Ames v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | David F. AMES and Sandy Ames, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Arizona and The Arizona Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellants. 6649. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The central issue raised on appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the filing of a notice of claim letter with the Governor, the Attorney General and the Arizona Corporation Commission, satisfied the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-821 which require a person having a claim against the State to give notice of such claim to the State before commencing an action against the State. We hold that the State of Arizona (State) received sufficient notice and therefore affirm the trial court's decision.
On October 1, 1979, David F. Ames (Ames) was injured in an automobile collision with a train at a railroad crossing near 22nd Avenue and McDowell Road in Phoenix. Before Ames filed a complaint against the State, he sent a notice of claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821 to the Arizona Corporation Commission, the Governor and the Attorney General of the State of Arizona. The Commission was notified because of its statutory responsibility, delineated in A.R.S. § 40-337, to approve and prescribe the character of railroad crossings over public highways. The notice of claim sent by Ames was not acknowledged by any of the three offices to which it was sent. However, Risk Management Services of the Department of Administration of the State of Arizona did acknowledge to Ames that it had received a forwarded copy of the notice.
Ames subsequently filed suit in September of 1980 against the State and the Arizona Corporation Commission, among others, alleging negligent failure to properly inspect, supervise and insure proper maintenance and operation of the warning signal.
During the course of discovery Ames learned that the 22nd Avenue and McDowell railroad crossing signal was a one-of-a-kind experimental device. Further inquiry revealed that the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) participated in the design, construction and maintenance of this particular experimental crossing device. This was the only crossing signal in the state with which ADOT had any connection.
In January of 1982 Ames filed an amended complaint adding ADOT as a defendant and alleging the negligent design, construction and maintenance of the railroad traffic control device. Ames never sent ADOT a notice of claim nor did his amended complaint allege that such notice was given to ADOT.
Prior to submission to the jury, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the Arizona Corporation Commission. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict against ADOT and the State and judgment was entered accordingly.
No issue has been raised on appeal by the State and ADOT attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings. The State's central contention is that Ames' failure to file the required notice of claim with ADOT and his failure to allege the same in his amended complaint, invalidated any claim which he might have had against the State. This argument was raised by the State at trial by way of a motion to dismiss, motion for directed verdict, motion for new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court rejected each of these motions.
The applicable statute authorizing claims against the State, A.R.S. § 12-821 1 reads as follows:
"Persons having claims ... for negligence against the state, which have been disallowed, may on the terms and conditions set forth in this article, bring action thereon against the state and prosecute the action to final judgment."
In State v. Brooks, 23 Ariz.App. 463, 534 P.2d 271 (1975), the Arizona Court of Appeals remarked that:
23 Ariz.App. at 466, 534 P.2d at 274.
The State argues that the failure of Ames to send a notice of claim to ADOT prior to adding ADOT as a party, deprived the State of an opportunity to investigate the merits of Ames' case against ADOT. The State points out that the amended complaint contained the first formal mention of ADOT in connection with the suit. In addition, the amended complaint contained allegations concerning negligent design and construction which had not been raised in the original complaint. It is urged that these new allegations significantly changed the issues of the case.
The State contends that the amended complaint in fact constituted an entirely new claim against the previously unidentified state agency. As such, according to the State, A.R.S. § 12-821 required that a notice of claim be filed with ADOT and that ADOT be given a chance to investigate and grant or disallow the claim, prior to the prosecution of this action. The State cites dicta in Brooks to support this contention. "In our opinion, the procedure to be followed is to file the claim with the state agency whose action or non-action gave rise to the liability creating event ...." 23 Ariz.App. at 467, 534 P.2d at 275. While it may be good practice to give notice to the particular agency involved in the dispute, the above-cited comment in Brooks is dicta and as such does not carry the force of law. See Hernandez v. Yuma County, 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271 (1962).
We note that the State has raised no issue concerning the sufficiency of the information contained in the notice which Ames had previously sent to the Governor, the Attorney General and to the Arizona Corporation Commission. A notice of claim "must contain enough information to allow the State ... [to] conscientiously allow or disallow the claim." Brooks, 23 Ariz.App. at 466, 534 P.2d at 274. Assuming, as we must, that the substance of the claim was sufficient, it is our opinion that the State had ample notice and time to investigate the accident and determine its best course of action in dealing with Ames' claim after the receipt of Ames' notice of claim.
There are several reasons for our conclusion. First, it is the State, and not an agency thereof, which is the real party in interest. 2 Ames provided a notice of claim to the chief executive officer of the State, the chief legal officer of the State, and to the agency nominally in charge of overseeing and insuring the safety of railroad crossings. At the time that the notice of claim was sent Ames did not know, nor could he reasonably have known of ADOT's significance in this action. Ames could not...
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