American Brass Co. v. Torrington Brass Workers' Union Local 423, Intern. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers

• Decision Date: 23 July 1954
• Citation: 141 Conn. 514,107 A.2d 255
• Parties: AMERICAN BRASS CO. v. TORRINGTON BRASS WORKERS' UNION LOCAL 423, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 255

107 A.2d 255

141 Conn. 514

AMERICAN BRASS CO. v. TORRINGTON BRASS WORKERS' UNION LOCAL 423, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 23, 1954.

Samuel Gruber, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).

William J. Larkin, 2d, Waterbury, with whom, on the brief, was Walter M. Pickett, Jr., Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

In conformity with § 8161(d) of the General Statutes, the plaintiff addressed an application to the Superior Court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers. The defendant answered, admitting certain allegations and denying others, and added a cross application seeking correction of the award in various ways and confirmation of it as thus amended. The court found that the award should be vacated on the ground alleged and that this finding disposed of the necessity of acting on the cross application. The defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered, assigning as error the court's action in vacating the award and in refusing to grant the cross application.

The following facts are undisputed. On September 17, 1952, the plaintiff and the defendant, hereinafter called the company and the union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering rates of pay, hours of work, the right of the company to discharge an employee and the right of the union to submit to arbitration the propriety of the discharge, grievance procedure and other conditions of employment affecting production and maintenance employees at the company's Torrington division. A dispute arose between the company and the union on January 30, 1953. It concerned the discharge of an employee, designated in the record as Mr. D, who was within the bargaining unit covered by the agreement. His job, classified as hazardous, was on an annealing furnace. D had first been employed by the company in 1939. At that time he had been asked whether he had ever had any epileptic fits or convulsions. His answer to this question had been recorded as 'No,' although he denied ever having been interrogated on the subject. D left the company's employ in 1942 and entered the United States army. About three months after his induction he had an epileptic attack and, as a result, was given a medical discharge shortly thereafter. On April 29, 1943, he applied for re-employment by the company and was put back on his old job. On November 25, 1952, he was taken to a Torrington hospital, suffering from what his own physician described as epilepsy.

D reported back to the mill on December 8, 1952. At first the company refused to allow him to work on account of the nature of his illness, but because of the approach of the holidays and in order to give him an opportunity to obtain employment elsewhere, the company put him on a job until January 30, 1953, under a waiver signed by him and filed in the office of the workmen's compensation commissioner. On the last-named date, the company terminated D's employment. It was this discharge which brought about the dispute between the company and the union. The dispute was processed in accordance with one of the provisions of the agreement and was submitted to the Connecticut state board of mediation and arbitration, hereinafter called the board upon a single issue framed in the following language: 'Was Mr. D. discharged by the Company for just and proper cause?' On March 18, 1953, the board held a hearing, and on April 9, 1953, handed down this award: 'Mr. D. was not discharged by the Company for just and proper cause.' The board filed with the award a 'discussion' of the reasons upon which it based the award. That discussion is set forth in full in the footnote. ¹ Since 1944 the company has pursued a policy recommended by its medical department, of terminating the employment of any employee who is found to be suffering from epilepsy. There are many jobs at the Torrington division which are nonhazardous in nature, and D could handle them without danger to himself or to his fellow employees. At the time of his discharge he had built up a thirteen-year seniority and had earned more than half of his pension rights, all of which would be lost to him if he were discharged.

On the basis of the foregoing, the court vacated the award, after first concluding that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers. The company maintains that the court's judgment was correct since article II of the collective bargaining agreement provides that the company shall retain the right to discharge its employees for 'proper cause' and since 'proper cause' for D's discharge can be supported by either of two reasons. The first reason is that D made 'an incorrect answer to a pertinent question in his employment questionnaire; i. e. he knew that he had epilepsy when he was re-employed after discharge from the Army for epilepsy.' Apparently the assertion of fraud is advanced for the first time in this court and is so utterly inconsistent with the prior position of the company that it should receive a summary disposition. At the time of the hearing before the board, the representative of the company, when referring to the reasons which impelled the company to terminate D's employment, expressly disclaimed any purportedly incorrect or false statement made by D in applying for work, originally or after his tour of duty in the army. The record shows that the representative then said: 'We're not claiming a falsification here because we have no evidence of it.' The board had the right to accept that statement at full value and to exclude from consideration the reason now forced upon us. The company cannot, on appeal, raise a claim which it not only failed to present to the board but which it, in fact, expressly disavowed. We emphasize this in order to eliminate from the case fraud in any form. Indeed, the company itself has removed it.

The second reason advanced by the company in support of the court's action is that, because of the hazardous nature of the manufacturing of brass and copper products, D's epilepsy, manifested to the company for the first time during December, 1952, was a proper cause for his discharge. It is this claim which presents the decisive issue in the appeal.

The parties contemplated the possibility that disputes of various kinds would arise between them during the life of the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, they provided two distinct methods by which their controversies, if any, should be submitted to arbitration. The method pertinent to the case at bar deals exclusively with and is available only for those disputes growing out of the discharge by the company of any of its employees. Article VII(4) provides that '[i]n the case of a dispute as to the justice of Company action in a discharge case, the parties will accept the decision of an Arbitrator to be named by the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration.' ² The obvious purpose of this and of article II was a concession on the union's part that the company had an untrammeled right to discharge any employee for proper cause, and a concession on the company's part that the discharge would not be valid if, on submission to an arbitrator, he found it to be unjust.

The arbitration board to which the dispute over D's discharge was referred was entitled to exercise only such power as the agreement of the parties authorized. It is elementary that the charter of an arbitrator is the submission and no matter outside the submission may be included in the award. Pratt, Read & Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 136 Conn. 205, 208, 70 A.2d 120. Indeed, the basic test of the validity of an award lies in its conformity to the submission. Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Chase Brass & Copper Workers Union, 139 Conn. 591, 594, 96 A.2d 209. The submission in the case at bar read: 'Was Mr. D. discharged by the Company for just and proper cause?' The award of the board was that 'Mr. D. was not discharged by the Company for just and proper cause.' On its face, the award, with its categorical answer to the question propounded, would appear to be in the strictest conformity with the...