Ames v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Trs.

• Decision Date: 22 December 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-0706
• Parties: Ames, Appellant, v. Rootstown Township Board of Trustees, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

2022-Ohio-4605

Ames, Appellant,
v.
Rootstown Township Board of Trustees, Appellee.

No. 2021-0706

Supreme Court of Ohio

December 22, 2022

Submitted March 9, 2022

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 2020-P-0063, 2021-Ohio-1369.

The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, for appellant.

Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, James F. Mathews, and Andrea K. Ziarko, for appellee.

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging reversal in part for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.

Brosius, Johnson & Griggs, L.L.C., Julia E. Donnan, Jennifer L. Huber, and Peter N. Griggs, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Township Association, Ohio School Board Association, County Commissioners Association of Ohio, Ohio Municipal League, and Coalition of Large Ohio Urban Townships.

1

OPINION

Brunner, J.

{¶ 1} The Open Meetings Act, R.C. 121.22, requires that all meetings of public bodies be open to the public. Enforcement occurs through private suits, and as remedies for violations, the trial court issues injunctive relief and orders the public body to pay a $500 civil forfeiture as well as the plaintiffs attorney fees and court costs. R.C. 121.22(I). In this appeal, we consider the injunctive and civil-forfeiture remedies a trial court must order when it finds multiple violations of a single provision of R.C. 121.22. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that when multiple violations of R.C. 121.22 through the same conduct are found, the trial court may issue a single injunction, and when it does so, it is required to order the public body to pay a single $500 civil-forfeiture penalty as to all offenses. Having discerned a minor error in the injunction issued by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in part and reverse it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Open Meetings Act

{¶ 2} The Open Meetings Act ("OMA") provides that "[a]ll meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times." R.C. 121.22(C). "Public body" is defined as including "[a]ny * * * board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution." R.C. 121.22(B)(1)(a). "Meeting" is defined as "any prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its members." R.C. 121.22(B)(2).

{¶ 3} A public body is permitted to hold an executive session-from which members of the public are excluded-only for certain specified purposes. Under R.C. 121.22(G), "the members of a public body may hold an executive session only after a majority of a quorum of the public body determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an executive session and only at a regular or special meeting for the sole

2

purpose of the consideration of any of the matters identified in eight subparagraphs, R.C. 121.22(G)(1) through (8).

{¶ 4} Relevant here is R.C. 121.22(G)(3), which permits an executive session for "[conferences with an attorney for the public body concerning disputes involving the public body that are the subject of pending or imminent court action." R.C. 121.22(G)(3). Also relevant is R.C. 121.22(G)(8), which permits an executive session to occur "[t]o consider confidential information related to the marketing plans, specific business strategy, production techniques, trade secrets, or personal financial statements of an applicant for economic development assistance, or to negotiations with other political subdivisions respecting requests for economic development assistance." But R.C. 121.22(G)(8) imposes two conditions on any executive session held under that provision. It requires that the information to be considered be directly related to requests for economic-development assistance under particular provisions of the Revised Code and that the public body vote to determine that the executive session is "necessary to protect the interests of the applicant or the possible investment or expenditure of public funds to be made in connection with the economic development project." R.C. 121.22(G)(8)(a) and (b).

{¶ 5} Once a meeting has concluded, the minutes "shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be open to public inspection." R.C. 121.22(C). "The minutes need only reflect the general subject matter of discussions in executive sessions authorized under [R.C. 121.22(G) or (J)]." Id.

{¶ 6} For alleged violations of the statute, the OMA creates a private right of action, such that "[a]ny person may bring an action to enforce" the statute within two years of the alleged or threatened violation. R.C. 121.22(I)(1).

{¶ 7} R.C. 121.22(I) then sets out specific remedies, which are at the center of this appeal:

3

(1) * * * Upon proof of a violation or threatened violation of this section in an action brought by any person, the court of common pleas shall issue an injunction to compel the members of the public body to comply with its provisions

(2)(a) If the court of common pleas issues an injunction pursuant to division (I)(1) of this section, the court shall order the public body that it enjoins to pay a civil forfeiture of five hundred dollars to the party that sought the injunction * * *.

"Irreparable harm and prejudice to the party that sought the injunction shall be conclusively and irrebuttably presumed upon proof of a violation or threatened violation of this section." R.C. 121.22(I)(3). The section also requires the court to award court costs and reasonable attorney fees. R.C. 121.22(I)(2)(a). Finally, "[a] member of a public body who knowingly violates an injunction issued pursuant to [R.C. 121.22(I)(1)] may be removed from office by an action brought in the court of common pleas for that purpose by the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general." R.C. 121.22(I)(4).

B. The present suit

{¶ 8} Appellant, Brian M. Ames, filed an action against appellee, Rootstown Township Board of Trustees, in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas in 2017. He alleged in 16 counts that the board violated the OMA on 16 separate occasions in 2015 and 2016, and he demanded "an injunction to compel the [board] to comply with the requirements of R.C. 121.22 in future meetings" as well as "a civil forfeiture and attorney's fees as provided by law for each count." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the board.

{¶ 9} On appeal, the Eleventh District affirmed in part and reversed in part. Ames v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2019-Ohio-5412, 151 N.E.3d 37 (11th Dist.) ("Ames I "). It found that the board did not violate the OMA at two of the

4

meetings identified in the complaint but that it did violate the OMA at the remaining 14 meetings. Six of the violations occurred at meetings held in 2015; of those violations, five occurred when the board entered into executive session to discuss legal issues with an attorney but in doing so, failed to identify one of the purposes for which an executive session is permitted under R.C. 121.22(G)(1) through (8). At the sixth meeting held in 2015, the board entered into executive session to discuss "employee discipline and pending litigation" but did so without an attorney present, contrary to the requirement of R.C. 121.22(G)(3) for discussions concerning pending litigation. The appellate court also found that the board violated the OMA on eight occasions in 2016 by entering into executive session to discuss economic development at eight separate meetings without satisfying the two conditions set out in R.C. 121.22(G)(8)(a) and (b). The court therefore concluded that summary judgment should have been granted for Ames on these 14 violations. It remanded the matter to the trial court for it to address the proper remedy for those violations.

{¶ 10} On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ames on the eight violations of R.C. 121.22(G)(8) committed in 2016. As a remedy, it enjoined the board from "conducting business in violation of R.C. 121.22(G)(8)(a)" and ordered the board to pay Ames a civil forfeiture of $500, plus $1,000 in attorney fees. It did not address the six violations of R.C. 121.22(G)(8) committed in 2015 and identified in Ames I.

{¶ 11} On appeal, the Eleventh District again reversed in part and affirmed in part. 2021-Ohio-1369 ("Ames II "). First, it affirmed the trial court's decision to issue one injunction and award one $500 civil forfeiture and $1,000 in attorney fees for the eight violations of R.C. 121.22(G)(8) committed in 2016. It relied on its holding in Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2007-G-2780, 2007-Ohio-6728. In that case, the trial court had found 20 violations of the OMA based on the public body's failure to specify in its meeting minutes the precise

5

reason why it had entered into executive session at 20 separate meetings. As a remedy for those 20 violations, the trial court issued one injunction and ordered one $500 civil forfeiture. Id. at ¶ 4-5. The Eleventh District affirmed in relevant part. It concluded that the violations were "technical" in nature, id. at ¶ 27, 30-relating only to the public body's "failure to fully specify its basis for entering executive session"-rather than violations based on formal actions of the public body while in executive session, id. at ¶ 30. There was also "no intent to conceal the overall purpose for entering executive session." Id. at ¶ 27. The plaintiff was therefore "entitled * * * to only one statutory injunction and one civil forfeiture." Id. at ¶ 30.

{¶ 12} In the present case, the Eleventh District reiterated its holding in Weisbarth, concluding that "when multiple technical violations are of the same nature, the remedy is one injunction and one...