Amerace Corp. v. Stallings

• Decision Date: 13 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC00-565.,SC00-565.
• Citation: 823 So.2d 110
• Parties: AMERACE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Gary E. STALLINGS, et ux., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

823 So.2d 110

AMERACE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Gary E. STALLINGS, et ux., Respondents.

No. SC00-565.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 13, 2002.

Frank H. Gassler, Hala A. Sandridge, and Charles Tyler Cone of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal and Banker, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

Robert Fraser and Daniel F. Pilka of Pilka & Associates, P.A., Brandon, FL, for Respondents.

Warren B. Kwavnick of Cooney, Mattson, Lance, Blackburn, Richards & O'Connor, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for FL Defense Lawyers' Association, Amicus Curiae.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Amerace Corp. v. Stallings, 753 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with the First District Court of Appeal's opinions in Rockman v. Barnes, 672 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), and Easkold v. Rhodes, 632 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), on the issue of whether a plaintiff in a personal injury case may recover interest from the date of the verdict through the date of the judgment. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that interest is not recoverable until judgment is entered.

BACKGROUND

Respondent Gary E. Stallings and his wife brought a personal injury action against Amerace Corporation ("Amerace"),¹ and on June 13, 1998, the jury awarded the Stallingses a verdict of $1 million,² but found Stallings' employer 60% at fault. On June 22, 1998, Amerace filed a renewed motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for new trial.

On July 9, 1998, the Stallingses filed a motion and memorandum of law in which they included a request for "interest on the entire verdict amount and prejudgment interest at the legal interest rate after the verdict was rendered on June 13, 1998." On November 5, 1998, the court entered an order denying Amerace's motions, except as to the amount awarded for medical bills, for which the court ordered a remittitur. On November 12, 1998, the Stallingses filed a notice of acceptance of remittitur of $196,940.02, in accordance with the court's order of November 5, 1998.³

The trial court entered final judgment on November 18, 1998, and on December 7, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on the Stallingses' motions for costs and prejudgment interest. At that hearing, the Stallingses argued that they were entitled to interest from the date of the June 13 verdict until the date of the November 18 judgment. The court entered an amended final judgment on December 22, 1998, but denied the Stallingses' request for interest between the verdict date and the final judgment date.

Amerace appealed, raising several issues challenging the jury verdict. The Stallingses cross-appealed, seeking review of the trial court's denial of their claim for interest between the date of the verdict and the date of the entry of the final judgment. The Second District "affirm[ed] the final judgment in all respects except the issue of prejudgment interest," explaining:

Once a jury has fixed the amount of a plaintiff's damage by its verdict, the plaintiff is entitled to interest on that amount, and the interest is to be included in the final judgment. See Palm Beach County Sch. Bd. v. Montgomery, 641 So.2d 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)

; Leigh M. Fisher, P.A. v. Ackerman, 744 So.2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

We, therefore, remand to the trial court for entry of an award of prejudgment interest.

Amerace Corp., 753 So.2d at 593.

The holding in Amerace conflicts with the holdings in Easkold and Rockman. In Easkold, the First District reversed a trial court's award of interest from the date of the verdict:

The next question is when the interest started running. The trial court held that the interest runs from the date of the jury verdict. This was error. Post-judgment interest begins to run when the judgment has been filed with the clerk of the court. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Powell, 513 So.2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987),

review denied mem., 520 So.2d 585 (Fla.1988). Appellant's argument that this rule does not pertain in cases decided by jury is not persuasive. See, e.g., Smith v. Dunning, 467 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that interest cannot be allowed before entry of judgment in a tort case decided by jury).

632 So.2d at 147. In Rockman, the First District reaffirmed its holding in Easkold. See 672 So.2d at 891.

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether a plaintiff should be entitled to recover postverdict prejudgment interest in a personal injury action from the time period between when a jury verdict is rendered and when a final judgment is entered. Historically, plaintiffs in personal injury cases have not been entitled to prejudgment interest. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985)

; Zorn v. Britton, 120 Fla. 304, 162 So. 879 (1935); Farrelly v. Heuacker, 118

Fla. 340, 159 So. 24 (1935). As we explained in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Percefull, 653 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1995), damages in personal injury cases are too speculative to liquidate before final judgment. The only exception to this rule is if the plaintiff can establish that he or she has suffered the loss of a vested property right. See Alvarado v. Rice, 614 So.2d 498 (Fla.1993).

However, the issue in the instant case is slightly different from the claim raised in Argonaut and the other cases cited above. Unlike Argonaut, the plaintiffs in this case are not claiming that they are entitled to interest from the date of the loss or injury. Rather, the plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to interest for the period between the time when the verdict was rendered and the time when judgment was entered. So although the instant case is technically a "prejudgment" interest case, it is more appropriately labeled a "postverdict" interest case.

With one exception—Green v. Rety, 616 So.2d 433 (Fla.1993)—no case from this Court has ever permitted "post-verdict" interest. In Green, a plaintiff obtained a libel verdict, but the trial court sua sponte withheld judgment and entered an order of remittitur and an alternative order for a new trial on damages. When the plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur, the trial court ordered a new trial on damages and the plaintiff appealed. The Third District agreed that a remittitur was appropriate, but found that the trial court's remittitur had been excessive. See Rety v. Green, 546 So.2d 410, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)

. The Third District decreased the amount to be remitted and directed the trial court to allow the plaintiff a reasonable time within which to accept or reject it. On remand, the plaintiff accepted the modified remittitur. After acceptance, the plaintiff contended that for purposes of postverdict interest the judgment should be entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the original verdict, while the defendant argued that the final judgment should be dated when actually entered, and not as of any earlier date. The trial court disagreed with both positions and entered final judgment effective the date of the Third District's published opinion in the earlier appeal. On appeal, the Third District held that entry of judgment on the reduced jury verdict should be considered effective as of the date of the verdict, with interest accruing from that date. See Rety v. Green, 595 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992),

approved,

616 So.2d 433 (Fla.1993). The Third District certified the question to this Court. This Court agreed with the Third District, reasoning that pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(c),⁴ the date of the verdict controls and all interest should be computed from the date of the verdict. See

616 So.2d at 435.

The controversy in Green arose because the trial court originally withheld judgment. Since the appellate process can last several months or even years, rule 9.340(c) provides that, in cases such as Green, interest should be computed from the date of the verdict.

In contrast to Green, judgment was entered in the present case. Yet the plaintiffs focus on the delay between the time when the verdict was rendered and when the judgment was entered. However, at the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for costs and prejudgment interest, the trial court asked, "Was there ever a request for me to enter a judgment by the plaintiff?" When counsel answered "no," the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion, explaining:

If I would have had a request to enter judgment, I would have entered it. I always enter them even with pending motions, pending motions for new trial or pending motions for judgment, the renewed motions for directed verdict, I always enter the judgments. Then if something changes, I go back and change them.

As the trial court pointed out, the proper procedure in this case would have been to request that the court enter a judgment promptly after the verdict. Thus, we find that, consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' request for interest between the verdict date and the final judgment date. Our holding is further bolstered by the plain language of section 55.03, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998),⁵ which specifically provides that interest does not accrue until the date of the judgment, not verdict. Accordingly, we quash the Second District's decision in Amerace and approve the First District's opinions in Easkold and Rockman.⁶

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., SHAW, HARDING, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent and would follow the lead of the majority of the district courts of appeal that have concluded, consistent with principles of law articulated in our prior cases, that interest from the date of the verdict should be allowed in personal injury cases. The Court has not addressed the precise issue before us...