State v. Milauskas

• Decision Date: 28 October 1925
• Docket Number: No. 16887.,16887.
• Citation: 318 Ill. 198,149 N.E. 294
• Parties: STATE v. MILAUSKAS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

318 Ill. 198

149 N.E. 294

STATE

v.MILAUSKAS et al.

No. 16887.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1925.

Suit by the State against George Milauskas and others for an injunction to abate a liquor nuisance. Decree awarding permanent injunction, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.Appeal from Sangamon County Court; Roger E. Chapin, Judge.

Sherman, Bainum & Pree, and L. E. Stone, all of Springfield, for appellants.

Edmund Burke, Corp. Counsel, and W. Edgar Sampson, City Atty., both of Springfield, for the State.

STONE, J.

The corporation counsel and the city attorney of the city of Springfield filed in the county court of Sangamon county, under section 22 of the Prohibition Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 43, § 23), a bill for injunction to abate a liquor nuisance. The bill was verified, and alleged that certain premises therein described were being used and had been used as a place where intoxicating liquors were sold, kept, and bartered in violation of the statute, by George Milauskas and Anna Milauskas, and that Christian C. Wieland was the owner of said premises. The affidavits of three persons were attached to the bill, showing specific acts in violation of the law as in the bill alleged. A temporary injunction was issued as prayed in the bill, and an order for a preliminary hearing entered. Summons was issued against all the appellants, who, however, entered their appearances and filed a general and special demurrer to the bill, and later, by leave of court, withdrew the same and filed an amended demurrer, by which they attacked the Illinois Prohibition Act as unconstitutional and void. The court overruled the demurrer, and the appellants elected to abide the same, and a final decree was thereupon entered finding the allegations of the bill to be true, and a permanent injunction was decreed as prayed.

The only questions involved in this appeal are those concerning the constitutionalityof the Illinois Prohibition Act. The appellants have assigned numerous errors touching that question.

[1] It is first contended that the injunction provisions of the Prohibition Act violate the constitutional guaranty of right of trial by a jury, secured by section 5 of article 2 of our Constitution. This question is no longer an open one in this state, but has been by this court decided adversely to the contention of the appellants in State v. Zimmerman, 317 Ill. 197, 148 N. E. 5;State v. Froelich, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N. E. 733; and Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680.

[2] It is next contended that the injunction provisions violate section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of Illinois, concerning due process of law. The argument is that the injunction does not give to the parties defendant notice sufficient to meet the requirements of due process of law. This question is not open to the appellants, since they entered their appearance and demurred to the bill. No question of that character, therefore, affects them, and it has been repeatedly held by this court that it will not entertain objections concerning the constitutionality of a provision of the statute which does not effect the party objecting. People v. Diekmann, 285 Ill. 97, 120 N. E. 490;People v. Huff, 249 Ill. 164, 94 N. E. 61.

[3] It is next contended that the act violates section 18 of article 6 of the Constitution of Illinois, in that it confers equitable jurisdiction upon county courts. This question was decided contrary to the contention of the appellants in State v. Aiello, 317 Ill. 159, 147 N. E. 916, and is no longer an open one.

[4]It is also contended that section 25 of the Prohibition Act invades the powers of the judiciary, in that it prescribes the maximum and minimum penalty to be imposed upon one found guilty of contempt for violation of an injunction issued under the act. No question of that character appears in this case. There is nothing in the record concerning a violation of the injunction, and the appellants are not affected by section 25 of the Prohibition Act. This contention will therefore not be considered. People v. Diekmann, supra; People v. Huff, supra.

It is further urged that the Prohibition Act is unconstitutional in that its title contains no reference to the provision conferring equity jurisdiction on the county court, and it therefore violates that provision of section 13 of article 4 of our Constitution which requires that the subject embraced in an act ‘shall be expressed in the title.’ The title of the act is:

‘An act to restrict the manufacture, sale, transportation, possession and use of intoxicating liquor, aiding thereby in establishing uniformity in state and federal laws in regard thereto.’

[5] In determining whether the provisions of an act violate this clause of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution the following rule is to be applied: Where a general purpose is declared in the title of an act, the means of accomplishing that purpose are presumed to be intended as necessary incidents, and any means reasonably adapted to the purpose indicated in the title may be included in the act. If by fair intendment the provisions in the body of the act have a necessary or proper connection with the title the act is not open to this constitutional objection. If the title is general, any number of provisions may be contained in the act, no matter how divers they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject-matter, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject. People v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 290 Ill. 327, 125 N. E. 310;Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466;Keeran v. Traction Co., 277 Ill. 413, 115 N. E. 636;People v. Huff, supra; People v. Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, 93 N. E. 244;American Badge Co. v. Improvement Ass'n, 246 Ill. 589, 92 N. E. 972;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994.

[6] The Prohibition Act is a reguiatory act as well as one imposing prohibition. Any means reasonably adapted to the purpose of restricting the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors may be included in the body of the act, and the fact that it provides proceedings in court to enforce its provisions does not render it void as contravening the clause of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution here invoked. There are many acts providing certain regulations which contain provisions for proceedings in court, but it has been uniformly held, as shown by the cases above cited, that such provisions are not open to this...