American Linseed Oil Co. v. Crumbine

• Decision Date: 30 June 1913
• Docket Number: 3,727.
• Citation: 207 F. 332
• Parties: AMERICAN LINSEED OIL CO. v. CRUMBINE, Chief Food and Drug Inspector of Kansas.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

207 F. 332

AMERICAN LINSEED OIL CO. v. CRUMBINE, Chief Food and Drug Inspector of Kansas.

No. 3,727.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 30, 1913

Hugh A Myers, of Omaha, Neb., and W. A. S. Bird, of Topeka, Kan. (S L. Lashbrook, of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.

John S Dawson, Atty. Gen., and S. N. Hawkes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Price, Alburn & Daoust, of Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for appellee.

Before SANBORN and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLARD, District judge.

CARLAND Circuit Judge.

The American Linseed Oil Company, a corporation of the state of Ohio, filed the bill in this action against Samuel J Crumbine for the purpose of having chapter 179, Session Laws of the state of Kansas 1911, declared unconstitutional and void upon two grounds:

First, because said act violates the provision of section 16, art. 2, of the Constitution of the state of Kansas, which provides as follows:

'No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.'

Second, because said act violates the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it prohibits the sale of any compound of linseed oil in the state of Kansas regardless of how it may be labeled.

By stipulation the case was heard upon demurrer to the bill and final judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the same. The bill alleges that Samuel J. Crumbine is the legally appointed, duly authorized, and acting chief food and drug inspector of the state of Kansas, whose duties are the enforcement of certain special enactments made by the Legislature of said state pertaining to the purchase and sale of foods, beverages, condiments, medicines, linseed oil, paints, and other products included therein; that appellant is engaged in manufacturing, buying, selling, and importing pure linseed oil, linseed oil compounds and blends, and has a large number of customers and prospective customers in the state of Kansas to whom it has for a considerable period of time offered for sale through advertisements and sold by mail orders and by traveling salesmen its aforesaid products within said state; that among said products is a certain compound or blend of linseed oil composed of less than 96 per cent. of linseed oil, which it had during the time aforesaid offered for sale and sold, by means aforesaid, to its customers within said state as a substitute for linseed oil, said compounds or blends being known and labeled as follows:

'The American Linseed Oil Company, Omaha, Nebraska. Boiled Linseed Oil, not sold or intended for Food or Medicinal Purposes.'

'The American Linseed Oil Company, Omaha, Nebraska. Raw Linseed Oil, not sold or intended for Food or Medicinal Purposes.'

That, beginning some time prior to the commencement of this suit, the said defendant, assuming to act in his official capacity as chief food and drug inspector of the state of Kansas, has continually therefrom wrongfully and unlawfully opposed the sale and introduction of said compounds and blends of linseed oil, described as aforesaid, within said state, and unlawfully advised appellants' customers and prospective customers to refuse to contract with appellant for the purchase and sale of said linseed oil compound or blends, and threatened to prosecute appellant in the event of the sale or offer to sell by it of the aforesaid compounds or blends to any person, firm, or corporation within said state; that appellant has sold in manner aforesaid and shipped to its said customers within the state of Kansas the compounds or blends of linseed oil above mentioned as a substitute for linseed oil, under the name 'Linsol' and in containers labeled as follows:

'The American Linseed Oil Company, Omaha, Nebraska. Linsol, not sold or intended for Food or Medicinal Purposes.'

That appellant has sold in manner aforesaid and shipped within the state to its aforesaid customers the aforesaid compound or blend of linseed oil as a substitute for linseed oil, under the name 'Blended Linseed Oil' and in containers known and labeled as follows:

'The American Linseed Oil Company, Omaha, Nebraska. Blended Linseed Oil, not sold or intended for Food or Medicinal Purposes.'

That said defendant, assuming to act in his official capacity as chief food and drug inspector of the state of Kansas, wrongfully and unlawfully opposed the sale and introduction of the aforesaid compounds or blends of linseed oil within said state, sold and labeled as 'Linsol' or sold and labeled as 'Blended Linseed Oil,' and threatens to prosecute appellant and its customers in the event of a sale of the same, and that said defendant threatens to continue to oppose and to prevent the sale thereof, claiming that the law hereinbefore referred to wholly prohibits the manufacture, sale, or offer for sale or use within the state of Kansas said compounds of linseed oil labeled as aforesaid.

The law claimed to be unconstitutional appears in the margin. ^[1] It is claimed that this law violates section 16, art. 2, of the Constitution of the state of Kansas, for the reason that it contains more than one subject, namely, adulteration of turpentine and adulteration of linseed or flaxseed oil; the contention being that no such natural relation exists between the oil extracted from the seed of flax and that substance which is by distillation extracted from the gum of the long-leaf pine and other trees, called turpentine, as will in the face of the constitutional provision quoted permit the Legislature to unite them under the same head or title in making a provision against their adulteration and sale, but that to accomplish such purpose two separate acts must be passed. The trial court was of the opinion that turpentine could be properly classified as an oil and that there was no such want of relation between turpentine oil and flaxseed or linseed oil as to forbid the Legislature from so classifying them under the Constitutional provision above quoted. The position taken by the trial court may be correct, but we are of the opinion that the subjectmatter of the law complained of is adulteration, and so considered there is certainly but one subject contained in the act. The general subject of the law being adulteration, the Legislature could extend its provisions to such compositions as it wished. In regard to the proper construction of section 16, art. 2, of the Constitution of Kansas, the Supreme Court of that state in the case of State v. Barrett, 27 Kan. 213, used the following language

'In order to correctly interpret that provision of section 16, art. 2, of the Constitution, * * * its object must be taken into consideration; and the provision must not be construed or enforced in any narrow or technical spirit but must be construed liberally on the one side so as to guard against the abuse intended to be prevented by it, and liberally on the other side so as not to embarrass or obstruct needed legislation.

' * * * The title of an act may be as broad and comprehensive as the Legislature may choose to make it; or it may be as narrow and restricted as the Legislature may choose to make it. It may be so broad and comprehensive as to include innumerable minor subjects, provided all these minor subjects are capable of being so combined and united as to form only one grand and comprehensive subject; or it may be so narrow and restricted as to include only the smallest and minutest subject.

'And while the title to an act may include more than one subject, provided all can be so united and combined as to form only one single, entire, but more extended subject, yet neither the title to the act nor the act itself can contain more than one subject, unless all the subjects which it contains can be so united and combined as to form only one single subject.

'In construing the title to an act, as well as the act itself, reference must be had to the object of the act, and to the evil sought to be remedied by it.'

In Rathbone v. Hopper, 57 Kan. 245, 45 P. 611, 34 L.R.A. 674, the same court said:

'A technical interpretation, however, has never been applied in this state to the titles of legislative acts. On the other hand, it has been consistently held that the constitutional limitation should not be enforced in any narrow or technical spirit but should be liberally interpreted with a view of upholding the acts of the Legislature. It has been regarded to be the duty of the court to view the acts of the Legislature with great respect and so far as possible endeavor to reconcile and sustain them. Illustrations of liberal interpretations placed upon the titles of acts may be found in almost every volume of our decisions, but we need only refer to a few of them. Woodruff v. Baldwin, 23 Kan. 494; Philpin v. McCarty, 24 Kan. 393; Com'rs of Marion Co. v. Com'rs of Harvey Co., 26 Kan. 181; Com'rs of Cherokee Co. v. State ex rel., 36 Kan. 337 (13 P. 558); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harrelson, 44 Kan. 253 (24 P. 465); State v. Bush, 45 Kan. 140 (25 P. 614); In re Pinkney, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 89 (27 P. 179); State ex rel. v. Lewelling, 51 Kan. 562 (33 P. 425); In re Sanders, Petitioner, 53 Kan. 191 (36 P. 348, 23 L.R.A. 603); Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 367 (40 P. 666); Rogers v. Morrill, 55 Kan. 737 (42 P. 355).'

Upon the second point we are also of the opinion that the law does not offend against any provision of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The law does not prohibit appellant from selling its merchandise within the state of Kansas; it simply requires that, if appellant shall sell the compounds and blends of linseed oil described in the bill, it shall be properly marked. The object of the statute in this respect is to prevent fraud and deception. Appel...