American Badge Co. v. Lena Park Improvement Ass'n

• Decision Date: 28 October 1910
• Citation: 92 N.E. 972,246 Ill. 589
• Parties: AMERICAN BADGE CO. v. LENA PARK IMPROVEMENT ASS'N et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

246 Ill. 589

92 N.E. 972

AMERICAN BADGE CO.

v.LENA PARK IMPROVEMENT ASS'N et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1910.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; George J. Cowing, Judge.

Action by the American Badge Company against the Lena Park Improvement Association and others. Plaintiff had judgment and defendants brought error to the Appellate Court, whence it was transferred to the Supreme Court. Affirmed.Rocco De Stefano, for plaintiffs in error.

CARTER, J.

January 25, 1910, a judgment was entered in the municipal court of Chicago for $150 in favor of the American Badge Company, the defendant in error, against the Lena Park Improvement Association, W. Williams, P. Hicks, and W. L. Hicks, the plaintiffs in error, before Hon. George J. Cowing, county judge of Will county, holding a branch of the municipal court of Chicago by request of the judges of that court. This writ of error was sued out of the Appellate Court for the First District, where, on motion of the defendant in error, it was transferred to this court on the ground that the assignment of errors involved the constitutionality of section 13 of the municipal court act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 37), which provides: ‘The judges of said municipal court may interchange with judges of other city courts, and with county judges, and said respective judges may hold court for each other and perform each other's duties when they find it necessary or convenient.’

It is insisted, first, that said section 13 is not covered by the title of the act, and is therefore in contravention of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution. The title of the act reads, ‘An act in relation to a municipal court in the city of Chicago.’ Every act must embrace but a single subject, but it may include other provisions not foreign to the general subject, which legitimately tend to accomplish the legislative purpose as to that subject. An act may contain many provisions and details for the carrying out of its purpose. The object of this provision of the Constitution is to prevent the joining in one act of incongruous or unrelated matters. It was not its design to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation or to require that the title should set forth a detailed statement or an index of the contents of the act. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82;Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 70;People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319, 6 N. E. 480;People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217;Boehm v. Hertz, 182 Ill. 154, 54 N. E. 973,48 L. R. A. 575. This provision of the municipal court act is incident to or in a reasonable sense connected with and auxiliary to the subject indicated by the title. If the dockets of the municipal court were overcrowded, it would certainly tend to promote the administration of justice in that court to call in other judges under the provisions of said section 13 to speedily dispose of the business of the court, thus preventing a denial of justice through long delay in the trial of causes.

It is further urged that said section 13 is void because it is not germane to section 34 of article 4 of the Constitution, which authorizes the creation of the municipal court of Chicago by providing ‘a complete system of local municipal government in and for the city of Chicago.’ We think this section is clearly incident, and therefore germane to the purposes of said section 34.

We do not assent to the argument of counsel that said section 13 is in contravention of section 29 of article 6 of the Constitution, requiring that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation, and that the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all the courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, shall be uniform. It is true we have held that the municipal court of Chicago is to be regarded as a local court of the city, established for the purpose of administering the law within the city, and not as a part of the judicial department of the government of the state at large, but this does not prevent the interchange of the judges of the municipal court with other city courts or the judges of the county courts. A similar provision with reference to the exchange of city judges under the general city court act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 37, § 6), allowing judges of the city court to sit in the circuit court, has been held valid. American Car Co. v....