American Can Co. v. City of Tampa

• Decision Date: 31 December 1943
• Citation: 14 So.2d 203,152 Fla. 798
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: AMERICAN CAN CO. v. CITY OF TAMPA et al. CITY OF TAMPA et al. v. AMERICAN CAN CO.

14 So.2d 203

152 Fla. 798

AMERICAN CAN CO. v. CITY OF TAMPA et al.

CITY OF TAMPA et al. v. AMERICAN CAN CO.

Florida Supreme Court

December 31, 1943

On Rehearing April 30, 1943.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1943. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Whitaker, Whitaker & Terrell and Harry B. Terrell all of Tampa, for petitioner American Can Co. in case No. 1 and for respondent in case No. 2.

Alonzo B McMullen and Ralph A. Marsicano, both of Tampa, for respondents City of Tampa in case No. 1 and for petitioners in case No. 2.

R. J. Duff, of Tampa, for petitioners J. G. Bedingfield, George V. Booker, and J. W. Dupree in case No. 1.

Paul Game, of Tampa, for petitioners Hillsborough Inv. Co. and Collier Florida Coast Hotels, Inc., in case No. 1, and for respondents in case No. 2.

Robert H. Anderson, of Miami, and James S. Moody, of Plant City, as amicus curiae.

WHITFIELD, Justice.

A suit was brought in the circuit court by American Can Company, a corporation seeking to have the city officials enjoined from enforcing occupational license taxes and ad valorem taxation of property used in an 'industrial plant' in the manufacture of steel vessels in Hillsborough County, Florida, to pay statutory contract bonds of the city issued before the adoption in 1930 of added Section 12, Article IX of the Florida Constitution under which the tax exemption is claimed, the theory of the defendants being that such ad valorem tax is levied for payments on the bond contract obligation of the city which is protected by the Federal Constitution.

The defendants woved to strike the portion of the bill of complaint claiming exemption from license taxes, to dismiss the bill of complaint for want of equity and for a better bill of particulars.

Several property owners and tax payers of the city and one bond-holder petitioned to intervene as defendants. Plaintiff moved to strike the petitions to intervene.

By one order the circuit court denied defendants' motions to dismiss and for better particulars, sustained plaintiff's motion to strike each of the petitions to intervene and sustained defendants' motion to strike the allegations and prayer of the bill regarding occupational license taxation without prejudice to plaintiff's right to litigate the question of whether or not the amount of occupational license taxes assessed against plaintiff are arbitrary and unreasonable.

Two petitions for interlocutory certiorari were filed in the cause, one by the plaintiff as to license taxes and one by the several defendants joined by the petitioners to intervene as to all the other matters.

Petitioners, defendants below, present as a question: 'Is an industrial plant engaged primarily in the manufacture of steel vessels exempt from the payment of taxes levied for the payment of principal and interest on original obligation bonds of a municipality which were outstanding at the time the constitutional amendment allowing exemption was adopted?'

Plaintiff petitioner poses this: 'Is the exemption from taxation contained in Section 12, Article IX of the State Constitution limited to ad valorem taxation or does the exemption include other forms and classes of taxation, particularly license taxation?'

With reference to ad valorem taxation, the Florida Constitution provides that 'the Legislature * * * shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.' Amended Section 1, Article IX. 'The property of all corporations, except the property of a corporation which shall construct a ship or barge canal across the peninsula of Florida, if the Legislature should so enact, whether heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes.' Section 16, Article XVI. Exclusive use of property for any one of the above stated purposes warrants exemption from ad valorem taxation. See Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 142 Fla. 657, 195 So. 607.

Other exemptions from taxation are provided for. Added Section 12, Article IX, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, adopted November 4, 1930, is as follows:

'For a period of fifteen years from the beginning of operation, all industrial plants which shall be established in this State on or after July 1st, 1929, engaged primarily during said period in the manufacture of steel vessels, automobile tires, fabrics and textiles, wood pulp, paper, paper bags, fiber board, automobiles, automobile parts, aircraft, aircraft parts, Glass and Crockery Manufacturers and the refining of sugar and oils, and including by-products or derivatives incident to the manufacture af any of the above products, shall be exempt from all taxation, except that no exemption which shall become effective by virtue of this amendment shall extend beyond the year 1948.

'The exemption herein authorized shall not apply to real estate owned and used by such industrial plants except the real estate occupied as the location required to house such industrial plants and the buildings and property situated thereon, together with such lands as may be required for warehouses, storage, trackage and shipping facilities and being used for such purposes.'

By the terms of the quoted organic section the exemption from taxation extends only to 'industrial plants * * * engaged primarily * * * in the manufacture of steel vessels' and other stated products and commodities, and 'by-products or derivatives incident to the manufacture of any of the above products', including 'the real estate occupied as the location required to house such industrial plants and the buildings and property situated thereon, together with such lands as may be required for warehouses, storage, trackage and shipping facilities and being used for such purposes.'

Plaintiff petitioner in effect contends that the decision in Fleischer Studios et al. v. Paxson et al, 147 Fla. 100, 2 So.2d 293, 298, is controlling in this case.

In the Fieischer case Section 14, Article IX, was applicable which section is more specific and comprehensive in its exemptions from taxation than is Section 12, Article IX. In that case the allegations referring to the importation from another state of personal property of great value and of peculiar nature and uses for suggested scientific purposes in the studios, and in effect stating that such property was assessed for ad valorem taxation although admittedly not subject to public debt services taxation, which allegations together with others required the giving of an opportunity for further showing of tax exemptions instead of dismissing the bill of complaint, thereby warranted the reversal for appropriate proceedings in that case. The opinion states: 'Every case must be determined on its own essential facts and the controlling law applicable thereto. When a tax exemption is claimed, it must be shown that the dominant law is not violated by the claimed exemption.'

In this case the 'industrial plant' and its incidents are established upon land that was subject to the municipal bond taxation. The manufacturing engaged in on the land is purely a business enterprise; and there is no sufficient showing of a legal right of exemption of the property from authorized taxation to pay municipal contract obligations for which taxation the land was subject when the tax exemption amendment of the constitution was adopted, the contract obligation being secured by the dominant Federal Constitution. The exemption claimed in this case is under Section 12, Article IX.

The bill of complaint contains allegations designed in effect to show that after the adoption in 1930 of Section 12, Article IX of the Florida Constitution and relying thereon, plaintiff acquired the fee simple title to described land in Tampa Florida; that the greater portion of such lands were marsh lands of very small value that were filled in and the plaintiff's industrial plant, buildings and extensions established thereon engaged primarily in the manufacture of steel vessels; that is to say, metal containers, commonly known as tin cans, which are made from steel and tin in the proportion of 98 1/2 per cent steel and 1 1/2 per cent tin, and are used in canning food and liquids for human consumption; that required and used in and about the manufacture of the steel vessels, plaintiff owns and has located on the described premises personal property consisting of numerous specified classes of articles and fixtures and also manufactured product or can stock; that 200 or more employees are engaged with a weekly payroll of $7,500 and plaintiff manufactures annually about 300,000,000 steel vessels and cans. There are allegations and figures as to the assets and bonded debt of the city and the gradual reduction of such debt; that the city is a solvent and growing city, with no defaults in its bond payments and can pay all bonds as they mature 'without taxing plaintiff or its properties until the year 1949;' that on December 14, 1937, plaintiff made and filed with the defendant city tax assessor, its written claim for exemption from all taxation by defendant city until the year 1949; that defendants, contrary to the constitutional amendment and without authority of law, have levied stated taxes on said premises for the years 1938, 1939, and 1940, which have been paid; that taxes assessed on the premises for 1941 in the amount of $2,322.46 have not been paid; that said $2,322.46 taxes assessed on the tax rolls of the city is a cloud on plaintiff's title though void; that plaintiff has...