American Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Denwitty
Decision Date | 06 February 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 14564,14564 |
Parties | AMERICAN STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. v. DENWITTY ex ux. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Samuels, Brown, Herman & Scott, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Burt Barr and J. Lee Zumwalt, Dallas, for appellee.
Appellant's proceeding by bill of review, seeking to set aside a default judgment obtained against it, resulted in a denial of the bill; and this appeal has been prosecuted from such adverse rendition.
Statement of the case in nature and result as made by appellant is not challenged and will be adopted to the extent quoted.
The following facts appear without dispute: Home Office of Appellant Company is in Fort Worth, Tarrant County. On September 13, 1949 Mabel Therkerield (now Gustard), employed by said Company to solicit applications for insurance, procured the issuance of a policy to Martha Denwitty, wife of appellee Lester Denwitty. The policy, No. 58516, provided for certain indemnity to the holder in event of disability from accidental injury. It was delivered to insured by Mabel Gustard and accepted-the $39 initial premium being duly paid. From and after January 1950, Mabel Gustard ceased to have any connection with appellant; her appointment from the State Board of Insurance Commissioners as an agent for the Company expiring April 1, 1950 without renewal. She was therefore not an agent, servant or employee of the American Standard Life Insurance Company on September 13, 1950 (due date of renewal premium), or on September 25, 1951 when citation addressed to the said Company was served upon her as its agent. There was no service on appellant in the original cause wherein default judgment was rendered other than the purported service on Mabel (Therkerield) Gustard. Martha Denwitty testified that the renewal premium of $39 was paid to Mabel Gustard in September 1950 without any notice from either the latter or the Company that Gustard's agency had terminated; the injury for which claimant asserts liability under the policy occurring in June 1951. Gustard admitted receiving the payment, though telling Martha that she was no longer an agent, but that she would take the money and deliver it to Doc. Harbert, a Company supervisor. This witness (Gustard) about that time left the City on a sick call and placed the money with an acquaintance for delivery to Harbert; said third party failing to do so. At any rate, appellant never received this 1950 renewal payment nor is there any evidence that the matters last related were ever called to the Company's attention until after Martha's injury, when she made demand for blank forms in establishment of claim. Mabel Gustard further stated that in the initial transaction (purchase of policy) the receipt delivered to Martha Denwitty was on a Company form originally attached to the signed application; the receipt signed by her on taking the $39 renewal of premium from Martha in September 1950 being of the former's own composition and not on the standard form required by the Company.
Material here, the policy sued on contained the following recitals: Additional provisions: V.A.T.S. Insurance Code, Art. 21.04 (formerly Art. 5063, R.S.), captioned 'Solicitor Deemed Company's Agents', reads in part: '* * *, but such agent shall not have the power to waive, change or alter any of the terms or conditions of the application or policy.' In this connection Martha Denwitty testified that she had never read the policy although, so far as the record reveals, it had continuously remained in the possession.
Several points advanced by appellant may be stated in substance: (1) Invalidity of the original or default judgment because of a lack of proper service upon the Company; (2) a valid and meritorious defense to the policy was established, the evidence showing that such policy, first issuing on September 13, 1949, lapsed prior to date of injury upon which the claim was predicated; and (2) receipt by a former agent of renewal premium without knowledge of the Company and never received by it, was of no force and effect in view of the policy provision that 'A receipt signed by the Secretary or Registrar of the Company shall be the only evidence binding on the Company of the payment of any premium after the first.' Appellees' counterpoints are to the effect that, (1) appellant's remedy was by way of writ of error, Art. 2249a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. to set aside a default judgment; and is hence not entitled to maintain the instant bill of review; (2) estoppel on part of the Company to deny agency, claimants having paid the renewal premium to Gustard, soliciting agent, without knowledge that the latter's authority had terminated; (3)(a) the policy provision for payment of initial premium was contained in a 'hidden and obscure part of the policy,' and therefore void, (b) and that such provisions relating to renewals were in conflict with V.A.T.S. Insurance Code, Art. 3.44, sec. 1 (old art. 4732, R.S.), and void.
We will consider the foregoing points generally and in inverse order. Viewing the evidence adduced most favorably from standpoint of claimants, there exists no basis of estoppel whereby the Company was bound by the acts of Mabel Gustard, it having no knowledge of her attempted collection of renewal premium until after Martha's injury. When a liability is enforceable because of the 'apparent' or 'ostensible' authority of an agent, having no actual authority, it is upon the principle of estoppel. 2 T.J., p. 424; Continental Oil Co. v. Baxter, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 463. Appellees were on notice of the policy limitations concerning method of renewal payments and their...
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