American Bakeries Co. v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 05 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27122. |
| Citation | 200 S.E. 485,59 Ga.App. 150 |
| Parties | AMERICAN BAKERIES CO. v. JOHNSON et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
In personal injury action, petition alleging that plaintiff's leg was broken, and that he suffered other physical injuries which were permanent in character and which would interfere with his ability to labor in the future, and that his earning capacity would be curtailed materially authorized charge on impairment of health and vigor.
Where defendant denied plaintiff's allegation that plaintiff's injuries were caused by concurrent acts of negligence of both defendants, charge that a defendant contended that injury received by plaintiff was not result of concurrent negligence of the defendants was not error, on the ground that it was not the defendant's contention that plaintiff's injury was not result of concurrent negligence of both defendants.
Where court instructed that a defendant contended that sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was his own negligence and charged that if only cause of injury was plaintiff's negligence, there could be no recovery, the charge was not objectionable on ground that court failed to instruct jury that the defendant's contention that sole proximate cause of injury sustained by plaintiff was his own negligence, or failed to instruct jury that there could be no recovery if injury was done by plaintiff's consent, or was caused by his own negligence.
Where plaintiff contended that his injuries were caused by concurrent acts of negligence of both defendants, court's charge that defendants could be sued jointly despite fact that injuries might not have been sustained had only one of the acts of negligence occurred was not harmful to defendant held liable on ground that it was calculated to confuse and mislead jury into belief that joint liability would exist even though such defendant was not guilty of negligence, in view of further charge.
Instruction that it would be sufficient to support a verdict in suit against two defendants if negligence of both contributed to the injury was not an instruction that there could be a recovery against both, notwithstanding the negligence of one of defendants might not have proximately contributed to the injury, especially where court subsequently instructed jury that if a defendant's negligence did not combine to produce injury, such defendant would not be liable.
A charge that if plaintiff was negligent but plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendants' negligence plaintiff could recover damages in diminished amount was not error harmful to defendants because court omitted to charge in connection therewith that, if plaintiff's negligence and defendants' negligence were equal, there could be no recovery.
Charge that if plaintiff was negligent, but plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendants' negligence, plaintiff could recover damages in diminished amount was not error on ground that court failed in connection with some other portion of the charge to charge that no recovery could be had under comparative negligence rule if plaintiff by exercise of ordinary care could have avoided the consequences of defendants' negligence.
Even if defendant's motortruck had come to complete stop before plaintiff passed from behind it into path of another automobile which injured him, which injury, it was contended, was the proximate result of truck owner's negligence, it was not error on ground that, as truck had come to a stop, there was no negligence of defendant that could be apparent to plaintiff for court to charge that the plaintiff's duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid consequences of defendant's negligence would not arise until plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that such negligence was apparent, or by exercise of ordinary care should have been apparent.
Statute requiring motor vehicles used on highways to be equipped with suitable devices for dimming or changing focus so as to prevent glaring implies that a duty rests upon the operator of a motor vehicle along highway to dim lights or change focus, when necessary to prevent blinding of approaching drivers. Code 1933, § 68-302.
The object of statute requiring motor vehicles operated on highway to be provided with suitable devices for dimming or changing focus so as to prevent glaring is to put a duty upon the operator of motor vehicle to prevent his lights from blinding approaching drivers, and thereby creating a dangerous situation from which injury to person or property might occur from operation of either vehicle. Code 1933, § 68-302.
Where, as result of failure of operator of motor vehicle to dim lights or change focus so as to prevent glaring, driver of approaching motor vehicle is blinded and unable to see a pedestrian ahead in the road, and by reason thereof runs into the pedestrian without fault on part of such driver, jury is authorized to find that operator who failed to dim or change focus of lights was negligent, and that pedestrian's injury was proximate cause of such negligence. Code 1933, §§ 68-302, 68-9908.
Where it appeared that operator of motortruck failed to dim lights but deflected truck to left side of highway in front of approaching automobile, and there stopped with lights on truck burning at full glow, thereby blinding driver of approaching automobile and preventing him from seeing pedestrian crossing highway in time to avoid hitting pedestrian, whether truck operator's conduct, with respect to lights and in turning to left instead of right when meeting approaching vehicle, was negligence and whether such negligence, or whether negligence of pedestrian was proximate cause of injury, was for jury. Code 1933, § 68-302.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; E. D. Thomas, Judge.
Personal injury action by Claude Johnson and others against the American Bakeries Company. To review an adverse judgment, defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Where plaintiff contended that his injuries were caused by concurrent acts of negligence of both defendants, court's charge that defendants could be sued jointly despite fact that injuries might not have been sustained had only one of the acts of negligence occurred was not harmful to defendant, held liable on ground that it was calculated to confuse and mislead jury into belief that joint liability would exist even though such defendant was not guilty of negligence, in view of further charge.
Neely, Marshall & Greene and W. Neal Baird, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Paul W. Hughes, W. O. Slate, F. Lee Evans, and R. M. Wright, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.
Syllabus OPINION.
1. In a suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by ...
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