American Century Mortg. Investors v. Strickland

Decision Date17 May 1976
Docket NumberNo. 51956,No. 2,51956,2
Citation227 S.E.2d 460,138 Ga.App. 657
PartiesAMERICAN CENTURY MORTGAGE INVESTORS v. A. J. STRICKLAND, III
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Walker, Yancey & Gupton, Fred H. Walker, Valdosta, for appellant.

Tillman, Brice, McTier, Coleman & Talley, Wade H. Coleman, Valdosta, for appellee.

MARSHALL, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order by the Superior Court of Lowndes County denying the confirmation of the public sale of real estate, without legal process, made pursuant to the security deeds following default on the secured debts. the sole enumeration of error alleges that the conclusions of law were not supported by adequate findings of fact.

The debtor, Strickland (appellee), negotiated three loans with the creditor, American Century Mortgage Investors (appellant), two for $600,000 each and one for $40,000, a total indebtedness of $1,240,000. Appellee pledged two shopping centers as security for these indebtednesses. Though some $200,000 in interest was paid, the principal remained due and payable when appellant declared the entire indebtedness due. Upon failure to make payment as demanded, appellant exercised its right under the security deeds to sell the pledged real estate at public outcry. There is no contention that the procedures leading up to the public sale were improper. At the public sale, appellant bid on the two shopping centers, one for $525,000 and the other for $425,000, leaving a substantial indebtedness.

At the confirmation hearing, the evidence of which was not transcribed, the parties did not dispute that there was evidence submitted on behalf of appellee that he had expended $1,400,000 in developing the two properties. He offered the testimony of an expert appraiser that the market value of the combined properties was $1,286,000, a value $336,000 above the price paid by appellant at the public sale. The expert appraisers for the appellant gave opinions of value as $1,016,500 ($66,500 above the knock-down price) and $985,000 ($35,000 above the knock-down price), respectively.

Other evidence at the confirmation hearing indicated that the advertising of the sale included the sale of both personalty and realty and that these advertisements were read at the time of the sale. Further-more there was evidence that the appellant and appellee had the understanding that a foreclosure sale was a prerequisite to the transfer of a clear title to a third party who apparently was acceptable to both appellant and appellee; that there was some question whether the third-party purchaser would negotiate the sale; but that the appellee was not aware the third-party purchaser had withdrawn until the very day of the public sale. Appellant questions the interpretation of these facts but in essence did not dispute them.

Based upon these facts the trial court concluded: (1) the appellant had failed in its burden to establish the purchase price as the true market value; (2) that the purchase price was grossly inadequate in comparison with its true market value; (3) by advertising that both realty and personalty would be sold together, the appellant effectively 'chilled' purchases by prospective buyers interested only in real estate or only in personalty; and (4) that by keeping open the debtor's hopes that the third-party purchaser would ultimately purchase the property, the foreclosure sale was accompanied by elements of fraud, surprise, mistake and misapprehension adversely affecting the bidding by denying the debtor time to obtain other financing or other interested bidders. Held:

1. In essence appellant complains the trial court's finding of fact that the 'two properties greatly exceed (in value) the sums bid in by plaintiff at the foreclosure sale' is not a finding of a specific fact; to wit, the 'true market value.' Thus appellant complains there is no basis for the conclusions of law that it failed to carry its burden in establishing 'true market value,' and that the bid prices at the foreclosure sale were grossly inadequate in comparison with the 'true market value' of the properties.

Ga.L.1935, p. 381 (Code Ann. § 67-1504) provides: 'The court shall require evidence to show the true market value of the property sold under such powers, and shall not confirm the sale unless he is satisfied the property so sold brought its true market value on such foreclosure sale.'

We do not read so strict a requirement into that provision as does the appellant herein. The statute requires the trial court to call for sufficient evidence to satisfy himself as to what is the true market value of the property. It does not demand the court establish as a matter of fact and law what is the actual dollar amount of the true market value. The statute further requires that, if he is not satisfied that the foreclosure sale brought what in his opinion approximates the true market value of the property, he is required to deny confirmation of the sale and, if necessary, to order a resale. The trial judge complied with the statute in this case.

Appellant further contends, however, the trial court did not comply with CPA § 52(a) (Ga.L.1969, pp. 645, 646; 1970, pp. 170, 171 (Code Ann. § 81A-152(a)) by failing to 'find the facts specifically.'

Findings of fact) . . . should be brief, concise, pertinent and...

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27 cases
  • Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Public Service Com'n
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 1990
    ...OCGA § 50-13-17(b). This requirement must be "inclusive enough to afford an intelligent review." American Century, etc., Investors v. Strickland, 138 Ga.App. 657, 660, 227 S.E.2d 460 (1976). (Emphasis supplied.) I do not question the arithmetical accuracy or mathematical methodology as to a......
  • Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ivey-Matherly Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 1977
    ...Accord: Classic Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Investors, 135 Ga.App. 105, 106(2), 217 S.E.2d 411; American Century v. Strickland, 138 Ga.App. 657, 661, 227 S.E.2d 460. We have examined the record and since there is some evidence to support the trial judge's findings that the pro......
  • Atreus Communities of Am. v. Keybank Nat'l Ass'n.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 4, 2011
    ...Co., 186 Ga.App. at 324, 367 S.E.2d 269 (1988) (involving disputed cost to complete); see also Am. Century Mortgage Inv. v. Strickland, 138 Ga.App. 657, 659(1), 227 S.E.2d 460 (1976) (“[OCGA § 44–14–161(b) ] requires the trial court to call for sufficient evidence to satisfy [it]self as to ......
  • Jonesboro Inv. Trust Ass'n v. Donnelly
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 1977
    ...required by statute or the Constitution of the State, does not entitle one to a jury trial. See also American Century Mortgage Investors v. Strickland, 138 Ga.App. 657, 661, 227 S.E.2d 460; Classic Enterprises v. Continental Mortgage Investors, 135 Ga.App. 105(2), 217 S.E.2d 411. The appell......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Georgia Foreclosure Confirmation Proceedings in Today's Recessionary Real Estate World
    • United States
    • State Bar of Georgia Georgia Bar Journal No. 16-4, December 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...(1977). [13] Echols v. Edwards, 185 Ga. App. 688, 690, 365 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1988); American Century Mortgage Investors v. Strickland, 138 Ga. App. 657, 65960, 227 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1976). [14] Compare, PSI Pneumatic Structures, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Newnan Bank, 159 Ga. App. 766, 285 S......

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