Ames v. Dipietro-Kay Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1992
• Docket Number: DIPIETRO-KAY
• Citation: 617 A.2d 559
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,386 Mark AMES v.CORP. and Volvo Penta of America.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 559

617 A.2d 559

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,386

Mark AMES v. DIPIETRO-KAY CORP. and Volvo Penta of America.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 16, 1992.

Decided Dec. 8, 1992.

Justin W. Leary (orally), Robert A. Laskoff, Lewiston, for plaintiff.

Harold J. Friedman (orally), Jennifer S. Begel, Friedman & Babcock, Portland, for defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.

RUDMAN, Justice.

Dipietro-Kay Corporation ("Dipietro-Kay") and Volvo Penta of America ("Volvo") appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Knox County, Kravchuk, J. ) following a jury verdict finding them both liable, under theories of negligence and product liability, for the injuries sustained by Mark Ames ("Ames"). On appeal, Volvo and Dipietro-Kay contend that the Superior Court erred in denying their motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in that: (1) Ames's own actions constituted a superseding cause of his injuries as a matter of law and (2) the court's instruction to the jury on the emergency doctrine was improper. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

In November of 1986, Ames, a lobsterman from Matinicus, purchased a Volvo engine for his boat from Dipietro-Kay. During the next three or four months, the engine's air filter box twice came apart while Ames was fishing in open waters. Specifically, the clamps securing the air filter box cover, and the cover itself, had fallen off and caused the filter to slip into the box toward the air intake hole of the engine's turbocharger. On both occasions, Ames turned off the engine and reassembled the air filter without any further difficulty. In addition to being informed of Ames's particular problem, testimony presented at trial revealed that Volvo had received other complaints regarding the air filter problem shortly after the engine came on the market in 1986.

On April 17, 1987, Ames was traveling in his boat from Tenants Harbor to Friendship when he noticed that the cover to the box had again come off and that the air filter was lodged in the air intake hole. This time Ames was not traveling in open waters. The boat was approximately 300 feet from the dock and moving at a speed of 12 knots. While the engine was running, Ames reached in with his left hand to grab the filter. Unfortunately, at that moment, the top of his left middle finger was completely severed by the turbo blades located approximately three inches inside the air intake hole.

Ames filed suit against Volvo and Dipietro-Kay and, after a two day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ames. The jury found both Volvo and Dipietro-Kay guilty of negligence and, furthermore, that Ames's injuries were "proximately caused by an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition in the Volvo engine or air filter box." Although Ames was also found negligent, his degree of culpability was found to be less than either Volvo or Dipietro-Kay. The Superior Court denied post-trial motions for a new trial and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and this timely appeal was filed.

I.

Volvo and Dipietro-Kay first argue that the evidence presented at trial compels the conclusion that Ames's own actions constituted a superseding cause of his injuries entitling them to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must determine "whether by any reasonable view of the evidence, including the inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party], the verdict can be sustained. The judgment in favor of [the non-moving party] must stand unless it is clearly erroneous." C.N. Brown Co. v. Gillen, 569 A.2d 1206, 1215 (Me.1990) (quoting Pombriant v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine, 562 A.2d 656, 659 (Me.1989)). The trial court's refusal to grant a new trial will not be disturbed unless a clear and manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Binette v. Deane, 391 A.2d 811, 813 (Me.1978).

In order to recover under either a product liability or a negligence theory, it is essential that the plaintiff prove that a product's defective design or the defendant's negligent conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Marois v. Paper Converting Machine Co., 539 A.2d 621, 623 (Me.1988); W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 102, at 710 (5th ed. 1984). We have previously defined proximate cause as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 495 (Me.1973) (quoting Johnson v. Dubois, 256 A.2d 733, 734 (Me.1969)). However, the mere occurrence of an intervening cause does not automatically break the chain of causation stemming from the original actor's conduct. In order to break that chain, the intervening cause must also be a superseding cause, that is, neither anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable. Johnson v. Dubois, 256 A.2d 733, 735 (Me.1969). Thus, Volvo and...