American Fabricare v. Township of Falls

• Decision Date: 13 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 99-1650.,CIV.A. 99-1650.
• Parties: AMERICAN FABRICARE t/a Laundry Wearhouse, Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF FALLS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

101 F.Supp.2d 301

AMERICAN FABRICARE t/a Laundry Wearhouse, Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF FALLS, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 99-1650.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 13, 2000.

MEMORANDUM

LOWELL A. REED, Jr., Senior District Judge.

This action arises out of the efforts of plaintiff American Fabricare to move its laundromat facilities into a new shopping center in the Township of Falls, Pennsylvania ("Township"). In September 1998, plaintiff signed a lease agreement for store space in a shopping center with the intention of preparing the space and opening for business by early 1999. In October 1998, Township officials informed plaintiff that the necessary permits for construction and occupancy would not issue until plaintiff paid additional sewer tapping fees, which were assessed because of the high rate of wastewater discharge that plaintiff's laundromat would generate. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, and opened for business.

Plaintiff contends that the extraction of additional fees violated its rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violated Pennsylvania law. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Documents No. 11 and 12). For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion will be denied and defendant's motion will be granted.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "the test is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir.1994)). "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Furthermore, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2515. On a motion for summary judgment, the facts should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.1993).

When opposing parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must consider each motion separately, and "each side must still establish a lack of genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." United States ex rel. Showell v. Philadelphia AFL-CIO Hospital Ass'n, No. 98-1916, 2000 WL 424274, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4960, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 18, 2000) (quoting Nolen v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 32 F.Supp.2d 211, 213 (E.D.Pa.1998) (citing Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968))).

State Law Claims

I begin with plaintiff's state-law claims, as Pennsylvania law provides a context that will inform my consideration of all the issues in this case. Plaintiff asserts that the sewer tapping fees charged to it by the Township violated state law. "The burden is on the challenging party to prove that the Authority abused its discretion by establishing a rate system which was either unreasonable or lacking in uniformity." Smith v. Athens Township Auth., 685 A.2d 651, 655 (1996).

Upon a careful review of the law and the facts, I conclude that the neither the Township's establishment sewer tapping fees nor the assessment of such fees to plaintiff violated the law of Pennsylvania. To the contrary, the Township's sewer tapping fees were authorized by and consistent with Pennsylvania law.

The sewer tapping fees charged by the Township at the time relevant to this case were established by Township of Falls Authority Resolutions 95-1 and 95-6. (Defendant's Exh. L and K, respectively). The resolutions were passed by the Township of Falls Authority pursuant to the Municipal Authorities Act, 53 Pa.S.A. § 306, which allows municipal authorities to exist for the purpose of operating, among other things, "sewers and sewer systems or parts thereof." 53 Pa.S.A. § 306(A)(a). According to the Act, municipal authorities are authorized to

fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in the area served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be determined exclusively by it, for the purpose of providing for the payment of the expenses of the Authority, the construction, improvement, repair, maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties, and ... the payment of principal and interest on its obligations.

53 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(B)(h). Municipal authorities also are authorized under the statute "[t]o charge certain enumerated fees to property owners who desire to or are required to connect to the Authority's sewer or water system." 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(B)(t).

The Act delves into great detail in addressing the circumstances in which sewer tapping fees are appropriate. According to the Act, tapping fees "shall not exceed an amount based upon some or all of the following fee components:" (1) capacity; (2) distribution or collection; (3) special purpose; and (4) reimbursement part. See 53 Pa.S.A. § 306(B)(t). The Act describes what may and may not be included in each component and how tapping fees should be calculated, see id., and directs municipal authorities to "have available for public inspection a detailed itemization of all calculations clearly showing the manner in which the fees were determined." 53 Pa.S.A. § 306(B)(t)(2).¹

I conclude that Resolutions 95-1 and 95-6 adhered to these requirements. Both resolutions set forth the separate capacity and collection components of the tapping fees in compliance with the Municipal Authorities Act. Resolution 95-1 referenced the calculations required by the Act for establishing the different components for tapping fees, represented that such calculations were performed, and attached copies of the calculations. (Township of Falls Resolution 95-1, Defendant's Exh. L).² Plaintiff does not take issue with the calculations performed by the Township, nor does it claim that the Township erroneously interpreted the tapping fee requirements of § 306(B)(t).³ Rather, plaintiff appears to challenge the authority of the Township to enact tapping fees. However, plaintiff points to no evidence that Resolutions 95-1 and 95-6 were not an legitimate exercise of the authority granted to municipal authorities under 53 Pa. S.A. § 306, and each resolution, on its face, complied with § 306(B)(t). There is, therefore, no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the resolutions were authorized by Pennsylvania law.

Nor is there evidence that the Township's resolutions were unfairly or irrationally applied in contravention of state law. Under the resolutions in this case, the owner of a property was assessed a sewer tapping fee of $1,533.33⁴ per equivalent dwelling unit (EDU) of likely discharge. (Township of Falls Resolution 95-1, Defendant's Exh. L; Township of Falls Resolution, Defendant's Exh. K).⁵ Typically, houses and apartments and average-use retail stores were assessed a fee in the amount of one EDU. (Id.). In plaintiff's case, Township authorities determined, based on water-use figures submitted by plaintiff, that plaintiff's laundromat would generate 19 EDUs of discharge. (Deposition of James J. Dillon, Township Manager, Defendant's Exh. O, at 29-30). Consequently, Township officials notified plaintiff that because the store space had been credited only one EDU, plaintiff was required to pay sewer tapping fees for the 18 additional EDUs, for a total of $27,599.94, before a construction permit or certificate of occupancy would issue. (Letter of Wayne Bergman, Oct. 28, 1998, Defendant's Exh. J).

There is nothing on the record to suggest that the Township applied the fees to plaintiff in manner inconsistent with the Municipal Authorities Act or in arbitrary or capricious manner. The evidence shows that plaintiff was merely assessed the very sewer tapping fees required by legitimate Township resolutions, which were, in turn, authorized by state law. A reasonable jury could not find otherwise. Therefore I conclude as a matter of law that the Township did not violate Pennsylvania law by passing Resolutions 95-1 and 95-6 and enforcing them with respect to plaintiff's laundromat.⁶ Therefore defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's state municipal law claims will be granted.

It is also clear from the foregoing discussion that defendant has produced ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Township did not violate Pennsylvania law by adopting Resolutions 95-1 and 95-6, or by enforcing them against plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied as to its state law claim.

Constitutional Claims

To sustain a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant acted under color of law; and (2) defendant's actions plaintiff deprived of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but it provides a procedural mechanism by which plaintiffs can recover for violations of constitutional rights. See Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 195-96 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). The substantive rights at issue here are plaintiff's constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process.⁷

1. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth...