American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. I.C.C.

Decision Date21 July 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-1036,94-1036
Citation54 F.3d 842
Parties149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338, 312 U.S.App.D.C. 9 AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents, CSX Transportation, Inc., Intervenor.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Gordon P. MacDougall argued the cause and filed the briefs, for petitioner.

Judith A. Albert, Atty., I.C.C. argued the cause, for respondents. With her on the brief were Henri F. Rush, Gen. Counsel, John J. McCarthy, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel and Virginia Strasser, Atty., I.C.C., Anne K. Bingaman, Asst. Atty. Gen., John J. Powers, III and Robert J. Wiggers, Attys., U.S. Dept. of Justice.

James S. Whitehead argued the cause, for intervenor. With him on the brief was James D. Tomola.

Before WALD, RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner American Train Dispatchers Association (the "Union") seeks review of three orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the interpretation of Article I, Sec. 5(a) of the New York Dock conditions, designed to protect employees affected by railroad consolidations. The Union challenges both the Commission's initial orders requiring submission of the dispute to arbitration, and the Commission's affirmance of the arbitrator's decision that the carrier had properly excluded transaction-related overtime earnings in calculating the employees' displacement allowance. We conclude that the Commission's interpretations are permissible and therefore deny the petition for review.

I.

The Interstate Commerce Act (the "ICA") vests the Commission with exclusive authority to examine, condition, and approve proposed rail carrier mergers and consolidations. 49 U.S.C. Secs. 11341-11351 (1988). The ICA also requires the Commission to impose on such mergers certain labor-protective conditions, which are designed to shield railroad workers from the adverse effects of industry upheaval. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 11347; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 132-33, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 1165-66, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991). To comply with Sec. 11347, the Commission has announced a comprehensive set of arbitration procedures and employee benefits, known as the New York Dock conditions, that apply to railway job consolidations. See New York Dock Ry.--Control--Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 360 I.C.C. 60, 84-90 (1979) ("New York Dock "), aff'd sub nom. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.1979).

One condition imposed by New York Dock requires railroads to compensate its employees who are adversely affected by a Commission-approved consolidation. Under New York Dock, Article I, Sec. 5(a), the carrier must replace the lost wages of such employees for up to six years following a consolidation or merger. See New York Dock, Art. I, Sec. 5(a), 360 I.C.C. at 86 (quoted infra at pp. 848-849). In each month during the protected period, the employee is entitled to a displacement allowance equal to the difference between the employee's actual earnings and the "average monthly compensation" earned during a test period prior to the consolidation.

In 1987, CSX Transportation, Inc. announced a plan to consolidate its train dispatching operations into a single facility in Jacksonville, Florida. See American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. CSX Transp., Inc., 9 I.C.C.2d 1127, 1128-29 (1993) ("Third Order "). The Union and CSX entered into an Implementing Agreement in January 1988 to govern the consolidation; the terms of the Agreement entitled employees to the protective benefits of New York Dock. The plan required dispatchers taking jobs at the new location to relocate to Florida and undergo training on a new computerized dispatching system, in many cases before their former duty stations had closed. As a result, vacancies and personnel shortages existed in a number of offices during the transfer period, and a number of dispatchers who remained behind logged unusual amounts of overtime. The terms of their employment required dispatchers to work overtime when necessary.

Pursuant to New York Dock, CSX prepared average monthly compensation statements for approximately 250 dispatchers who were displaced during the first phase of the reorganization. In computing the test period average, the carrier deducted the overtime earnings that were traceable to the consolidation transaction, maintaining that the labor protective conditions did not require inclusion of such extraordinary earnings. 1 The Union objected to the deductions and filed a complaint with the Commission, seeking an order requiring CSX to include the transaction-related overtime earnings in the average compensation figure. The Commission dismissed the complaint in favor of initial resolution through arbitration under New York Dock, Article I, Sec. 11. See American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. CSX Transp., Inc., Fin.Doc. No. 28905 (Sub-No. 24) (served June 25, 1990) ("First Order "). Over objection, the Union submitted its claims to arbitration. 2

An arbitral panel decided that CSX had properly excluded the dispatchers' transaction-related overtime. 3 The panel determined that neither Congress nor the Commission had clarified the meaning of "total compensation," instead leaving it to arbitrators to interpret the term on a case-by-case basis. Reviewing previous arbitration decisions under the various precursors to New York Dock, the panel found that the preponderance of arbitral precedents had adopted the position urged by CSX. Over the dissent of the Union member, the panel majority concluded that a contrary interpretation would create an unintended windfall for employees throughout the six year protective period--a result inconsistent with the labor conditions' limited purpose of protecting employees from suffering adverse effects to their normal earnings as a result of the transaction.

The Commission denied the Union's appeal of the arbitration decision. See Third Order, 9 I.C.C.2d at 1128. Noting that its general scope of review for arbitral awards is highly deferential, the Commission acknowledged that "when reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of the Commission's labor conditions, the agency is entitled to subject it to 'more searching review.' " Id. at 1131 (citing Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 812 (D.C.Cir.1993)). The Commission then affirmed the award on the ground that a literal interpretation of Sec. 5(a) conflicted with other provisions in the New York Dock conditions as well as the conditions' "overall policy ... that employees be protected only against those losses that are caused by the transaction." Id. at 1134.

The Commission also rejected the Union's challenges to the representative use of Mr. Barr's claim, see supra note 3, and to the method by which CSX calculated the amount of transaction-related (and thus excludable) overtime, see supra note 1. The Commission emphasized that its review of the arbitral award was concerned solely with whether transaction-related overtime could be properly excluded under New York Dock, and that for that purpose the focus on Mr. Barr was appropriate. See id. at 1133. With respect to the methodology CSX used to identify and exclude transaction-related overtime, the Commission generally approved the use of a pre-transaction control period to establish a baseline level of overtime hours that could then be compared with overtime hours accrued in the course of the transaction. Id. at 1135. At the same time, however, the Commission noted that the transaction-related nature of the overtime was undisputed in Mr. Barr's case, and twice acknowledged that other displaced employees could challenge the carrier's calculation with respect to their own overtime earnings. See id. at 1133, 1135.

II.

In remitting the Union's dispute with CSX to arbitration, the Commission recognized that "the Commission itself has considered, as a general matter, whether the compensation received by employees satisf[ies] statutory minimum levels." First Order at p. 3. It nevertheless concluded that the dispute with CSX was appropriate for initial arbitration because it involved individual claims about "the calculation of individual benefits," where an arbitrator's expertise would be valuable. Id. at pp. 3-4. The Commission noted that the opportunity for Commission review would ensure consistency with New York Dock.

The Union does not suggest that the order to arbitrate is inconsistent with the statute or New York Dock. 4 Rather, the Union contends that the Commission's decision conflicts with agency policy to take initial jurisdiction over questions concerning "compensation guarantees" under labor protective conditions. The Union relies on Great N. Pac.--Merger--Great N., Fin.Doc. No. 21478 (Sub-No. 6) (served Dec. 11, 1986 & April 5, 1988) ("Landis "), aff'd sub nom. Landis v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 930 F.2d 748 (9th Cir.1991). Landis involved a claim that the carrier miscalculated a dismissal allowance provided under labor protective conditions analogous to the New York Dock conditions. On referral from a federal district court where the employee had initially filed suit, the Commission resolved the dispute without remitting it for arbitration, notwithstanding the fact that the conditions provided for an arbitral remedy. The Union maintains that the instant case also involves a "compensation guarantee" under labor protective conditions, and that the Commission therefore acted inconsistently when it declined to exercise initial jurisdiction. 5

The apparent conflict with Landis thus raises the question whether the Commission adequately explained its departure from prior practice. See King Broadcasting Co....

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