Amdahl v. Fillmore County

• Decision Date: 30 September 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 47146,s. 47146
• Citation: 258 N.W.2d 869
• Parties: O. H. AMDAHL, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant. Harold KARLI, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant. Clayton E. FISHBAUGHER, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant. Carl FANN, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant. to 47149.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 869

258 N.W.2d 869

O. H. AMDAHL, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant.

Harold KARLI, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant.

Clayton E. FISHBAUGHER, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant.

Carl FANN, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Appellant.

Nos. 47146 to 47149.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 30, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Upon appeal to the district court under Minn.St. 387.20, subd. 7, from a decision of the county board determining the salary of the county sheriff, the district court conducts a review of the salary determination in a hearing de novo, and the court is specifically authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the county board upon a determination that the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, oppressively, or without sufficiently taking into account the extent of the responsibilities and duties of the office. Because a sheriff is a quasi-judicial officer, such a delegation of authority by the legislature does not offend the constitutional requirement of separation of powers.

The determination of the district court will not be set aside by this court on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Held, under the facts of this case, that there is sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings.

2. In statutory appeals to the district court from decisions of the county board determining the salary and budget of the county auditor, treasurer, and county recorder, authorized by Minn.St. 384.151, subd. 7; 385.373, subd. 7; and 386.015, subd. 7, the district court conducts a review of the salary determination in like manner as though reviewed by certiorari, and the court's inquiry is limited to whether the board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive manner, or without sufficient consideration of the responsibilities and duties of the office. Limited inquiry is also permitted into facts dehors the record which might reveal as arbitrary or capricious action of the board which might otherwise appear reasonable.

Upon appeal to this court from the determination of the district court, we will make an independent examination of the action of the county board without according any special deference to the same review conducted by the district court. Neither the district court nor this court may substitute its judgment for that of the county board. Held, under the facts of this case, that the appealing officers failed to establish that the actions of the county board were improper under the statutes.

3. In statutory appeals to the district court from decisions of the county board determining the budget of a county office, attorneys fees may be awarded to the appealing officer.

Robert R. Benson, County Atty., Preston, for appellant.

Baudler, Baudler & Maus, and Lawrence E. Maus, Austin, for Amdahl & Fann.

J. F. Herrick, Lanesboro, for Karli.

Gartner, Burkhardt, Shulman & Ekstrand, and David Shulman, Preston, for Fishbaugher.

Heard before ROGOSHESKE, SCOTT, and PLUNKETT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

In January 1976, the Fillmore County Board of Commissioners voted to raise in varying amounts the salaries of the county sheriff, auditor, treasurer, and county recorder. ¹ The board also set the budgets for all offices except that of the sheriff, approval of which was still pending. Thereafter, separate statutory appeals to the district court were instituted by the officers on the grounds that their raises were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and made without sufficient regard to their duties and responsibilities. With the exception of the sheriff, each of the officers also sought an increase in his office's budget. The district court ordered the county to increase the salaries and budgets in certain specified amounts. The county appealed from the judgments entered in all four cases, and they were consolidated for consideration. For reasons which follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court with respect to the sheriff's appeal but reverse as to the other officers.

During the fall of 1975, the Fillmore County commissioners reviewed the salaries of the county sheriff, county recorder, auditor, and treasurer and determined that each officer's salary should be raised in varying amounts. In determining the salary increases to be given each of these county officials, the commissioners took into account such factors as the wage rate of elected officials contrasted with appointed officials, the previous increases in each officer's salary since his reelection in 1974, and the salaries paid officers holding similar positions in the other counties of Minnesota. The commissioners were also concerned with the fact that the county was close to its maximum levy limitation, which meant that the funds were not available to pay every county employee the salary he requested.

After the proposed salary increases were formally adopted by the commissioners on January 27, 1976, each of the above mentioned officers instituted statutory appeal proceedings in district court, claiming that his raise was inadequate. ² With the exception of the sheriff, all of the officers also requested budget increases for their respective offices, principally for the hire of additional personnel and an increase in the salaries of existing staff. On June 10, 1976, the trial judge found generally that the salary increase for each of the county officers was unreasonable and not based on an adequate consideration of their respective responsibilities and duties. Additionally, the court found that the budgets for the offices of the county recorder, auditor, and treasurer were too low. The court then proceeded to set increased salaries for the officers and budgets for their offices. ³ All of the officers, with the exception of the sheriff, were also awarded $300 in attorneys fees, since their appeals were concerned in part with budget changes. The county has taken a direct appeal to this court from the judgments entered with respect to the above changes.

Recently we had occasion to discuss generally the role of the judiciary in reviewing decisions of one of the other branches of government "Before discussing the precise standards which apply to review of administrative agency decisions as they have emerged from our prior decisions, it is appropriate to reiterate general principles which govern our courts in dealing with all such cases. The legislature may not constitutionally delegate to the judiciary duties which are essentially administrative in character. We have consistently viewed with disfavor statutes which specify trials de novo and which attempt to confer original jurisdiction on trial courts over policy matters which are the responsibility of the legislative and executive branches. The repeal of Minn.St.1974, § 115.05, subd. 7, may have stemmed from recognition of that principle. We have repeatedly called attention to the danger of eroding the barriers which guarantee the separation of powers. Steenerson v. G. N. Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.W. 713 (1897); State v. G. N. Ry. Co. 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W. 247 (1915); State v. Duluth Mi. & I. R. Ry. Co. 246 Minn. 383, 75 N.W.2d 398 (1956). In the Steenerson case, we said on reviewing a rate decision of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission:

" 'If by this the legislature intended to provide that the court should put itself in the place of the commission, try the matter de novo, and determine what are reasonable rates, without regard to the findings of the commission, such intent cannot be carried out, as a statute which so provided would be unconstitutional. The fixing of rates is a legislative or administrative act, not a judicial one.' Steenerson v. G. N. Ry. Co. 69 Minn. 353, 375, 72 N.W. 713, 716." Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, Minn., 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (1977).

Similarly, the fixing of rates of compensation for county officers and the budgets of their offices is essentially a legislative or an administrative act, not a judicial one. Therefore, the provisions of our constitution impose constraints upon the permissible scope of judicial action regarding county salary determinations, limiting judicial review to a determination of whether the salary was set in an arbitrary or unreasonable fashion. However, certain exceptions to this general rule have been recognized when the officers involved are officers of the court:

"We * * * held (in Rockwell v. County of Fillmore, 47 Minn. 219, 49 N.W. 690) that, as a general proposition, fixing the compensation of a public officer involves the exercise of legislative power, which the courts are expressly 'inhibited' by the constitution (Minn.Const. art. 3, § 1) from exercising; but that the rule has no application where fixing the compensation of an officer or quasi officer of the court is involved, and that in such a case the court may be constitutionally invested by statute with power to fix the amount of compensation, even though the officer otherwise belongs to the executive department of the government." Cahill v. Beltrami County, 224 Minn. 564, 566, 29 N.W.2d 444, 446 (1947).

In Cahill we went on to state that a sheriff is a quasi-judicial officer, and that the determination of his rate of compensation by the judiciary upon de novo consideration did not offend the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.

Consistent with the constitutional limitations on the scope of the judicial function in reviewing the actions of county boards which have set the salaries of county officers, the legislature has provided variant schemes for judicial review of such decisions. In appeals from decisions by the county board determining the salary of the sheriff, the legislature has provided for de novo review ⁴ and has specifically empowered the district court to substitute its judgment for that of the county board upon a determination that the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, oppressively, or without sufficiently taking into...