American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunny South Aircraft Service, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 March 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31870,31870 |
| Citation | 151 So.2d 276 |
| Parties | AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, a Florida corporation, Petitioner, v. SUNNY SOUTH AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC., a Florida corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Dean, Adams, Fischer & Gautier and Robert M. Sturrup, Miami, for petitioner.
Worley, Gautier & Dawes and Lynn F. Lummus, Miami, for respondent.
The petition for writ of certiorari seeks review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 1 alleging direct conflict with decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, and this Court in the following cases: Canada v. State, 139 So.2d 753 (Fla.App.2nd 1962); Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 548 (Fla.App.2nd 1960); Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 373 (1921); Phoenix Assur. Co., Limited, of London v. Eppstein, 73 Fla. 991, 75 So. 537, L.R.A.1917F, 540 (1917). There is conflict and we have jurisdiction.
The facts of the case appear to be that St. Elmo Raymond Montayne, a qualified pilot, leased the aircraft in question from the appellant corporation for the purpose of transporting a passenger on a charter flight from Fort Lauderdale to Orlando. After becoming airborne, the passenger forced the pilot at gunpoint to depart from the flight plan and to proceed to a directed location in the interior of Cuba. A landing was made in a pasture. The passenger alighted and gave the pilot a telephone number to call upon his return, informing him the people at that number would pay him. The pilot took off to return to the United States. After gaining an altitude of approximately 4,000 feet he was overtaken by a Cuban military aircraft which attacked and damaged the plane by gunfire. He escaped and made a forced landing. Rebel forces hid him and the plane for several days, after which he took off and returned to his point of departure in Broward County.
The trial judge held there was no intent to commit theft at the time possession was taken, there being no evidence to indicate that anyone intended to permanently deprive the plaintiff of the ownership of the aircraft. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed and remanded, holding that: 2
'The trial judge concluded that no theft was established because he viewed the facts to be such as to show an absence of intent on the part of the passenger to permanently deprive the plaintiff of its ownership of the aircraft. Appellant contends correctly that the proper rule to be applied is that a theft results where a natural consequence of the taking is an unreasonable risk of permanent loss to the owner. Thus, in Groover v. State, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, at 475, 26 A.L.R. 373, the Supreme Court of Florida said: 'Any taking that may result by a natural and immediate consequence in the entire loss and deprivation of the property to the owner is larceny.''
The troublesome point in this cause is the quality of intent required to support an allegation of theft. The conflict between the language of the District Court in the cause under review and that of the Groover, 3 Phoenix, 4 Canada 5 and Williams 6 cases should be reconciled.
No useful purpose can be served by a rehash of the textbook and case discussion on this point. In the Phoenix decision the rule is stated in absolute terms which obviously conflict with the rule announced in the Groover case. It is our conclusion that the substance of the definition followed in the several cases which seemingly conflict but, nevertheless, tend to the same end, should be held to mean that the intention to steal, that is to mean that deprive the owner permanently of his property, a question of fact to be determined by the jury, is an essential element in the crime the intention to steal, that is to feloniously of another, without his consent, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof, or the intentional dealing with the property of another, without his consent, in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of permanent loss, constitutes an intent to steal.
This doctrine recognizes the principles (1) that the intent to steal, animo furandi, requires an intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property and (2) that every person is presumed to intent the natural and probable consequence of his act.
The conclusion of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is approved and the writ of certiorari is discharged.
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