American Hospital Management Corp. v. Harris

• Decision Date: 05 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 77-3906,77-3906
• Citation: 638 F.2d 1208
• Parties: AMERICAN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia HARRIS * , Secretary of Health & Human Services; Blue Cross of Northern California, Blue Cross Association, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1208

638 F.2d 1208

AMERICAN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT CORP., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia HARRIS ^*, Secretary of Health & Human Services; Blue Cross of Northern California, Blue Cross Association, Defendants-Appellees No. 77-3906.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 18, 1980.

Decided Feb. 5, 1981.

Paul A. Schumann, Schumann & Shain, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

William T. McGivern, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., White, Giambroni & Walters, Oakland, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before KENNEDY, SKOPIL and ALARCON, Circuit Judges.

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant American Hospital Management Corporation (AHMC) appeals from a dismissal of its action challenging the validity and applicability of 42 C.F.R. § 405.427 (1980). ¹ We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

The facts are not in dispute. In 1972, AHMC owned and operated Unity Hospital in San Francisco. AHMC was at that time in extreme financial difficulty, and urgently needed substantial funds to remain in business. After trying, unsuccessfully to negotiate a sale and leaseback arrangement concerning Unity Hospital with outsiders, AHMC sold and leased back the facility from California Medical Properties Company (Cal Med), a limited partnership formed by a group of AHMC stockholders.

The agreement was consummated on November 1, 1972, with a purchase price of $1,800,000, ² and a lease calling for an annual rental of $180,000 for 20 years. At the time of the sale the facility had an appraised value of $2,254,000. Without the cash funds and the assumption of the delinquent taxes, AHMC would have been forced into bankruptcy.

Allan C. Shaw, the only general partner of Cal Med, was also the president of AHMC. He held 44.94 percent of the common stock of AHMC and a 10 percent interest in the limited partnership. Three of the directors of AHMC held 46.16 of the common stock and a 30 percent interest in the limited partnership. In total, partners holding a cumulative 60.44 percent interest in the limited partnership owned 48.86 percent of the AHMC stock.

In 1974, AHMC filed a claim under the Medicare Act for $180,000, the amount of rent paid to Cal Med, as a reimbursement cost.

Blue Cross of Northern California, acting as Intermediary for the then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education & Welfare ("HEW"), Joseph Califano, disallowed the rental payment as a cost because it considered the sale and leaseback of Unity Hospital as a transaction between related organizations within the meaning of 42 C.F.R. § 405.427. Appellant AHMC appealed the intermediary's determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ("the Board"). The Board affirmed the action of the intermediary. That decision became the final decision of the Secretary. Appellant brought an action in federal district court challenging the Secretary's decision; the district court, after hearing, granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.

Appellants first contend that there is no factual support for the Board's finding that plaintiff AHMC and Cal Med are "related organizations" within the meaning of 42 C.F.R. § 405.427. We cannot agree.

Our review of the Board's conclusion is limited to determining whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 139500(a)-(d) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1395(00 (f) (1976); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976); Memorial Inc. v. Harris, No. 78-3169, slip op. at 2502, --- F.2d ---- at ---- (9th Cir. March 28, 1980). See Good Samaritan Hospital, Corvallis v. Mathews, 609 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1979). While we recognize that our review of the Board's conclusion must be searching and careful, ³ we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Board simply because we might have reached a different conclusion. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). The Board found that AHMC and Cal Med were "related organizations" within the meaning of Section 405.427 because of common ownership and common control of both organizations. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. The 16 partners of Cal Med owned approximately fifty percent of AHMC's common stock and 6.34 percent of its preferred stock. This fact clearly supports the Board's finding of common ownership. Similarly, the record shows that the president of AHMC was the only general partner of Cal Med, placing him in a position of significant influence in both organizations. Moreover, three of AHMC's seven directors held a 30 percent interest in Cal Med. These facts, in addition to the significant degree of common ownership of the stock of both organizations, fully supports the Board's findings that AHMC and Cal Med were subject to common control within the meaning of § 405.427. ⁴

Appellant next argues that in promulgating § 405.427, the Secretary of HEW exceeded the rule-making authority granted to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1) (A) (1976). ⁵ According to the appellant, § 405.427 is invalid because its application to the facts of this case would defeat two of the principal purposes of the enabling legislation under which the regulation was promulgated, namely, (1) that actual costs incurred by providers be reimbursed by Medicare, and (2) that necessary costs incurred for efficiently delivering services to Medicare recipients not be shifted to those not so covered. According to appellants, while HEW may promulgate regulations under § 1395x(v) (1)(A) to protect Medicare against unfair and overreaching claims on the part of providers, this regulation's attempt to achieve that purpose is impermissibly overbroad.

We hold that § 405.427 is a proper exercise of the Secretary's rule-making authority under § 1395x(v)(1)(A). Our review of the validity of that regulation is limited to determining whether the regulation is reasonably related to the purpose of the relevant enabling legislation, as well as to the more particular purpose through which the regulation implements those objectives in a particular area. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1660, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973). In making our determination, we must give substantial deference to HEW's interpretation of § 1395x(v)(1)(A) as set forth in the challenged regulation; HEW was the agency charged with the responsibility for interpreting the statute, and presumably has brought its expertise to bear in formulating the regulation that interprets it. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-802, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965).

The statute mandates that only costs actually incurred in the efficient delivery of needed health care services be reimbursed. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1) (A) (1976). The regulation implements that requirement by providing that where facilities, services or supplies are furnished to a provider by a "related" entity, the provider is to be reimbursed at the cost of those items to the related entity, rather than at the cost charged to the provider. In the Secretary's judgment, there is a significant likelihood that charges incurred by providers in their transactions with entities related to them by common ownership or control will be artificially inflated because of the absence of bona fide arms-length bargaining. The regulation is thus designed to prevent seemingly separate entities from engaging in what is in fact self-dealing at the expense of the Medicare program. Schroeder Nursing Care, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 311 F.Supp. 405, 410 (E.D.Wis.1970).

Appellants concede that there is a potential for abuse in transactions between related entities, but argue that the transaction involved in this case had all the indicia of fairness. They urge us to require the Secretary to scrutinize each transaction between related entities individually for unfairness, so that just compensation will not be denied to providers whose transactions with related entities do not exhibit the artificial inflation of costs that the regulation is designed to guard against.

It is true that the regulation here may not achieve its objective with mathematical precision; in this case, for example, the appellees concede that but for the regulation in question, AHMC's request for reimbursement would have been approved. It is well established, however, that this fact, standing alone, will not invalidate the regulation. See Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 294-95, 97 S.Ct. 549, 553-54, 50 L.Ed.2d 485 (1977); Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, San Diego v. Harris, 625 F.2d 905, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980). So long as the regulation has a reasonable basis in fact, the regulation must be upheld as a valid exercise of the Secretary's discretion. ⁶ As stated by the Fourth Circuit in its well-reasoned opinion in Fairfax Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Califano, 585 F.2d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1978):

Particularly in a program as complex as the Medicare program, with its large number of providers and suppliers ..., the Secretary in his regulations may make, indeed he must make, 'rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific,' using generalized classifications governing the methods of calculating 'reasonable cost' when it is obvious that individualized cost calculations are both not administratively practical and unduly expensive. (footnotes omitted) ⁷

Here, the criteria in the challenged regulation which define "related entity" are carefully drawn and are sufficiently precise ⁸ so that entities found to be "related" under the regulation are reasonably assumed to be dealing with each other at less than arms-length. The regulation, in addition, further narrows the scope of "related entity" by exempting from its coverage providers who demonstrate that the transaction in question meets the conditions set out in subsection (d). We therefore conclude that the regulation, hedged as it is by a...