American Acc. Co. v. Reigart

• Decision Date: 16 September 1893
• Citation: 23 S.W. 191,94 Ky. 547
• Parties: AMERICAN ACC. CO. OF LOUISVILLE v. REIGART.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

23 S.W. 191

94 Ky. 547

AMERICAN ACC. CO. OF LOUISVILLE v. REIGART.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

September 16, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Mason county.

Action by Julia J. Reigart against the American Accident Company of Louisville, Ky. on an accident insurance policy issued by defendant to Thomas I. Reigart, and made payable to plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Thomas H. Hines and Whittaker & Robinson, for appellant.

Cochran & Sons, John F. Lacey, and E. W. Hines, for appellee.

PRYOR J.

The appellee, Julia J. Reigart, the widow of Thomas I. Reigart instituted this action in the Mason circuit court to recover $5,000 upon an accident policy issued by the American Accident Company of Louisville, Ky. to said Reigart, and made payable to his wife if she survived him. Her husband lost his life by eating a piece of beefsteak that, in the attempt to swallow, accidentally passed into his windpipe, choking him to death in a few moments. By the terms of the policy, the insurance was made payable for injury or death received through external, violent, and accidental means. That the death of the insured was accidental is conceded, but it is contended that the contract of insurance only embraces accidental injuries caused by external violence, or accidents brought about by means externally violent. It is argued that the act of chewing or eating food is natural and harmless and if, in eating, a part of the food passes into the windpipe, causing death, it cannot be said that death was produced by means of external violence or force; in other words, that the plain meaning of the language of the policy "through external, violent, and accidental means," is that the accident causing death must have been caused by an external force. The court below, placing a different construction on the contract, said, in effect, to the jury, if the death was accidental, and caused by the passing of the steak into the windpipe, they should find for the plaintiff.

The rule laid down by Mr. May in his work on Insurance (3d Ed. § 175) is as follows: "No rule, in the interpretation of a policy, is more fully established, or more imperative and controlling, than that which declares, in all cases, it must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, so as not to defeat without a plain necessity his claim to indemnity, which, in making the insurance, it was his object to secure. When the words are, without violence, susceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted." And we might add that no construction should be placed upon such contracts as would defeat the intention of both parties, as it is manifest, if the interpretation given the language of this policy by counsel for the defense is adopted, it would defeat the intention of both the contracting parties. The doctrine of this court, as announced in Hutchcraft's Ex'r v. Insurance Co., reported in 87 Ky. 300, and 8 S.W. 570, where the authorities were reviewed on the question there presented, recognizes fully this rule of construction, and that regard must be had to the purpose sought to be accomplished by both the parties.

This appellant is an accident insurance company, and its policies are termed ...