereby Mexican citizens, not established in Texas, might lose title and possession of such lands. Plaintiffs concede that they cannot recover if the statutes of limitation of Texas can be lawfully applied.

That part of Article VIII of the treaty which provoked this controversy announced that: "In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not established there shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it, guarantees equally ample as if same belonged to citizens of the United States." (9 U.S.Statutes at Large, 922 et seq.)

Considering the narrowness of the controlling question, as we view it, a remarkable amount of historical knowledge and legal learning has been expended in the discussions. The views of counsel and of the lower court have been elaborately presented. Nevertheless, the case seems to require from us no extended discussion in order to vindicate the soundness of the conclusions which we have reached.

Our answer is found in the words of the treaty rather than in the pages of history. It would not be fatal to the correctness of our conclusion were it to be conceded that the lands between the Nueces and the Rio Grande did not come under the suzerainty of the Republic of Texas, or the United States of America, until they were ceded in and by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and that the State of Texas never acquired jurisdiction over these until the passage by Congress of the Compromise Agreement of 1850. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq.

Antecedent to a construction of the pertinent passage of the treaty it would seem profitable to consider the relation of treaties generally to federal and state constitutions and statutes.

Clause 2 of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

A treaty lawfully entered into stands on the same footing of supremacy as does the Constitution and Laws of the United States. It is generally self-operating in that it requires no legislation by either Congress or the state. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 515, 68 L.Ed. 1041. A treaty must be regarded as a part of the law of the state as much as are the state's own statutes and it may override the power of the state even in respect of the great body of private relations which usually fall within the control of the state. The treaty-making power might even be superior to those powers which are reserved to the states. State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984.

But while there is no express limitation in the federal Constitution upon the treaty-making power, nevertheless it is not unlimited. It is subject to prohibitions within that Constitution against the state, or federal government. The treaty-making power does not extend "So far as to authorize what the constitution forbids". Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 10 S.Ct. 295, 297, 33 L.Ed. 642; Asakura v. Seattle, supra; Missouri v. Holland, supra; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 78 U.S. 616, 20 L.Ed. 227.

In United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 24 L.Ed. 192, it was stated: "The power of the State to regulate the tenure of real property within her limits, and the modes of its acquisition and transfer, and the rules of its descent, and the extent to which a testamentary disposition of it may be exercised by its owners, is undoubted. It is an established principle of law, everywhere recognized, arising from the necessity of the case, that the disposition of immovable property, whether by deed, descent, or any other mode, is exclusively subject to the government within whose jurisdiction the property is situated. McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 202, 6 L.Ed. 300. The power of the State in this respect follows from her sovereignty within her limits, as to all matters over which jurisdiction has not been expressly or by necessary implication transferred to the Federal government. The title and modes of disposition of real property within the State, whether inter vivos or testamentary, are not matters placed under the control of Federal authority. Such control would be foreign to the purposes for which the Federal government was created, and would seriously embarrass the landed interests of the State."

See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715, 24 L.Ed. 565.

Is the contention of the Plaintiffs that the treaty forever takes from the State of Texas the power to enact statutes of limitation or other statutes that might adversely affect the title or possession of Mexicans and Texas citizens alike, inconsistent with the general rule of international law that in case of the division of an empire the power to regulate and control property passes to the new sovereign of the area involved? Would the interpretation of the treaty sought by the Plaintiffs be out of harmony with the dual sovereignty plan of government under which the states have the exclusive right to pass laws regulating the alienation, tenure, title, and possession of lands within their boundaries? Would the requirement that the property of a non-resident alien be free from statutes of limitation or state regulation while that of a citizen of the state where the lands are located should be subject to such statutes, be inconsonant with the general concept of the equal protection of the law and likewise repugnant to the general purpose of the last sentence of Article VIII of the treaty?

We propound these thought-provoking questions not for the purpose of answering them but only for the purpose of showing the chasms of doubt into which the path laid out by Appellants might...