Knebel v. Hein Burns v. Hein

• Decision Date: 11 January 1977
• Docket Number: Nos. 75-1261 and 75-1355,s. 75-1261 and 75-1355
• Citation: 97 S.Ct. 549,429 U.S. 288,50 L.Ed.2d 485
• Parties: John A. KNEBEL, Secretary of Agriculture, Appellant, v. Karen HEIN et al. Kevin J. BURNS, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Karen HEIN et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

429 U.S. 288

97 S.Ct. 549

50 L.Ed.2d 485

John A. KNEBEL, Secretary of Agriculture, Appellant,

v Karen HEIN et al.

Kevin J. BURNS, etc., et al., Appellants,

v. Karen HEIN et al.

Nos. 75-1261 and 75-1355.

Argued Nov. 29, 1976.

Decided Jan. 11, 1977.

Syllabus

Federal and state regulations that disallow a deduction for transportation expenses in connection with a job training program for purposes of computing the income of food stamp recipients held not to conflict with the Food Stamp Act of 1964 or to deny equal protection or due process. Pp. 292-297.

(a) Though under the Act's broad delegation of authority, the Secretary of Agriculture might have defined income in a variety of ways, his decision to adopt a definition of income including wages, welfare payments, training allowances, and other monetary receipts, with a 10% standardized deduction of the wages or training allowance (including tuition grants and travel allowances), and only a few specific deductions, is a valid exercise of his statutory authority. The availability of alternatives does not render the Secretary's choice invalid. Pp. 293-295.

(b) Allowing a specific deduction for items such as transportation expenses would significantly increase administrative costs as well as risks of disparate treatment. P. 295.

(c) Nothing in the Act requires that deductions include all necessary nonfood expenditures. P. 295-296.

(d) The regulations embody no conclusive presumption; they merely represent the reasonable judgments that (1) recipients of state travel allowances should be treated like other trainees and wage earners, and (2) the standard 10% deduction, coupled with the 30% ceiling on coupon purchase prices, provides an acceptable mechanism for dealing with ordinary expenses such as commuting. Pp. 296-297.

D.C., 402 F.Supp. 398, reversed.

Stephen L. Urbanczyk, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the appellant Secretary of Agriculture, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, by Lorna Lawhead Williams, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellants, Kevin J. Burns, etc., and others.

Robert D. Bartels, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellees.

Mr. Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the program administered by the Secretary of Agriculture and cooperating state agencies pursuant to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 703, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), certain low-income households are entitled to purchase food coupons at a discount. The price an eligible household must pay for food stamps is determined, in part, by its "income" as defined in the applicable federal and state regulations. Under those regulations a transportation allowance, which appellee receives from the State of Iowa and uses to defray the cost of commuting to a nurses' training program, is treated as "income." The questions presented on this appeal are whether those regulations are authorized by the statute and, if so, whether they are constitutional.

Appellee Hein, a divorced woman with custody of two children, is the head of a household receiving assistance.¹ Prior to September 1972, she paid only $46 for food stamps with a retail value of $92. Thereafter she received a grant from the State which paid her tuition at a nurses' training school, plus a transportation allowance of $44 per month.² The actual monthly expense of commuting between her residence in Muscatine, Iowa, and the school in Davenport amounted to at least $44.³ The allowance nevertheless increased the "income" which determined the price of her food stamps,⁴ resulting in a $12 price increase.

After exhausting state administrative remedies, appellee filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Iowa regulations requiring that transportation allowances be included in income. Because the constitutionality of the regulations was challenged, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.⁵ The District Court originally held the Iowa regulation invalid as inconsistent with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture. ⁶ 371 F.Supp. 1091 (1974). While the State's appeal was pending in this Court, the Secretary promulgated a clarifying amendment eliminating the basis for the District Court's holding.⁷ We therefore vacated the original judgment, 419 U.S. 989, 95 S.Ct. 297, 42 L.Ed.2d 260.

On remand, the Secretary of Agriculture was joined as an additional defendant. The District Court then held both the state and the federal regulations invalid. 402 F.Supp. 398 (1975). The court could identify no rational basis for treating as income a training allowance which is fully expended for its intended purpose. Consequently, the court reasoned, the regulation did not implement the statutory objective of providing adequate nutrition for low-income families. Since the allowance did not increase appellee's "food purchasing power," the District Court felt that it was totally irrational for the allowance to increase the cost of appellee's food stamps. This analysis led to the conclusion that the regulation conflicted with the Food Stamp Act and discriminated against recipients of transportation allowances in violation of the equal protection guarantee explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.⁸

We are persuaded that the statute authorized the Secretary and the State of Iowa to issue the challenged regulations and that the regulations are constitutional.

The salutary purpose and the broad outlines of the federal food stamp program are well known.⁹ The Food Stamp Act authorizes the Secretary to "formulate and administer a food stamp program" which will provide an eligible household "an opportunity to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet," 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a). He is to "prescribe the amounts of household income and other financial resources, including both liquid and nonliquid assets, to be used as criteria of eligibility," 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The charge for the coupons is to "represent a reasonable investment on the part of the household, but in no event more than 30 per centum of the household's income . . . ." § 2016(b). Finally, the Secretary "shall issue such regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as he deems necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the food stamp program." § 2013(c).

Under the statute's broad delegation of authority, the Secretary might have defined income in a variety of ways. He might, for example, have treated wages differently from training allowances. He decided, however, to adopt a definition of income which includes wages, welfare payments, training allowances, and most other monetary receipts.¹⁰ Only a few specific deductions are allowed.¹¹ These deductions do not include any itemized deduction for commuting expenses of either students or workers. Instead, there is a standardized deduction of 10% of the wages or training allowance (including tuition grants and travel allowances), which is intended to cover incidental expenses.¹²

The District Court was correct that the regulations operate somewhat unfairly in appellee's case. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that they are the product of a valid exercise of the Secretary's statutory authority. Perhaps it might have been more equitable to allow a deduction for all commuting expenses,¹³ or for the expenses of commuting to a training program, or as the order of the District Court provides just for such expenses covered by state transportation allowances. But the availability of alternatives does not render the Secretary's choice invalid.¹⁴ Moreover, a plainly acceptable reason exists for rejecting each of these possible alternatives.

Allowing a deduction for all transportation expenses would create significant administrative costs as well as risks of disparate treatment.¹⁵ Disparate treatment of trainees and wage earners could be criticized as unfairly discriminating against the worker. Similar criticism can be leveled against the order entered by the District Court in this case, under which members of the class would fare better than workers with equally low receipts and equally high expenses.

The District Court's primary reason for invalidating the regulations was its view that transportation grants do not increase food purchasing power.¹⁶ But the grant does give a household more food purchasing power than another household which receives no grant but incurs similar nondeductible expenses related to training or employment. Moreover, nothing in the statute requires that deductions include all necessary nonfood expenditures. On the contrary, the requirement in § 2016(b) that the price of the food stamps shall not exceed 30% of the household's income, assumes that 70% of that income may be expended on nonfood necessities.¹⁷ Thus, there is a built-in allowance for necessary expenses beyond the specific deductions.¹⁸

We conclude that the federal regulations defining income were reasonably adopted by the Secretary in the performance of his statutory duty to "formulate and administer a food stamp program" and are therefore within the Secretary's statutory authority. Since there is no question about the constitutionality of the statute itself, the implementation of the statutory purpose provides a sufficient justification for both the federal regulations and the parallel state regulations to avoid any violation of equal protection guarantees. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-770, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2468-2469, 45 L.Ed.2d 522; Mathews v. de Castro, 429 U.S. 181, at 185, 97 S.Ct. 431, at 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976). Nor do the regulations embody any conclusive presumption. They merely represent two reasonable judgments: first, that recipients of state travel allowances should be treated like other trainees and like wage earners; and second, that the standard 10% deduction, coupled with the 30% ceiling...