American Federation of Labor v. Watson

• Decision Date: 11 June 1945
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 881.
• Citation: 60 F. Supp. 1010
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. v. WATSON, Attorney General, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

60 F. Supp. 1010

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. v. WATSON, Attorney General, et al.

Civil Action No. 881.

District Court, S. D. Florida, Tampa Division.

June 11, 1945.

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Pat C. Whitaker and Tom Whitaker, both of Tampa, Fla., Joseph A. Padway and Herbert S. Thatcher, both of Washington, D. C., Edwin C. Coffee, of Jacksonville, Fla., and J. Dress Pannel, of Harrisburg, Pa., for plaintiffs.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., of Florida, and Howard S. Bailey, Sumter Leitner and George M. Powell, Asst. Attys. Gen. of Florida, for defendants.

Before WALLER, Circuit Judge, and BARKER and DE VANE, District Judges.

WALLER, Circuit Judge.

The 1943 session of the Legislature submitted to the people of Florida the following amendment as an addition to Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of their Constitution:

"The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."

The people, at the General Election of 1944, adopted the proposed amendment.

The American Federation of Labor, other State and national labor unions affiliated therewith, certain individuals suing as such and in their capacities as presidents of certain local unions, and certain corporate and individual employers of labor in Florida, all as plaintiffs and representatives of a class, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Tampa Division, against the Attorney General and the Governor, as well as the State Attorney, County Solicitor, and Sheriff of Hillsborough County, as defendants and representatives of a class, and also against certain corporations named as nominal defendants, asserting that said amendment was in conflict with several provisions of the Federal Constitution and statutes and praying temporary and permanent injunctions against the defendants in said suit.

The District Judge granted the temporary restraining order and caused this three-judge court to be assembled.

Jurisdiction of the Federal Court was predicated upon the allegations that the suit arises under Section 10 of Article 1, Article VI, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as authorized by Section 41(1) of Title 28, U.S.C.A., and that it is also a suit for redress for the deprivation of civil rights as permitted by Section 41(14) of Title 28, and Section 43 of Title 8, U.S.C.A. Jurisdiction of the three-judge Court is asserted under Section 380, Title 28, U.S.C.A.

The motion of the Attorney General of Florida to dismiss presents the legal issues upon which the case has been heard and which form the basis of the controversy, to wit:

I. Whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the District Court of the United States:

(a) As a controversy arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States involving an amount in excess of $3,000 under Section 41(1) of Title 28, U.S.C.A.; or

(b) As a suit for the redress of the deprivation of civil rights under Section 41(14) of Title 28, U.S.C.A. or Section 43 of Title 8, U.S.C.A., under which sections the amount in controversy is not material to a suit; and

(c) Even if the District Court of the United States has jurisdiction under either of the aforementioned sections, whether a case for the convening and consideration of a three-judge Court under Section 380, Title 28, U.S.C.A., has been shown.

II. Whether the amended section of the Constitution of the State of Florida deprives the plaintiffs of any rights under the following provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States:

(a) Section 10 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, prohibiting any state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts;

(b) Article VI of the Federal Constitution, providing that the Constitution, and laws of the United States which are made in pursuance of the Constitution, shall be the supreme law of the land;

(c) The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(d) The Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits any state from making or enforcing any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or from denying to any person the equal protection of the law;

(e) Sections 151 to 166 of Title 29, U.S.C.A., commonly known as the National Labor Relations Act.

III. Whether or not the allegations of fact in the complaint, as distinguished from conclusions of law, show irreparable injury on the part of the plaintiffs, or either of them.

IV. Whether or not the plaintiffs, or any of them, are entitled to maintain a suit for the deprivation of civil rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

V. Whether or not the constitutional amendment is a valid and lawful exercise of the police power reserved to the State under the Constitution.

VI. Whether or not there is any conflict between the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and said constitutional amendment.

There are certain minor, and more or less collateral, questions as to the propriety or legality of joining certain parties as plaintiffs making certain others defendants,¹ nominal or otherwise, but in contrast to the importance of the issues presented here it seems unnecessary to give them particular attention. We prefer to come as promptly as possible to the real issues in the case, with the idea of expediting the progress of this case to the Supreme Court, knowing full well that what we here say will not be long remembered.

We are of the opinion that under the allegations of the complaint the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, as distinguished from a three-judge Federal District Court, has jurisdiction under the allegation that the suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and where the amount in controversy is required to exceed $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs,² and that such Court also has jurisdiction of the controversy as a suit to redress alleged deprivation of civil rights under Section 43 of Title 8 and section 41(14) of Title 28, U.S.C.A.

The question of whether or not a three-judge Court has jurisdiction is more difficult. The controlling statute is Section 380 of Title 28, U.S.C.A., which prohibits a single District Judge from entering an "interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute, * * *." (Emphasis added.) Nothing is said in this statute as to restraining the enforcement of a provision in the constitution of a state. There is, of course, a wide distinction between a constitutional amendment, adopted by the people, and a statute passed by the Legislature. A mere majority of the Legislature may enact a statute, with the Governor's approval, but it takes three-fifths of the members of both Houses of the Legislature of Florida even to propose an amendment to the Constitution, and the proposed amendment must then be published in a newspaper in every county of the state for three months before the next general election, and at which it must receive a majority of those voting thereon in order to become a part of the organic law of the state. Article 17, Section 1, Constitution of the State of Florida. A state statute is an inferior source of law to that of a state constitution and cannot stand in opposition to it.

United States District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and particularly is this true of a three-judge Court. It is wholly statutory and all questions as to its jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800.

Cognizant that a three-judge Court is without jurisdiction to grant an injunction in a case involving a municipal ordinance which is alleged to be unconstitutional³ and that the same is true where an injunction is sought against a state statute which is not statewide in its scope,⁴ we entertain grave doubt as to whether or not we, as a three-judge Court, have jurisdiction of the case here for the reason that the constitutionality of no statute of the State of Florida is involved. Were it not for certain language in the case of Phillips v. United States, supra, and an appreciation of the fact that the dictum of today may, perhaps, be the law of tomorrow, we would hold that this Court is without jurisdiction. In the Phillips case neither the State Constitution nor statutes were under attack, but only the acts of the Governor which had been done under color of general provisions of the Constitution and laws of Oklahoma; however, the Supreme Court said that in order to bring the procedural device of the three-judge Court into play a suit is required "which seeks to interpose the Constitution against the enforcement of a state policy, whether such policy is defined in a state constitution or in an ordinary statute or through the delegated legislation of an `administrative board or commission'" 312 U.S. 246, 61 S.Ct. 483, although the statute mentions neither state constitutions nor state policies, nevertheless the Court held that the law in reference to the jurisdiction of the three-judge Court could not be liberally construed but could only be construed "as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." The decision inveighed against...