American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian

• Decision Date: 27 September 1982
• Docket Number: S.F. 24207
• Citation: 32 Cal.3d 440,186 Cal.Rptr. 235,651 P.2d 822
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 651 P.2d 822, 8 Media L. Rep. 2436 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George DEUKMEJIAN, as Attorney General, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 235

186 Cal.Rptr. 235

32 Cal.3d 440, 651 P.2d 822, 8 Media L. Rep. 2436

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George DEUKMEJIAN, as Attorney General, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants.

S.F. 24207.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Sept. 27, 1982.

As modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 15, 1982

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Richard D. Martland and Anthony L. Dicce, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and appellants.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., San Diego, Peter C. Lehman and Henry R. Mann, Deputy Dist. Attys., as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, San Francisco, Amitai Schwartz and Brent A. Barnhart, Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

Pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq. hereafter the Act), ¹ petitioner American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc. (ACLU) sought to inspect and copy, among other things, certain index cards and computer printouts held by defendant California Department of Justice. The department refused to allow inspection on the ground that the information in question was "intelligence information" exempt from disclosure under section 6254, subdivision (f) of the Act. The ACLU then brought suit to compel production of these records. The trial court, after inspecting the records in camera, ruled that data on the cards and printouts should be disclosed with the exception of personal identifiers and information which might reveal confidential sources. Defendants appeal from that decision.

The first issue presented by this appeal is the definition and scope of the exemption for "intelligence information" in section 6254, subdivision (f). We agree with the trial court that this exemption should not be read so broadly as to preclude discovery of any information in intelligence files which relates in some manner to criminal activity. We believe, however, that the court erred in limiting the statutory protection to personal identifiers and material which might disclose confidential sources. The term "intelligence information," even if read narrowly so as to further the Act's objective of expanded public disclosure, should protect information furnished in confidence, even if that information does not reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus the "intelligence information" exemption severely limits the information subject to disclosure, but does not entirely protect the index cards and printouts. Secondly, defendants invoke the balancing test of section 6255, asserting that the burden of segregating exempt and nonexempt information outweighs the benefits of disclosure. The issue is close, but after in camera inspection of the index cards in question, we conclude that in this case the segregation of personal identifiers, confidential information, and information which might reveal confidential sources will be so burdensome, and will so reduce the utility of disclosing the documents to the ACLU, that the public interest will not be served by requiring disclosure of the index cards. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment to the extent it compels disclosure of nonexempt information on the cards in question. The computer printouts, on the other hand, contain neither confidential information nor information supplied by confidential sources, but only data derived from public records. Excision of personal identifiers from the printouts would be a relatively simple task. We therefore affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment requiring disclosure of nonexempt information on the printouts.

I.

This case arose when the ACLU, in May of 1976, filed a request under the Act to inspect and copy a number of documents relating to state law enforcement surveillance practices and records. Among those documents were index cards compiled by a network of law enforcement departments known as the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU), listing persons suspected of being involved in organized crime. Each card lists, among other data, the individual's name, alias, occupation, family members, vehicles, associates, arrests, modus operandi, and physical traits. The subject of a card may be a person suspected of a specific crime; a person suspected of aiding, directly or indirectly, those involved in organized crime; or a person who is "associated" with a principal suspect. "Associates" might be individuals entirely innocent of crime, including family members, business associates, or attorneys of the principal suspects. ²

The ACLU also sought to inspect and copy computer printouts from the Interstate Organized Crime Index (IOCI). The IOCI printouts, in contrast to the LEIU index cards, contain entries based solely on information that is a matter of public record. ³ Existing IOCI printouts are still being used by law enforcement agencies but no new information is being added to them. The printout entries include, among other information, an individual subject's name, physical characteristics, criminal record, crime-related and noncrime-related associates, occupation, and residence.

The ACLU's objective in seeking disclosure was to determine generally the nature of the information contained on the LEIU cards and stored in the IOCI computers, not to ascertain the entries relating to any particular person. The ACLU, therefore, requested the first 100 cards in alphabetical order in the LEIU index and the first 100 entries in the computer printouts, omitting personal identifiers protected from disclosure by section 6254, subdivision (c). ⁴ When the department refused to permit inspection, the ACLU, charging that the department had violated the Act, brought suit to compel disclosure.

At trial, the department claimed the records in question were protected by section 6254, subdivision (f) of the Act, which permits the state to withhold "[r]ecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, and any state or local police agency, or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local police agency ... for correctional, law enforcement or licensing purposes ...." (Emphasis added.) The department also claimed an exemption under section 6255, which permits an agency to avoid disclosure of materials by showing that "on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record."

The trial court first rejected the department's claim of exemption under section 6254, holding that the exemptions in that section were confined to (1) personal identifiers, ⁵ i.e., information which might reveal the names of those who were the subjects of the cards and printouts, and (2) information which might reveal the names of confidential sources who gave the department the card and printout data. The trial court further found that "[p]ublic revelation of the information other than personal identifiers and confidential sources ... is in the public interest and the public interest weighs in favor of disclosure. Revelation of this information will inform interested members of the public of the type of information which the defendants develop and gather." Although the trial court initially concluded that separation of exempt from nonexempt information on the LEIU cards and the IOCI printouts would be unduly burdensome, on motion to modify the judgment the court reversed its decision and found that the burden of segregating nonexempt information was outweighed by the public interest in access to that information. The trial court therefore rejected the claimed exemption under section 6255, ⁶ and accordingly entered judgment requiring disclosure, among other matters, of the LEIU index cards and the IOCI printouts, excluding personal identifiers and data which would reveal confidential sources.

II.

The Act, enacted in 1968, replaced a confusing mass of statutes and court decisions relating to disclosure of governmental records. (See Schaffer et al., A Look at the California Records Act and its Exemptions (1974) 4 Golden Gate L. Rev. 203, 210-213.) The Act begins with a declaration of rights: "In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state." In the spirit of this declaration, judicial decisions interpreting the Act seek to balance the public right to access to information, the government's need, or lack of need, to preserve confidentiality, and the individual's right to privacy. (See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 651-652, 117 Cal.Rptr. 106; American Federation of State, etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 913, 915-916, 146 Cal.Rptr. 42.)

The Act was modeled on the 1967 federal Freedom of Information Act (81 Stat. 54), and the judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart. (See Northern Cal. Police Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 116, 120, 153 Cal.Rptr. 173; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781, 127 Cal.Rptr. 712; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 652, 117 Cal.Rptr. 106.) As enacted in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act exempted "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes." (See former 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).) ⁷ The California Act, enacted in 1968, elaborated on this exemption, barring disclosure of "[r]ecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the...