Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Fl. D., Etc.

• Decision Date: 24 June 1949
• Docket Number: No. 34893.,34893.
• Citation: 39 N.W.2d 183,229 Minn. 87
• Parties: DAYTON CO. v. CARPET, LINOLEUM AND RESILIENT FLOOR DECORATORS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 596, AFL, et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

39 N.W.2d 183

229 Minn. 87

DAYTON CO. v. CARPET, LINOLEUM AND RESILIENT FLOOR DECORATORS' UNION, LOCAL NO. 596, AFL, et al.

No. 34893.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 24, 1949.

Rehearing Denied October 14, 1949.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Paul W. Guilford, Judge.

Action by the Dayton Company against Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor Decorators' Union, Local No. 596, AFL, and others, to enjoin defendants from engaging in a strike to commit or threaten to commit unfair labor practices. From a judgment entered pursuant to findings and order of district court, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

William D. Gunn, Minneapolis, for appellants.

C. Donald Peterson, Morley, Cant, Taylor & Haverstock, and A. Lyman Beardsley, Minneapolis, for respondent.

J. Albert Woll, Herbert S. Thatcher, and James A. Glenn, Washington, D. C., amici curiae on behalf of American Federation of Labor.

KNUTSON, Justice.

This case comes here on appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to the findings and order of the district court of Hennepin county enjoining defendants from engaging in a strike for the purpose of committing or threatening to commit certain unfair labor practices.

Defendant Carpet, Linoleum and Resilient Floor Decorators' Union, Local No. 596, AFL, is a labor organization in the city of Minneapolis whose membership is composed of men and women working generally in the cutting and laying of floor coverings in Minneapolis and St. Paul. The labor organization will be referred to hereinafter as the union. The individually named defendants are members of that union and are either officers thereof or employes of plaintiff.

The material facts are not seriously in dispute. The Dayton Company operates a large department store in Minneapolis, employing many people in its various departments. It operates under what might be called an open shop, neither denying employes the right to belong to whatever union they may choose nor demanding or encouraging employes to belong to any union. Whether the employes wish to belong to a union or not is left entirely up to them without any interference by the company.

In connection with the sale of floor coverings, drapes, other window shades, and household furnishings of a similar nature, the company operates a workshop in which the cutting, fitting, and sewing of such furnishings are done to meet the requirements of the particular sale. The method of operation is substantially as follows: A prospective customer first contacts a salesman, who assists in selecting the material desired. The company then ordinarily sends a man to the customer's house to measure the floor, windows, furniture, or whatever the customer wishes to have covered. A sketch is made of the floors for carpets or of the windows for drapes, showing obstructions and dimensions and giving other information that may be helpful in preparing the material. This then goes to an estimator, who determines the yardage required and estimates the cost of the finished product. The estimate then goes back to the salesman, who contacts the prospective purchaser, and, if the sale is consummated, the measuring report goes to the shop, where the carpets, drapes, furniture coverings, or whatever it may be are cut, sewed, and fashioned, ready for use. The merchandise is then taken to the customer's house, where carpets or other floor coverings are laid, drapes or curtains hung, or whatever else may be required is done.

The cutting and sewing are done in a shop entirely separate from the main store. Those working on the cutting, sewing, and laying do not come into personal contact with the persons who do the selling, estimating, or measuring as a part of their work. The persons doing the measuring and estimating at this time, as well as selling, all operate out of the main store.

For many years prior to 1947, the measuring was done largely as part-time work by men who also did cutting, sewing, laying, and estimating. Most frequently, one man would measure the floor for rugs or carpets, another would measure the windows and walls for drapes, and possibly a third would measure furniture for coverings. The result was that frequently several men made trips to the same home for the purpose of measuring various parts of the house or furniture for a single job.

In 1947 the company determined to operate on a more efficient basis. The sales volume of the department had grown to such an extent that measuring required the full time of several employes. Accordingly, they engaged the services of three ex-service men who had taken special training in architectural drawing and designing. These three men were specially fitted for the work of measuring and preparing drafts of the rooms involved.

Practically all the employes in the floor-covering department were members of defendant union. The three men hired to do the measuring were obtained through the GI placement bureau and did not belong to any union. Upon learning that nonunion men had taken over the work of measuring, members of defendant union employed in the floor-covering department were instructed that subsequent to a stated date they were to do no work on any job on which the measuring was done by nonunion men. Thereafter, several conferences between officials of the union and the labor relations representatives of the company were held. The company refused to compel the new employes to apply for membership in the union. Representatives of the company were thereupon informed by representatives of the union that unless the measuring was done by union men no further work would be done on material required to complete jobs measured by nonunion employes. In order to avoid a complete shutdown of the department, the company commenced this suit for an injunction. An ex parte restraining order was issued. A few days later, a meeting was called of the employes who were members of the union who worked in the department involved, and they voted to go on strike. The nonunion men were given no opportunity to vote. A notice of intention to strike was served on the state labor conciliator, and copies were supplied to the labor relations representative of the company and to one of the employes of the company having some supervisory power over the workshop of the department involved. Subsequently, the names of the three nonunion men were given to a union representative by the labor relations representative of the company, and a meeting was arranged between the nonunion men and the union official. The union representative was unsuccessful in persuading the employes to seek membership in the union. Thereafter, the case came on for hearing on an application for a temporary injunction, which was granted, and upon trial a permanent injunction was granted restraining defendants from striking in violation of statutory provisions which will be discussed hereinafter. Judgment was entered pursuant to the court's order, and this appeal followed.

In 1939, the legislature of the state of Minnesota adopted a comprehensive labor relations act, L. 1939, c. 440, now M.S.A. c. 179, as amended. The objects which the legislature sought to accomplish are stated in the title to this act, as follows: "An act relating to the avoidance and settlement of labor disputes and the promotion of industrial peace, * * *." Among other things, the act provides for a "cooling-off period," during which an effort can be made to settle a dispute before calling a strike. § 179.06. This section provides for service of a notice upon the opposite parties in the event of a dispute and a short waiting period, during which an effort can be made, with the help of the labor conciliator if necessary, to settle the dispute peaceably. Thereafter, a notice of strike may be given if efforts to settle the dispute are unsuccessful.¹

The act reserves to each employe the right to determine for himself whether to belong to a union or not. § 179.10.² It gives to a majority of the employes of an appropriate unit power to select a bargaining representative, and such representative thereupon becomes the exclusive bargaining representative for all employes of the unit, but it reserves to individual employes or minority groups of employes the right to present grievances to their employer in person or through representatives of their own choosing. § 179.16, subd. 1.³

If a controversy arises as to the representative, the act requires the state labor conciliator to step in and certify the name or names of the representatives who have been selected. § 179.16, subd. 2.⁴

Before a strike may be called, it is the duty of the employer and the representative of the employes to endeavor in good faith to reach an agreement. § 179.06.

To initiate a strike in violation of § 179.06 is declared to be an unfair labor practice by § 179.11(2) and an unlawful act by § 179.11(10). It is also an unfair labor practice to call a strike unless it has been approved by a majority vote of the voting employes in a collective bargaining unit, or for any person or labor organization to cooperate in engaging in or inducing such strike, § 179.11(8), and such act is unlawful, § 179.11 (10).

1. At the time the three nonunion men were hired, the company and the union had a written contract which was still in force.⁵

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in rejecting oral evidence seeking to show that the Dayton Company had not previously questioned the right of the union to represent all employes in the floor-covering department and other evidence by which defendants sought to establish the rules of the union prohibiting its members from working with nonunion employes. Defendants further contend that the written agreement existing between the parties is not complete and that, inasmuch as it refers to an oral agreement, it is competent to show what the oral agreement was. As authority for this contention, defendants cite 2 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. §§ 3378 and 3392.

The...