American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Department of Cent. Management Services

• Decision Date: 19 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 79376,AFL-CI,A,79376
• Citation: 219 Ill.Dec. 501,671 N.E.2d 668,173 Ill.2d 299
• Parties: , 219 Ill.Dec. 501, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 134 Lab.Cas. P 58,261 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,ppellee, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 668

671 N.E.2d 668

173 Ill.2d 299, 219 Ill.Dec. 501, 153

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525,

134 Lab.Cas. P 58,261

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, Appellee, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES et al., Appellants.

No. 79376.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 19, 1996.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Gilbert Feldman, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), brought this action against defendants, the Department of

                [219 Ill.Dec. 504] Central Management Services and the Department of Children and Family Services (collectively, DCFS), seeking to confirm an arbitration award and to vacate a [173 Ill.2d 301] supplemental arbitration award.  710 ILCS 5/11, 12 (West 1992).  The circuit court of Sangamon County denied the requested relief, and the appellate court reversed, with one justice dissenting.  272 Ill.App.3d 814, 209 Ill.Dec. 540, 651 N.E.2d 718.   We granted leave to appeal (155 Ill.2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of appellate court
                

BACKGROUND

In December 1985, DCFS Child Welfare Specialist II Vera DuBose was assigned the case file of three minor children in DCFS's custody. In February 1990, DuBose stated in a written "uniform progress report" that she had seen the three children in February 1990 and that they were "doing fine." Unfortunately, the children had, in fact, perished in an accidental fire at their home on January 16, 1990. DuBose thereafter transferred from her DCFS regional office to another for unrelated reasons.

When DuBose's replacement conducted a "follow-up" on the children in August 1990, he learned of the children's deaths in the fire. The matter was then assigned to an internal DCFS investigator on August 22, 1990. During the internal investigation, DCFS also discovered that DuBose had failed to submit case plans for the family for the years 1988, 1989, and 1990.

The investigator completed his inquiries and submitted a written report to his superiors on December 13, 1990. No further action was taken in the matter until June 20, 1991, when DCFS informed DuBose that a "predisciplinary" meeting was scheduled for June 24, 1991. Pursuant to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, AFSCME was given an opportunity to rebut DCFS's presentation. In the rebuttal, AFSCME maintained that a complete and detailed statement was not possible without certain requested documentation. Moreover, AFSCME argued that disciplinary action could not be taken against DuBose in view of the "extreme time delay." After submission of the rebuttal, AFSCME received a copy of the investigator's summary report. AFSCME thereafter filed an addendum to its rebuttal, reiterating its position that any disciplinary action taken against DuBose would be untimely. On September 2, 1991, a predisciplinary report was issued, containing a recommendation that DuBose receive a 60-day suspension.

Contrary to the recommendation, DCFS notified DuBose nine days later that she was being placed on a 30-day suspension, pending a final determination of discharge. AFSCME then filed a grievance on DuBose's behalf. On October 1, 1991, DCFS notified DuBose that she was being discharged within three days for falsification of the uniform progress report and failure to prepare service plans for the children for three years as required by DCFS's internal rules. The matter then proceeded to arbitration.

At arbitration, AFSCME argued that DCFS failed to impose discipline in a timely manner, and that even if it did, DCFS did not have just cause to discharge the employee. After conducting a hearing, the arbitrator sustained the grievance and reinstated DuBose. The arbitrator ruled that DCFS had breached the parties' collective-bargaining agreement by failing to timely discipline DuBose. Moreover, the arbitrator concluded that the failure to impose discipline in a timely fashion prevented him from "address[ing] the merits of this dispute."

Rather than reinstating DuBose, DCFS applied to the circuit court of Sangamon County, seeking vacatur of the arbitrator's reinstatement award. In granting the relief, the circuit court agreed with DCFS that the reinstatement violated public policy established in the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1994)). The court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for a decision on the merits. The circuit court also denied AFSCME's request for certification of the issue for appeal. See 134 Ill.2d R. 308.

On remand, AFSCME "demurred," electing to stand on the arbitrator's initial decision that the disciplinary action was untimely. As a result, the arbitrator denied the grievance, noting that AFSCME's "demurral"" AFSCME then filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County, seeking to vacate the subsequent arbitration order and to confirm the arbitrator's initial award. Venue was subsequently transferred to the circuit court of Sangamon County, which, as noted, denied AFSCME's petition.

[219 Ill.Dec. 505] prevented him from hearing the merits of the case as directed by the circuit court.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the time provisions contained in the collective-bargaining agreement could not be relaxed in favor of public policy. The court noted the well-recognized policy of establishing time frames within which various types of actions must be commenced. The effects of such policy, the court reasoned, often produced harsh consequences--the "guilty" may go free or those tortiously injured may be uncompensated. 272 Ill.App.3d at 818, 209 Ill.Dec. 540, 651 N.E.2d 718. The court concluded that the initial arbitral award, DuBose's reinstatement, merely upheld the "essence" of the collective-bargaining agreement and, as such, could not be vacated in favor of public policy.

The dissent, although acknowledging the collective-bargaining agreement's express language regarding time limits, questioned the majority's disregard of the paramount considerations of public policy. Specifically, the dissent focused upon the result created by the majority's analysis, i.e., that "DCFS must be forced to hire back some social worker no matter how egregious" the conduct. 272 Ill.App.3d at 821, 209 Ill.Dec. 540, 651 N.E.2d 718 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).

For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

DISCUSSION

Resolution of this appeal requires that we consider whether public policy concerns may be used to override an arbitral award. DCFS argues that public policy dictates that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement be vacated because of the severity of DuBose's alleged conduct. AFSCME responds that the arbitrator's award reflects a proper interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, an agreement which contains certain procedures which must be followed in order for discipline to be imposed.

The Standard of Review

This court has consistently recognized that the judicial review of an arbitral award is extremely limited. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill.2d 246, 254, 124 Ill.Dec. 553, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988); Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 74 Ill.2d 412, 418, 24 Ill.Dec. 843, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979). This standard reflects the legislature's intent in enacting the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act--to provide finality for labor disputes submitted to arbitration. See 710 ILCS 5/12 (West 1994) (denying judicial authority to vacate arbitral awards except on grounds recognized at common law). The Act contemplates judicial disturbance of an award only in instances of fraud, corruption, partiality, misconduct, mistake, or failure to submit the question to arbitration. Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 Ill.2d 469, 474, 56 Ill.Dec. 653, 427 N.E.2d 1199 (1981). Thus, a court is duty bound to enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator acts within the scope of his or her authority and the award draws its essence from the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Board of Trustees, 74 Ill.2d at 421, 24 Ill.Dec. 843, 386 N.E.2d 47.

To this end, any question regarding the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement is to be answered by the arbitrator. Because the parties have contracted to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator, rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the meaning of the contract that the parties have agreed to accept. We will not overrule that construction merely because our own interpretation differs from that of the arbitrator. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 124 Ill.2d at 254, 124 Ill.Dec. 553, 529 N.E.2d 534.

Application of the Standard of Review

In this case, the arbitrator based his award of reinstatement upon the fact that DCFS breached the collective-bargaining "Discipline shall be imposed as soon as possible after the Employer is aware of the event or action giving rise to the discipline and has a reasonable period or time to investigate the matter.

[219 Ill.Dec. 506] agreement by failing to discharge DuBose seasonably. Article IX, section 1, of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement, which governs discipline, states in pertinent part:

In any event, the actual date upon which discipline commences may not exceed forty five (45) days after the completion of the predisciplinary meeting." (Emphasis added.)

In the present case, DCFS offered no explanation to the arbitrator for the seven-month interval between the conclusion of the investigation and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings. As a result, the...