Ames v. Attorney General

Decision Date11 February 1955
Citation124 N.E.2d 511,332 Mass. 246
PartiesJohn S. AMES and others. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL (two cases).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Robert G. Dodge, Boston (J. Wells Farley, Harold S. Davis, Endicott Peabody and John M. Woolsey, Jr., Boston), for petitioners.

Harris A. Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

QUA, Cchief Justice.

These are petitions in this court brought respectively for a writ of mandamus and for a writ of certiorari by the same petitioners against the Attorney General. The petition for a writ of mandamus is reported by the single justice upon the amended petition and upon the respondent's motion to dismiss and demurrer. The petition for a writ of certiorari is reported by the single justice upon the amended petition and the respondent's substituted motion to dismiss, demurrer, and return as extended.

The pleadings with the exhibits appended thereto or incorporated therein are voluminous and detailed. The substantive allegations are the same in each petition. For the purposes of this decision it will be sufficient to state them only in the broadest outline.

By indenture dated March 29, 1987, the trustees under the will of James Arnold transferred to the President and Fellows of Harvard College, hereinafter called the College, a fund to be held in trust by the College for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the 'Arnold Arboretum' on a large tract of land of the College in West Roxbury (now part of Boston) and for the support of an 'Arnold Professor' who should have the care and management of the arboretum. Under this indenture the College became the trustee of a public charitable trust. See Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431.

The original trust fund has been greatly augmented by subsequent gifts for the purposes of the arboretum, so that its total endowment now amounts at market value to some $5,000.000. It has sent field expeditions to gather specimens in various parts of the world. It now maintains at West Roxbury a collection of some 6,000 species and varieties of living trees and shrubs. It has also at West Roxbury an excellent horticultural-botanical library of about 4,000 books and 15,000 pamphlets and an herbarium of great value containing nearly 700,000 specimens. The conjunction of these resources in one place has given the arboretum a world wide status and reputation as an integrated scientific institution. Members of its staff have been engaged in full time scientific research, the published results of which have added to the reputation of the arboretum.

The college now proposes to remove to Cambridge the main body of the library and herbarium of the arboretum related to research to be there combined to a greater or less extent with other collections of books and specimens owned by the College in connection with its botany department. There are to be left at West Roxbury only such books and specimens as may be required to provide there 'a working library and herbarium.' It is alleged that this proposal, if carried into effect, would break down the arboretum as an integrated scientific institution, prevent future donations for its endowment, and injure its reputation and prestige; that it would involve the use of arboretum income for purposes outside the scope of arboretum activities; and that in some respects the intended action would interfere with the independent status of the Arnold Professor as established by the trust indenture. The position of the petitioners is that the College holds the endowment of the arboretum upon an express trust for the benefit of the arboretum alone as an entity separate from the College; that the funds were donated for the benefit of that entity and not of the College; and that the proposed changes, even if beneficial to botany at Harvard in general, would be harmful to the arboretum as a separate institution and would constitute breaches of the trust established by the indenture of 1872.

The petitions contain further allegations that the College has refused to bring a petition for instructions to determine its right to institute the proposed changes and that counsel for the petitioners sought the Attorney General to permit the use of his name in an information to be brought to obtain a declaratory decree. Conferences were had with an assistant attorney general and correspondence took place and arguments and legal opinions were presented with a view to persuading the Attorney General to permit the use of his name. On July 2, 1953, the Assistant Attorney General rendered a decision in writing in which he states that the judgment of trustees cannot be overridden by the courts unless the trustees decide arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith; that the College reached its decision honestly, faithfully, and for what it considers to be the best interests of the arboretum; that 'there is no legal breach of trust'; that 'To permit the use of the name of the Attorney General * * * where it is clear to him the trustee is acting in good faith and within the bounds of reasonable judgment and sound discretion, simply because others, equally in good faith, differ with the decision of the trustee, would open the door to unreasonable and vexatious litigations'; and that accordingly by direction of the Attorney General the application was denied.

The petitions go on to allege that the Attorney General has misconceived his duty; that he should have gone no farther than to determine whether there was a question fit for judicial inquiry; and that the decision discloses various specified errors of law and fact.

The petitioner do not allege that they have any right or standing in relation to the subject matter different from that of other members of the public. They do allege that they have for many years been actively interested in the arboretum and have contributed to it, and that all but two of them are members of the visiting committee appointed by the board of overseers of the College to visit the arboretum. So far as appears this committee has no rights or powers, but exists as a part of the machinery of the College merely for purposes of information and advice. It is not alleged that the petitioners are a majority of the committee, or that they are acting in its behalf. Compare Trustees of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors, 253 Mass. 256, 300-302, 148 N.E. 900.

The prayer of the petition for mandamus is that a writ issue commanding the respondent to vacate his decision refusing the use of his name, to 'grant the petitioners a hearing in the proper sense of the term,' and to reconsider the petitioners' application and grant it if upon full personal consideration of facts and law it appears that the issues which the petitioners seek to raise are fit subjects for judicial inquiry, even though it may appear to him that the past and proposed action of the College is not in breach of trust.

The prayer in the petition for certiorari is that the writ issue to quash the denial by the respondent of the petitioners' application for the use of his name, and that the respondent be required to grant a hearing on said application and to decide in accordance with correct principles of law.

In our opinion the decision of the Attorney General not to permit the use of his name in a suit against the College for alleged breach of a public charitable trust was a purely executive decision which is not reviewable in a court of justice. The duty of taking action to protect public charitable trusts and to enforce proper application of their funds rests solely upon the Attorney General as the representative of the public interests. This is so both at common law and under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 12, § 8. 1 The exclusive character of this duty thus placed upon the highest law officer of the Commonwealth has been repeatedly stated in our decisions. In Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 336, Chief Justice Shaw said that a suit for establishing and sustaining charitable trusts 'must be prosecuted with the sanction of the public prosecutor, whose duty it is to see that the public interests sustain no detriment, and to proceed in the prosecution or stay proceedings, as a just regard to these interests may require. It follows, therefore, that this proceeding is not to be considered as the suit of the relators; nor can the relators, of their own motion, or in their own names, take any step in the cause, or be heard as parties.' 2 At page 337. In Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass. 568, at page 573, 153 N.E. 13, at page 16, this court said, 'It is well settled that it is the exclusive function of the Attorney General to correct abuses in the administration of a public charity by the institution of proper proceedings. It is his duty to see that the public interests are protected and to proceed in the prosecution or to decline so to proceed as those interests may require.' The opinion then quotes from the previous decision of Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254, at page 256, 25 N.E. 427, at page 428, 9 L.R.A. 748, as follows, "But the law has provided a suitable officer to represent those entitled to the beneficial interests in a public charity. It has not left it to individuals to assume this duty, or even to the court to select a person for its performance. Nor can it be doubted that such a duty can be more satisfactorily performed by one acting under official responsibility than by individuals, however honorable their character and motives may be." Other authorities are Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. 328, 339; Attorney General v. Bedard, 218 Mass. 378, 385, 105 N.E. 993; Krauthoff v. Attorney General, 240 Mass. 88, 92, 132 N.E. 865; Judkins v. Hyannis Public Library Association, 302 Mass. 425, 19 N.E.2d 727; Bolster v. Attorney General, 306 Mass. 387, 389, 28 N.E.2d 475; Elias v. Steffo, 310 Mass....

To continue reading

Request your trial
34 cases
  • Com. v. Favulli
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1967
    ...judicial department of the Commonwealth.' An illustration of what would be a violation of art. 30 is presented in Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 253, 124 N.E.2d 511, where this court held that it would constitute intolerable interference by the judiciary with the executive department......
  • Com. v. Boston Edison Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 25, 2005
    ...judicially reviewable. See, e.g., Shepard v. Attorney Gen., 409 Mass. 398, 401, 567 N.E.2d 187 (1991), quoting Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 253, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 Boston Edison's contention that the ......
  • Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop Boston
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 25, 2007
    ...may require." Lopez v. Medford Community Ctr., Inc., 384 Mass. 163, 167, 424 N.E.2d 229 (1981), quoting Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 250-251, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955). However, a plaintiff who asserts an individual interest in the charitable organization distinct from that of the gene......
  • In re Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • August 4, 2004
    ...so to proceed as those interests may require." The caselaw is replete with similar pronouncements. See, e.g., Ames v. Atty. Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 250, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955) ("It is well settled that it is the exclusive function of the Attorney General to correct abuses in the administration ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT