Ambat v. City & County of San Francisco
| Decision Date | 27 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C 07-03622 SI,C 07-03622 SI |
| Parties | MERCY AMBAT, ET AL. Plaintiffs, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
On May 27, 2011, the Court heard argument on plaintiffs Lisa Janssen, Mattie Spires-Morgan, and Anjie Versher's Motion for Entry of Judgment and defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement. Having considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART each motion.
These consolidated cases involved challenges by approximately thirty sheriffs deputies to a gender-based staffing policy of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department. In mid-2006, the Sheriff reorganized inmate housing in the San Francisco jails such that all female inmates were placed in County Jail #8 in female-only housing units, or "pods." Thereafter, in October 2006, the Sheriff implemented a policy requiring that only female deputies be assigned to staff these female pods. Plaintiffs in this case were both male and female sheriffs deputies who alleged that the Sheriffs staffing policy ("the Policy") amounts to employment discrimination. Additionally, several of the plaintiffs brought retaliation claims against defendant. The Court granted defendant summary judgment on almost all of plaintiffs' claims.
The Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on retaliation claims brought by three plaintiffs: Lisa Janssen, Mattie Spires-Morgan, and Anjie Versher ("plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs contended that defendant retaliated against them by reprimanding them for complaining that the Policy constituted gender discrimination and for participating in this lawsuit. They pointed to written reprimands, negative performance evaluations, "written counseling," and other conduct that they argued was retaliatory.
A day after the Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' retaliation claims, and approximately three weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, the parties agreed to continue the trial date in order to enter into settlement negotiations on the remaining claims. A settlement conference was held with Chief Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on June 8 and June 10, 2010, and everyone agreed that the parties had settled the case. The agreement was read into the record. The Court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice upon settlement. Doc. 292.
Almost immediately it became clear that the parties disagreed about how the settlement should be memorialized. Plaintiffs objected to the dismissal, requesting instead that judgment be entered incorporating the terms of the settlement. Doc. 293. Defendant objected the form of judgment proposed by plaintiffs, explaining its belief that there should be a separate, written settlement agreement, and then a simple judgment entered that stated that the retaliation claims had been dismissed. The Court referred this disagreement back to Magistrate Judge James, and the parties were unable to come to a resolution.
Currently before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for entry of judgment, and defendant's motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Under Rule 58(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may request that judgment be "set out in a separate document." Final judgment should "grant the relief to which each party is entitled." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Becker, No. C09-5476RJB, 2010 WL 3340524 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2010).
District courts have the inherent and equitable power to enforce settlement agreements in cases pending before them. In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994); Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987). This enforcement power extends to oral agreements, "'particularly when the terms are memorialized into the record.'" See Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sargent v. HHS, 229 F.3d 1088, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2000). However, courts cannot enforce a settlement agreement where none exists; the parties must have actually agreed to the terms of settlement before the court can enforce that settlement. Cf. United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964). The moving party has the burden to present a prima facie case that the parties formed an enforceable settlement agreement. See Olam v. Congress Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1137 n.19, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
"The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally." Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). California law applies to a determination regarding the scope of the Settlement Agreement even though one of the underlying cause of action is federal. See United Commercial Ins. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1992). Under California law, the goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. See Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264 (1992). The mutual intention of the parties is determined by examining factors including the words used in the agreement, the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract, and the subsequent conduct of the parties. See Morey v. Vannucci, 64 Cal. App. 4th 904, 912 (1998); Hernandez v. Badger Construction Equipment Co., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1791, 1814 (1994).
The parties agree that they reached a settlement agreement on plaintiffs' retaliation claims, and that the settlement agreement was memorialized on the record before Magistrate Judge James on June 10, 2010. They disagree over the terms of the settlement, and the procedure by which it should be reduced to writing. Plaintiffs argue that the agreement should be entered by the Court as part of awritten judgment exactly as it was stated on the record on June 10. Plaintiffs have filed a motion for entry of judgment. Defendant argues that the parties agreed to execute a written settlement agreement and that the written agreement should make clear certain other terms that were implicit in the oral agreement. Defendant also argues that there is no legal grounds for plaintiffs' request that the judgment incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement. Defendant has filed a motion to enforce the settlement.
Plaintiffs argue that all claims have been resolved and that the Court should enter final judgment.1 Plaintiffs propose a final judgment that is nearly two pages long. The proposed judgement contains some of the terms of the oral settlement agreement, including that the Court has retained limited jurisdiction over the case. Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that the parties agreed to execute a written settlement agreement, not recite the settlement terms in the judgment. Additionally, defendant argues that the proposed judgment contains certain statements that were not part of the settlement agreement.2
When the parties memorialized the settlement agreement on the record, Magistrate Judge James asked Margaret Baumgartner, who was appearing on behalf of defendant, whether she had "authority to settle these matters." TR 2:20-2:21. Ms. Baumgartner replied as follows:
There is no indication on the record that the parties intended for the Court to include in the judgment the specific relief negotiated for in the settlement agreement. Cf. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523 (1986) (). The Court finds that the parties did intend for the City Attorney to sign the settlement agreement. But the record does not indicate that the parties agreed to enter into a written settlement agreement that differed in any way from the oral settlement agreement that was memorialized on the record, and which the parties agree is binding.
Once the parties sign a written settlement agreement, it will be appropriate to enter judgment. Below, the Court orders the parties to sign such an agreement within ten days. At that time, the Court will enter judgment in this case. The judgment will not contain the terms of the settlement, with the exception that it will indicate where the Court has retained jurisdiction over certain, limited matters.3Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendant has filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Defendant argues that the settlement contains five particular terms that plaintiffs have objected to. First, defendant argues that the parties manifested an agreement to execute a written settlement agreement. Second, defendant argues that the plaintiffs agreed to a general release of all their claims except their employment discrimination claims. Third, defendant argues that the parties agreed to a "no fault" settlement agreement with each side bearing the attorney's fees and costs that they incurred in connection with the settled retaliation claims. Fourth, defendant argues that...
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