American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 15446.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1944
• Docket Number: 15446.
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. v. REILLY et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

155 P.2d 145

113 Colo. 90

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. v. REILLY et al.

No. 15446.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 21, 1944

Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1945.

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Charles C Sackmann, Judge.

Declaratory judgment action by the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and others against W. I Reilly and others, constituting the Industrial Commission of Colorado, and others to test the constitutionality of the Labor Peace Act. To review the judgment, the plaintiff brings error, and the defendants filed cross-specifications of points.

Judgment modified in part, affirmed in part and otherwise vacated.

BURKE JACKSON and ALTER, JJ., dissenting in part.

Philip Hornbein, of Denver, Joseph A. Padway and Lee Pressman, both of Washington, D. C., Charles Mahoney, Wayne C. Williams, and Theodore Epstein, all of Denver, Herbert S. Thatcher, of Washington, D. C., Eugene Cotton, of New York City, Maurice Sugar and Ernest Goodman, both of Detroit, Mich., and Harry N. Routzohn, of Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiffs in error.

Gail L. Ireland, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., St. George Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., and R. Hickman Walker, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen. (Harry S. Silverstein, of Denver, of counsel), for defendants in error.

Carle Whitehead, of Denver, Arthur Garfield Hays, of New York City, General Attorney, Osmond K. Frankel, and Nathan Greene, Samuel J. Silverman, and Clifford Forster, all of New York City, for American Civil Liberties Union, amici curiae.

KNOUS Justice.

This action was initiated under the Declaratory Judgment Statute, article X, chapter 93, '35 C.S.A. (Rule 57, R.C.P. Colo.), by a group of labor organizations, their officers and individual members, plaintiffs in error here, hereinafter to be called the plaintiffs, against the members of the Industrial Commission of Colorado and Attorney General of Colorado, to whom we shall refer as the defendants, to test the constitutionality of the Labor Peace Act of Colorado, chapter 131, Session Laws of 1943 (subdivision 2a, chapter 97, 1943 Cum.Supp. to '35 C.S.A.).

This cause was assigned to the writer on November 30, 1944.

The attack was upon the act as a whole and upon several of its separate sections and subsections, specifically sections 20 and 21 in their entirety, and sections 6(1)(c), 6(2)(e), 6(2)(g), 6(2)(l), 7(2), 8(15) and 11(2). In the district court the ruling was that sections 20 and 21 were unconstitutional, but that otherwise neither the act generally nor the individual provisions assailed offended either the federal of state Constitutions. Here plaintiffs seek a review of the latter phase of the judgment below, while defendants have interposed cross-specifications of points to the adjudication of the invalidity of sections 20 and 21.

We shall first consider the questions raised by defendants' cross-specifications of points.

Section 20(1) of the act provides, inter alia: 'Each collective bargaining unit local labor union and company union now existing in this state is hereby required to incorporate within ninety days from the passage of this act, and any group hereafter organized is hereby required to incorporate before operating as such * * *.' Further, and by subsections (2) and (3)(a, b) and (4)(a) to (f), inclusive, section 20 sets out the manner in which such corporations shall be formed and function and explicitly imposes specific regulations for the internal management and affairs of such bodies. Section 21 reads as follows:

'(1) No collective bargaining unit or local labor union or group of employees shall enjoy the privileges recognized by this act unless they incorporate as herein provided. No persons required by this act to be incorporated shall carry on any of the activities purported to be regulated by this act, without incorporation hereunder.

'(2) Any violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor and punishable by fine of $300.00 for each offense, and each member of any group guilty of such violation shall be separately guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of $300.00.'

Summarizing the pleadings, evidence and arguments in a well-considered opinion, which is reported at length as American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 7 Labor Cases No. 61-761, the trial court, with reference to the points in consideration, inter alia, expressed:

'As to Sections i0 and 21 of the Labor Peace Act, plaintiffs raise in their argument and in their briefs as their major point that the Colorado statute by virtue of its previous general restraint requiring incorporation of all labor unions operating in the State of Colorado, constitutes an unconditional denial of the right of free speech, press and assembly to labor organizations and their members and otherwise deprives labor organizations and their members of liberty and civil rights, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, considered in conjunction with the First Amendment of said Constitution of the United States, and likewise violates, for the same reasons, Article II, Section 10 and Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, covering the same subject-matter. * * *

'And plaintiffs cite numerous cases in support of this contention, among which are Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]; N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 [57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352]; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 ; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-State Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 [42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360]; International Textbook Company v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 [30 S.Ct. 481, 54 L.Ed. 678, 27 L.R.A., N.S., 493, 18 Ann.Cas. 1103]; and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 [58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949].

'It is contended that the Supreme Court of the United States has regularly frowned on any efforts to impose burdens of this type, however, nominal in appearance, upon the exercise of the basic rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155]; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, , 63 S.Ct. 870 [891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 82]; Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233 [56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660], and [State of] West Virginia v. Barnett [34 W.Va. 74, 11 S.E. 735], as well as the cases above cited.

'The Court has carefully considered all of these cases and the statements of the learned judges therein, and has carefully considered the arguments and citations of authorities and briefs of the defendants, and has come to the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that these arguments and authorities have not been met or overcome by the defendants herein, and that Section 20 (and all the provisions and sub-sections thereof) and Section 21, are unconstitutional and inoperative and unenforceable for the reason that the same do require the prerequisite of incorporation for labor unions which, under its wording and provisions, does operate as a complete general previous restraint upon the exercise of the rights of free speech, free press and assembly, thus violating, in the opinion of the Court, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution considered in conjunction with the First Amendment, and the Court so declares and finds.'

Upon this rationale, concerning which we shall comment briefly, we are of the opinion that the conclusions of the trial court were sound and that its judgment as to the points in consideration must be affirmed.

The Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter in the field of Federal constitutional law and its decisions as to the meaning and scope of a constitutional provision bind state judges. American Federation of Labor v. Bain, 165 Or. 183, 106 P.2d 544, 130 A.L.R. 1278. In reaching its decision on the points now in consideration the trial court properly relied upon the pronouncements of the highest tribunal in our nation, which we think sustain the conclusion reached.

By the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104, it is now established beyond question, as counsel for defendants in effect concede, that picketing as an incident to a labor dispute is, at least in some of its phases, an exercise of the right of freedom of speech. In accord with those principles are our decisions in People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P.2d 989, 122 A.L.R. 1034; Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P.2d 436, and Denver Local Union v. Buckingham Transp. Co., 108 Colo. 419, 118 P.2d 1088. See, also, 31 Am.Jur. p. 947, § 229. Correlatively, as the Thornhill, Carlson and Harris cases, supra, emphasize, state legislation involving only reasonable regulation rather than an absolute prohibition of peaceful picketing, would not be unconstitutional. In this connection, see particularly Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200; Hotel and Restaurants Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437, 62 S.Ct. 706, 86 L.Ed. 946; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154; and Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143.

The courts of the United States for many years, and generally without regard to statute, have recognized the right of workmen to organize in labor or trade unions...