American Airlines, Inc. v. State Commission for Human Rights

• Decision Date: 25 January 1968
• Citation: 286 N.Y.S.2d 493,29 A.D.2d 178
• Parties: , 1 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 278, 29 A.L.R.3d 1402, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9848, 57 Lab.Cas. P 9106 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. STATE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS and Eloise N. Soots, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 493

286 N.Y.S.2d 493

29 A.D.2d 178, 1 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 278,

29 A.L.R.3d 1402, 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9848,

57 Lab.Cas. P 9106

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. STATE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS and Eloise N. Soots, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Jan. 25, 1968.

Herbert Prashker, New York City, of counsel (Poletti, Freidin, Prashker, Feldman & Gartner, and Arthur M. Wisehart, New York City, attorneys) for petitioner.

Alan J. Saks, Brooklyn, of counsel (Henry Spitz, New York City, with him on the brief) for respondent State Commission for Human Rights.

Before BOTEIN, P.J., and STEVENS, CAPOZZOLI, McGIVERN and McNALLY, JJ.

McNALLY, Justice.

This submission of controversy pursuant to CPLR 3222 involves the validity of conditions concerning the employment of respondent Eloise N. Soots requiring her prior to her 32nd birthday to elect between employment other than as stewardess or termination of her employment within and not later than 12 months after said birthday month, in the light of Executive Law, sec. 296.

Respondent Soots was employed by petitioner on February 27, 1956, as an airline stewardess. At that time she executed at American's request an agreement that her stewardess employment would terminate at age 32, that is, in 1964. The applicable collective bargaining agreement required Soots to elect between other employment with petitioner or continuance as stewardess for an additional period terminating no later than 12 months following the month of her 32nd birthday. Soots elected to continue as stewardess. Accordingly, petitioner terminated her employment on or about August 30, 1965.

Prior to 1958 the Executive Law, sec. 296, denominated as unlawful employment practices the refusal to employ, the discharge, or discrimination in compensation or other terms of employment of any individual because of race, creed, color, or national origin. It is to be noted that sec. 296 substantially extends to the employment relation the equal protection clause of the New York State Constitution (Art. 1, sec. 11). In the area of employment one's race, creed, color, or national origin may not be the basis for the refusal of or discrimination in employment. There are no gradations; the proscription is against the entire spectrum of discrimination based on the specified factors, or any of them. The proscription was total; discrimination was in absolute terms as to factors based on indiscriminate prejudice wholly unrelated to the employment status.

In 1958 the statute was amended to include as an unlawful employment practice the refusal of and discrimination in employment based on age. Age is not a factor within the purview of constitutional protection. The claim by respondent Commission that employment discrimination grounded on age under 65 is unlimited in scope is contrary to the public policy of this State against the employment of minors (Labor Law, Art. 4). 'All new laws are supposed to be enacted with knowledge on the part of the lawmakers of the existence and scope of the old laws, and hence it is reasonable to conclude that there was no intention, in enacting the new law, to repeal or change the old law * * *.' (Davis v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honor, 165 N.Y. 159, 166, 58 N.E. 891.)

Unlike the criteria of race, creed, color, or national origin, the concept of age involves a spectrum of physical capacities, disabilities, and qualities inclusive of minority, directly and rationally related to employment. There was, therefore, need for delimitation of the generic factor of age, particularly since the State had in the exercise of its public policy comprehensively limited and regulated the employment of minors. The Legislature accordingly and concurrently enacted subd. 3--a of sec. 296, restricting the application of the age factor to the 45 to 65 age bracket. (Laws of 1958, ch. 738.) In addition, the Legislature expressly excluded from the scope of sec. 296 the physical disabilities attending age. In sum, it was not feasible, in the light of the well established public policy against the unregulated employment of minors, and the irreversible physical factors attending age, totally to exclude the age factor in employment practices.

The title of Chapter 738 confirms the purpose of the Legislature to limit its application to those over 45 years of age. It is entitled: 'An Act to amend the executive law, in relation to discriminatory practices in the employment, retention and discharge of individuals who are over the age of forty-five.' Although a statute is to be determined by its provisions nevertheless, 'when its language is ambiguous and doubtful, resort may be had to its title, and the occasion of its enactment, to explain...